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Abstract
This thesis explores the online practices of two groups: a group of political exiles from 
Sudan and the other an alternative media organisation, to examine how people construct 
meanings of democracy. Both groups use online technologies to archive, reproduce, 
advocate, build arguments, and maintain and expand their social and political networks and 
offer democratic alternatives in politically restrictive environments. Key results from the 
research show that online political culture, at least as it is practiced by the groups in this 
study, are burgeoning novel definitions of democracy and disrupting or ignoring established, 
liberal models.
The research reported on in the thesis is based on a 24-month qualitative study of online 
and offline discursive practices. Fieldwork involved participatory work with Democracy Now!, 
an independent news programme based in New York City and broadcast on television and 
radio, with a growing online presence, and the Republican Brothers, a Sufi brother and 
sisterhood in exile from Sudan, with many members now living in the United Kingdom and 
the United States.
Much of the literature about online democracy has focused on either established democratic 
political institutions, such as parliament or elections, or on deliberative sites, such as 
political news groups. Most research in the e-democracy literature assumes a liberal 
democratic model as the basis for online democracy. While this research has made 
important progress in establishing how social scientists can study democracy online and to 
expand discussions on public spheres, pluralism, and mediated political communication, 
many studies have produced mixed results on how well online technologies support and 
extend political culture.
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Arabic Glossary
Arabic Transliteration English
(al-Ghurba) Alienation
(Baraka) Blessing
(al-Mahaba) Bond of love
2&jla (Tariqa) Brotherhood (Sufi religious order)
(al-Rukun) Discussion corner1
(al-Mahdi) The Expected One, Messiah, 
saviour
pjs (Karam) Generosity
(al-Ma'arifa) Knowledge
fcWJ (Ijma) Consensus
(Ijtihad) Independent interpretation
n \ i (Qaada) Leaders
ja l£ (Kaffir) Nonbeliever (very insulting)
(Jalsat salat) Prayer meeting
(zikr) Repetitive prayers or chants, a 
meeting for chanting (related to the 
word for “remembrance”)
(al-Jumhuriyya) Republican Brothers
illmVl (al-Ustadh) Revered teacher
1 The term is not an exact translation from Arabic but it is a translation of how the Republicans use the word.
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(Fatwa)
(Fitna)
(Shura)
(al-Sawt)
(Inshad)
(al-Fikr)
(Wavd)
(al-Kitaba)
Scholarly opinion on Islam, official 
opinion on Islamic doctrine
Sedition
Consultation 
Sound or voice
Spirituals (usually a repetitive 
chanting of the name Allah sung and 
accompanied with music, especially 
with the oud, a string instrument 
similar to the guitar)
Thought
Travelling political or social group 
Writing, handwriting
Terms and acronyms
Blog
Cable access 
DUP
Indymedia
FCC
NIF
NPR
Podcasting
SCP
Umma Party 
WTO
From “weblog”, a web-based diary or journal, regularly updated and 
hyperlinked to other online references, especially news information. 
The defining feature of a blog is the annotated references made by 
the blogger and thus most blogs are more about providing points- 
of-view on news events than simply providing information.
Under the Federal Communications Commission, all cable 
companies must provide one station for free public use in 
each community in which it operates. Generally cable 
access stations provide free or low-cost training on 
broadcast equipment and television production to community 
groups wanting to produce shows. The content of cable 
access shows are mandated to serve the public interest in 
some way.
Democratic Unionist Party, the political party of the 
Khatimiyya religious order.
Independent Media Centers, a primarily online media-based social 
movement. The movement is made up of 164 autonomous centres 
in approximately 56 countries, with the United States containing the 
most centres (60) for one country.
Federal Communications Commission
National Islamic Front (The Muslim Brothers)
National Public Radio
Broadcasting on MP3 files that can be downloaded to personal 
digital MP3 players. While podcasting got its start with independent 
bloggers, the software and technology is increasingly being 
adapted by commercial or mainstream media outlets, including the 
BBC, Democracy Now!, NBC, and NPR.
Sudan Communist Party
The political party of the Ansar or Mahdiyya religious order.
World Trade Organisation
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Introduction
Figure 1.1 American Progress (1872) John Gast
“We have no option but to be interested in constructing buildings; at the 
same time, we have no choice but to place, in full view of our buildings, 
the vision of the Unbuilt— ‘the foundation of possible things’, other 
foundations, other alternative worlds. Perhaps, then, we will not forget to 
measure Progress from the ground, from other perspectives, other 
possible foundations, even when we vainly believe that we are, 
ourselves, standing at the top of the tower”
— Homi Bhabha, Democracy De-realized (2003: 34)
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1.1 The Unbuilt
Looking at this allegorical nineteenth-century image painted to celebrate Progress in her 
American incarnation, let us, for a moment, ignore certain elements of the piece, such as 
the blatant cultural and racist biases that are too easy and obvious to critique. Instead I 
would like to draw attention to how technology and Progress are interacting in the painting. 
Progress carries the new communications technology of Gast’s time, the telegraph invented 
in Britain in 1840 (1844 in the US) and linked the American coasts by 1861, in her left hand 
and in her right she carries a school book. This is very significant: the harbingers of 
Progress, at least according to Gast, are information and communication technologies. 
Without information and the means to distribute and exchange it, progress is not possible. 
After that, all other technologies follow.
Behind Progress locomotives penetrate a heretofore savage and wild land, tamed 
by their tracks. Farmers with agricultural technologies till the earth alongside her, hoeing 
paths to new markets for their produce and ploughing forward through the soil toward their 
destinies. Within the American context of this allegory Progress moves from East to West 
leaving the Old World, not only of the East Coast but also of Europe and its political 
traditions, its old hierarchies and ways of thinking behind for the vision and promise of the 
New World that is cleansed (of its original inhabitants) and remade as a tabula rasa. With 
Progress technology, information and capital come entwined and move in a linear fashion to 
organize, order, and unify a chaotic frontier yet a frontier, also, of infinite possibilities.
This allegory of Progress could be symbolic on an additional level, one that Gast 
perhaps did not originally intend explicitly but nonetheless exists in the popular imagination 
about information and technology. Progress brings with her not only information, technology, 
and capital but also democracy to a world filled with chaos. Information and its distribution is 
said to be a fundamental characteristic of a liberal democracy; a free market of ideas. A 
utopian vision that has nothing to do with how we live our lives—why should it, a utopia is an 
ideal, not a reality—yet it is a vision that is peddled nonetheless with each new technology 
that comes on the market since the beginnings of print, through to the telephone, to 
broadcast, and now to the Internet.
Contrast Gast’s vision of Progress, a vision within which Gast assumes implicitly 
that we are already living, with Homi Bhabha’s commentary on Progress within the context
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of humanity’s endless pursuit of democracy. Bhabha, a cultural theorist who writes on the 
postcolonial condition primarily in India, tells us that we should always maintain a utopian 
vision of democracy, but that we must make it an explicit and separate vision, to remind us 
of what we have not yet attained and of what could be possible, as we plod up the ladders, 
carrying bricks on our backs to finish our Tower of Babel. He is also saying that this vision, 
“the foundation of possible things”, affords different vantage points to consider this tower 
that we are building, so that we might see that our tower is building up to nowhere (34). If 
Bhabha is suggesting that the buildings that we build are a vision of unity, then the Unbuilt is 
vision of disunity, not only in its multiplicity of perspectives but also by suggesting that the 
Unbuilt must remain forever unconstructed; it is something that we continue to strive for and 
a goal that is never attainable. It is through a plurality of angles and the unreachable ideal 
that we can see our buildings, our societies, for what they really are.
These two visions of Progress are a good starting point to explore some of the 
issues that this thesis will raise on democracy and communications technologies primarily 
because they are exemplars of the two main positions across the sociological field 
examining “e-democracy”. One prevalent thread makes the claim that the unfulfilled promise 
of democracy can be realised through new communication technologies. This is premised 
on the assertion that it is through information and the means to distribute and exchange it 
that makes a democratic society possible. One follows from the other: the technology will 
invigorate democratic culture, not the other way around. This could be considered to be a 
unifying vision of communication technologies’ role in democratic processes since it neatly 
wraps up both democracy and technology into a monolithic ideal. The other is a vision that 
suggests disunity, fragmentation and a more complex picture of the relationship. In this 
vision, there is no central democratic public but rather a network of contestatory publics and 
counterpublics connected through new communication technologies (Warner 2002).
1.2 Questions of democracy, technology and information
Each technological innovation, and in the case of this thesis, specifically communication or 
information technologies—from the emergence of print via the printing press to digitised 
information through computer networks—can be said to have gone through an invention
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cycle (Winston 1998). Throughout the cycle there are struggles over the design and 
implementation of the technology, suppressions of competing innovations, uncertainties 
over which rival technology will win out and how the technology will diffuse and be adopted 
on a large scale. The social and political contexts of development fundamentally form and 
shape the arch of technological innovation. For each significant technological innovation, 
humankind is said to enter a new stage: Stone, Bronze, Iron, Print, Steam, Information. 
Included in the rhetoric that surrounds a technological innovation is the assertion that 
innovation invariably leads us progressively forward and that we will live better having that 
innovation than at any other time in our history. Part of the cycle, certainly, includes 
hyperbole about how a particular innovation with profoundly transform society (Winston 
1998:2-3). Along with the initial exuberance that surrounds an innovation, a society’s 
meanings, hopes and fears become deeply embedded into the technological artefact.
One of the aims of this thesis is, therefore, to address some of these meanings that 
people give technologies, especially communication technologies. Communication 
technologies are quite often positioned to strengthen democracy, for example, and much 
scholarship is dedicated to explaining the links between technological usages and the 
revitalisation of democratic institutions. A relatively recent phenomenon has been to link 
democratic meaning to the Internet, as the technology’s development and diffusion has 
increased since the 1980s and more speculation and research has been focused on the 
potentials of this particular technology. So strong is this hope for the democratic promise of 
the Internet that e-democracy initiatives continue to spring up, flush with government 
money. In November 2005, for instance, the UK government launched its “e-Democracy 
National Project” fulfilling a goal in the government’s overall e-government strategy, which 
began in 2002, to engage citizens online by the end of 20052. This project, still in its early 
stages, represents a small part of a much larger strategy that has taken four years of 
planning and iterative steps to implement. The UK strategy is only one of many across the 
globe being initiated by both governments and civic organisations.
2 More information on the e-Democracy National Project can be found at: www.e-democracy.gov.uk. The 
strategy was initially launched in November 2002 with the publication of the National Strategy for Local 
Government by the Office of the Prime Minister.
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“A Two-Way Conversation: New technology has the power to change the 
way in which councils engage and work with their citizens; local e- 
Democracy can open the door to a genuine, two-way dialogue and deliver 
democratic renewal from the grass roots up” (Office of the Prime Minister 
2005, www.e-democracy.gov.uk).
As this quote from the front page of the e-Democracy website demonstrates, many of these 
e-democracy strategies spearheaded by governments are premised on an implicit 
assumption that there is something inherent in the very technological quality of the Internet 
that will invigorate and enliven the relationship between political institutions and citizens.
The other assumption inherent here is that citizens want to engage with politics online in the 
first place; the possibility that they may not be interested in politics at all, rarely comes up.
Communication technologies, from the emergence of print to the Internet, are said to 
share a common ontological quality that with each innovation increases in its strength: the 
diffusion of political power from institutions to the mass of society, to the grassroots. The 
Internet is said to occupy the enviable position of empowering people to participate in 
democracy like no other communications technology to come before it due to its ability to 
flatten information and communications hierarchies that pervades the technology. Due to its 
accessibility and lower bars of entry, both in terms of producing and accessing information, 
unlike broadcast or print production, these empowering qualities are said to be inherent in 
Internet technologies. While all communication technologies are said to have this quality- 
enabling a user to commute from one place to another via a road or to communicate from 
one person to another via a letter or newspaper— the Internet is said to have an 
unprecedented reach and power, and this means something for political culture, especially 
democracy. An early proponent of the democratic potential of the Internet, George Landow, 
ontologically links communication technologies’ “built-in power” to distribute information and 
knowledge to democracy:
“The history of information technology from writing to hypertext reveals an 
increasing democratization or dissemination of power. Writing begins this 
process, for by exteriorizing memory it converts knowledge from the
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possession of one to the possession of more than one.... The democratic 
thrust of information technologies derives from their diffusing information 
and the power that such diffusion can produce” (Landow 1992:174; cited 
in Trend 1997:155).
While virtually every new communications technology has been endowed with 
transformative qualities to change the very nature of politics and alter the diffusion of power 
in societies by the meanings that people give them, the Internet has come to symbolise the 
equalising and democratising technology par excellence. What makes the Internet more 
empowering to its users than earlier innovations? Some say it is the lowered bars of entry 
for producers of information; any one with access to a computer, to a phone or cable line 
and who has something to say can publish online. Once access to the technology is solved, 
it is much cheaper to publish online than to print a newspaper or to broadcast a radio or 
television programme. Those who believe that it is the Internet’s easier access that makes it 
a powerful democratic tool would point to the recent explosion in do-it-yourself (DIY) online 
media such as blogs and podcasts, as well as the Internet-based independent media 
movements and organisations as evidence that the Internet is indeed an information 
equaliser. No longer are we relegated to be simply “passive consumers” of news information 
nor does news information need to be mediated by mainstream media. Now with nothing 
more than a laptop and a wireless card we all can be journalists and take back the media 
from big news corporations which are considered the definers of news events. Others might 
say that the Internet is democratic in the way it allows users to access information from a 
variety of sources and would highlight the growth in news indexers, search engines and 
portals that enable users to find articles from news sources from all over the world. While I 
cannot address all of these issues within the limitations of this thesis, these are some of the 
assumptions and meanings that I seek to question, explore, complicate and challenge.
1.3 Goals and realities of this thesis
While clearly there have been immense changes in how people access and distribute 
information, organise themselves into social and political movements and engage in political 
debates brought about, in part, by the widespread usage of the Internet, it is much more
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difficult to make a facile leap to the technology “finally empowering” us and fulfilling all of the 
broken promises of democracy. This thesis, therefore, takes as its starting point a question 
about the link between a communications technology and democracy. It explores the 
experiences of Internet users and how they construct its meanings and roles in democratic 
cultures. Within the thesis, the contending interpretations of new information technologies 
and what they mean for people in relation to democratic cultures are addressed.
Specifically, through focusing on the uses of the Internet, information, news and dialogue 
among two groups, the research reflects on the meanings that people give to the political 
discourse that occurs on the Internet in bulletins boards and in online news sites, and 
considers how political identities are constructed through these discourses. Both how the 
Internet should be shaped and deployed in societies (should it be free or censored, for 
instance) and what democracy is, are highly contentious and this is precisely why both are 
so valuable to study, because they both represent struggles over meanings and 
interpretations.
1.3.1 Research questions
This study, which is focused primarily on two groups of people who employ web-based 
technologies to engage in political discourse, aims to be a response to calls for new 
understandings to be developed in e-democracy based on empirical evidence. In choosing 
the two groups, the first a small group of political exiles from Sudan and the other, a small, 
American independent news programme with an Internet presence, the aim was to explore 
what Internet-based political discourse means for people who either are or perceive 
themselves to be outside of a democratic political institution. Most research on Internet use 
and democracy has focused on users who either are engaging in online discourse with other 
users for purposes of participating in institutionalised politics, such as around election 
campaigns or referenda, or to engage directly with government and political institutions. Not 
very many sociological works in e-democracy exist that examine peoples’ online 
engagements outside of institutionalised politics, nor is there much scholarship that focuses 
on how people interpret online “democratic culture” or how they construct the meanings that 
they give to democracy and the Internet. Are Internet users really using the technology in 
the ways that are envisioned by the hyperbolic claims made about the Internet? In other
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words, is it a technology that is finally giving a “voice to the voiceless” and enabling 
“ordinary people” to finally engage, from a position of empowerment, in the political systems 
in which they live? Surely one technology cannot promise all of that, can it?
1.3.2 About the study
This thesis represents ethnographic research that was conducted over two years in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. During the study I spent time with two groups, the 
Republican Brothers and Democracy Now!. The Republican Brothers is a small political and 
religious group, a Sufi brotherhood, originally founded in 1945 in Khartoum, Sudan. The 
Republican Brothers was organised to challenge the British colonial occupation of the 
country and after Sudanese independence in 1956, the movement transformed to a 
religious order and maintained a small but influential presence in the political environment 
during the post-independence decades. From 1985 to 1989 many Republican members 
were forced into exile because of the continued dangerous political conditions in Sudan. It is 
with this group of Republican exiles that I conducted most of the interviews for this research. 
Democracy Now! started out in 1996 as small radio programme on Pacifica Radio, an 
independent US broadcaster, to provide daily election coverage of the 1996 US presidential 
race. Since its founding it has mushroomed to a multimedia news organisation with radio 
and television broadcast and online programmes, and has a reach to over 420 North 
American broadcast stations and stations in Europe through the Internet. I spent two years 
conducting fieldwork with both groups and the data that I collected during that time is 
reported on in this thesis.
1.4 Chapters in brief
The thesis is organised in two parts, a review of the literature and a presentation of new 
findings. The first half addresses the literatures and theories on information technologies, 
the role of news journalism and media analysis, and democratic models. In the second 
portion of the thesis, the empirical research is reported on.
Chapter Two. Three Models of Democracy: Liberal. Islamic and Radical addresses 
three theories of democracy, liberal, Islamic and radical. The chapter begins with an
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exploration into a few of the conceptual dilemmas that arise during debates on the nature of 
democracy. From there the discussion follows some of the dilemmas raised, specifically 
about individualism and freedom of speech, to discuss the liberal and Islamic models of 
democracy. Based on the feminist critiques of liberal democracy, I examine the debates on 
deliberative democracy and the synthesis of liberalism and socialism as proposed by 
theorists of radical democracy.
Chapter Three. The Fourth Estate: Journalism and Information in Democracies 
traces the development of news journalism in Western societies, and how news and 
information have become intertwined with theories about democracy. In the discussion 
about the role of journalism in democracy, I focus on the recent development of civic 
journalism, the growth of professionalised journalistic practices, especially the notion of 
“objectivity”, the Fourth Estate and sociological analysis of media ideology. These 
discussions about the role of journalism are relevant not only to the later chapters of the 
thesis, especially Chapter Eight, but also to understand better how theorists of e-democracy 
conceptualise the crisis of political communication and how the Internet might alleviate 
some of the alienating effects that they see as endemic to communication mediated by 
journalism.
Chapter Four. A Fourth Wav? E-democracv follows the development of e- 
democracy over the past three decades since it was first proposed in the early 1970s. I 
examine the two main streams of the e-democracy literature: e-government, or online 
mediated engagement with institutionalised politics and e-deliberation, or online political 
discourse among private citizens about organised politics. This review of the e-democracy 
literature also shows the value in researching online democratic discourse offline, as most 
studies have limited their research to online phenomena only. This thesis aims to address 
empirically this gap which continues to present rich opportunities for further research.
Chapter Five. Methods presents the data and analytical methods utilised in this 
thesis. Chapters Six to Eight address the two empirically separate but theoretically linked 
studies and in this chapter I describe in detail the two groups that I researched, how I gained 
access and dealt with ethical dilemmas that arose during the research. I also discuss my 
rationale for choosing to use an ethnographic approach to the research.
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Chapter Six, Republican Brothers in Sudan and in Exile introduces the first group 
under study in the thesis, the Republican Brothers. I present the social, political and 
historical contexts in which the Sufi brotherhood was operating in Sudan before its exile. 
Close attention is paid to the discursive culture and identity that they developed through 
their public speeches and discussions as well as their print production.
Chapter Seven. The Republican Brothers Online continues the study on the 
Republican Brothers and the discursive culture they developed, now in exile and online. I 
examine how being in exile and online presents unexpected dilemmas for the group as well 
as a perceived disruption to an identity that they cherish and endeavour to protect. I also 
explore how they interpret online political discussion and how these discussions are 
configured into a Sudanese model of democracy.
Chapter Eight An Alternative Voice in the Wilderness: Democracy Now! looks at the 
second group studied in this thesis, Democracy Now!, a small but influential independent 
news programme operating out of New York City. In this chapter I examine the short history 
of the programme and how it fits into the larger contexts of American media politics. I 
analyse how Democracy Now! journalists construct their roles as such in American 
democratic culture and how their use of Internet technologies either expand on or contradict 
their perceived roles. Special attention is paid to the rhetorical strategies employed in the 
discourses of the journalists online, in print and in recorded speeches to distinguish 
themselves from what they call “access media" or American mainstream news media.
Chapter Nine Democracy’s Contested Imaqinaries synthesises the sociological 
literature on democratic theories, information, media and journalism and e-democracy. This 
chapter recapitulates the research questions and shows how this thesis challenges the 
existing literature on e-democracy. A brief return to the empirical chapters is made to 
highlight the significant points to emerge from the research.
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2 Three Models of Democracy: Liberal, Islamic and 
Radical
What do we mean by the term “democracy”? Does democracy mean the same thing for all 
societies, for all people, all the time or does it have multiple and disputed meanings? If it 
does have disputed meanings or its meanings are contingent, how can we talk about 
democracy online if we don’t know what definition of democracy we are working with? 
Therefore, before we can talk about e-democracy, we need to understand better the 
conceptual frameworks within which we are working, we need an exploration of some of the 
debates that have been occurring over defining what makes a democratic society. But in our 
attempt to define what democracy means, we need to get beyond empty platitudes such as 
“freedom” and “liberty” that function as shorthand words that say little about what we are 
trying to understand.
Within this chapter I begin with the more general topics on Western liberal 
democracy and compare these with the debates on democracy as theorised in Islamic 
thought since it is significant to the context of my thesis. An examination of both Western 
and Islamic democratic theories is also important since, as I will show later in this chapter, 
the debate over what democracy is has been overshadowed by Western conceptions of the 
idea and by examining alternative systems, I hope to present a somewhat more complicated 
vision of democracy. I will also examine more recent thinking on critical theory’s response to 
liberal democracy: radical democracy.
2.1 Democracy’s conceptual problems
What makes a society democratic? Is it how political elections are carried out, is it how 
effectively elected officials respond to their constituents, is it the number of citizens’ rights 
that are enshrined in a constitution that make it democratic? Is it more libertarian and 
individualistic qualities that make a democratic society, such as the presence of an open
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market economy with few government interventions interfering with what comes “naturally” 
when capitalists are allowed to buy, sell, and force open new markets?
Part of the problem with talking about democracy as both a concept as well as a 
system of practice is that it is necessarily a highly contested and elusive idea. Would you 
recognise a democracy if you saw one, what would it look like, can you honestly think of a 
democracy, as you define it, that exists today? One characteristic that is said to make up 
democracy is governance by the people. Some believe that representative governance or 
direct governance, a system where elected officials enact the will of the people or a 
participatory system where lots are drawn from ordinary citizens to run government, as it 
was practiced in ancient Athens, are some features that make societies democratic. If you 
go for a representative government where officials are charged with the responsibility of 
executing the wishes of their constituents, is it still a democracy if only less than half of 
eligible voters voted, and of those who did vote, a paper-thin majority voted for those who 
end up in office, leaving the large minority of voters to be represented by officials that they 
feel are not qualified to represent them?3 And of those who did not vote, why not? Some 
might say this is due to eligible voters having little or no access to information to make an 
informed decision to vote, or that it is due to voter malaise, or even that it is a protest 
against the poor choices of politicians for whom to vote. Or it could be that would be voters 
are just not interested.
Let’s take another characteristic often attributed to making a society a democratic 
one, freedom of expression, the freedom for citizens to deliberate on issues that concern 
them in a space free from state control or coercion. Some question if a society is still 
democratic if only a small number of voices are able to speak and be heard, such as when 
large media conglomerates own both the ability to produce and distribute news and 
information, or if there is simply an indecipherable din of voices or opinions in this space,
3 In the 2000 US Presidential elections, an average of 41 percent of the eligible voters cast a ballot (Source: 
United States Elections Project (2004) http://elections.gmu.edu). Of course, this presidential election was said 
to have not been won but stolen, where President Bush’s Democratic opponent, Al Gore, won the general 
election but lost the race only after the US Supreme Court declared Bush the winner when the results of the 
Florida race were disputed. Bush won by five votes in the Electoral College (see CNN). For another example 
see the 21 April 2002 first round prime ministerial elections in France that, due to voter apathy, gave extreme- 
right and nationalist candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen 18 percent of the vote, which sent shockwaves across 
France. Le Pen subsequently lost to Jacques Chirac, his victory is attributed to the highest ever voter turnout 
since 1958 to ensure that Le Pen did not win in the second round (See CNN 5-6 May 2002).
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such as the plethora of online bulletin boards and chat rooms (Barber 1997; McChesney 
1999). Is it still a democratic society when, hiding behind the rights of free expression, a 
radio journalist encourages citizens to pick up machetes and hack their neighbours to death 
or when a narrowly focused interest group publishes a hit list on their website, complete with 
home addresses and daily schedules of those on the list?4
I take these examples of what some might say make societies democratic, that is, a 
government by the people and the freedom for people to access information, to form 
political opinions and to express them publicly, to discuss further some of the current 
theories on democracy. As I will demonstrate through the following exploration of some of 
the fundamental ideas on democracy, theorising around these concepts is a much easier 
task than pinning them down in practice. Yet in my attempt to demonstrate some of 
democracy’s conundrums I do not want to provide normative definitions of what democracy 
is. Perhaps by providing some examples of conceptual dilemmas as they exist in societies 
that are considered democratic, we can have these examples in mind as we consider what 
democracy means as well as clarify my own position as to what is particularly concerning to 
me in the context of this thesis. Having said that, in general I am less interested in 
examining established, official political institutions of the status quo, such as parliaments or 
congresses, and how they relate to their constituents. Rather my interest is centred on the 
political culture of democracy, the subaltern publics that engage with each other and with 
institutions that have the power to legislate and mediate; not only governments or “the state” 
but also other power positions, such as corporations and media groups that guard and 
protect their power status in societies. ^
Democracy pared down to its origin of meaning, “demos”, is defined as “the people” 
and “kratos” means “rule or power” in ancient Greek, and means rule by the people
4 On 3 December 2003, two Rwandan journalists, Ferdinand Nahimana of Radio Television Libres des Mille 
Collines (RTLM) and Hassan Ngeze, editor of the newspaper Karangura, were sentenced to life imprisonment 
and a third journalist, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza also from RTLM, received a 35-year sentence for using their 
broadcasts and newspaper to incite the 1994 genocide. More than 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis and 
moderate Hutus, were killed in 100 days (see The Guardian A Dec. 2003).
The Nuremberg Files, a radical antiabortion website based in the United States, publishes in a hit list the 
names, addresses and other personal data, such as daily work schedules of doctors who perform abortions. 
Three doctors who appeared on the list were killed and the day following their murders, their names were 
crossed through in red. On 28 March 2001, after a two-year court battle to close down the website, the 9th US 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the website was protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution 
(see The Washington Post 29 March 2001).
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(Arblaster 2002:16; Dahl 1989:3). As I will show in the following examples however, “rule 
by the people” is an ideal rather than a practice, and indeed, in many instances it is an 
unfavoured ideal. Some argue that demos has a more ambivalent meaning and can either 
signify the citizen body or the poor masses (Farrar 1992:19). This ambivalence is evident in 
arguments about whether democracy is actually a desirable condition for a society to exist 
in. Arguments against democracy were made by Plato, who was famously opposed to 
democracy in the sense of universal and pluralistic governance and from the Enlightenment 
thinkers who believed in civil liberties—for property-owners, that is—through to the framers 
of the American constitution in 1787. The leaders of the American Revolution, popularly 
considered the beginning of modern democracy, did not trust the masses to be reasonable 
enough to rule and thus limited democratic participation to an elite, property-owning 
(including the ownership of other human beings), male and white minority (Arblaster 2002; 
Dahl 1989; Lessig 1999). Benjamin Franklin, one of America’s Enlightenment thinkers who 
helped to draft the Articles of Confederation that are the foundation of the US Constitution, 
was inspired by Native American democratic cultural and political organisations and drew 
upon some aspects of the Iroquois League’s democratic principles to write the Articles, but 
he consciously left out their most fundamental one: the direct consensus of all citizens 
(Trend 1996:9). For literally millennia, the idea that the “masses” should govern themselves 
was an abhorrent one, with the development of what some call modern democracy 
progressing in fits and starts well into eighteenth century. Statesmen and philosophers such 
as Thomas Jefferson, John Stuart Mill and Edmund Burke, to name a few, all denounced a 
form of democracy that would allow direct participation by all citizens but rather each called 
for varying degrees of representative democracy (Arblaster 2002). Part of the fear of direct 
democracy is that majority rule will inevitably turn to despotism. In his criticism of the 
Virginian legislature, for instance, Thomas Jefferson said: “One hundred seventy three 
despots would surely be as oppressive as one... an elective despotism is not the 
government we fought for” (quoted in Arblaster 2002:38).
The American Civil Rights Movement’s struggle for the universal protection of 
human rights exemplifies what Jefferson feared, and serves to demonstrate an ongoing 
tension between two concepts in democratic theory: the will of the majority versus the 
protection of the rights of the individual. The tyranny of the majority was apparent in the
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trampling on basic human and individual rights of Jim Crow laws of the American southern 
states in place from 1890 to 1965. These local laws mandated the segregation of black and 
white people in public and private facilities and were reinforced by the US Supreme Court in 
1883 by its overturning the Civil Rights Act of 1876. In its ruling the Supreme Court argued 
that the 14th Amendment, which guarded against discrimination, could only be enforced for 
issues of discrimination by the state, and not for those committed by private individuals. The 
persistent social exclusion suffered by black Americans was thus codified into law. The civil 
rights struggles of black Americans serve not only as an example of the tyranny of the 
majority but also where social exclusion contradicts constitutional rights; black (male) 
Americans had the right to vote since 1870 with the passing of the 15th Amendment (black 
women enjoyed suffrage in 1921 with the 19th Amendment) but were denied it since they 
were terrorised by white violence and many voting rights activists were killed if they tried to 
register black Southerners to vote.
The Civil Rights Movement not only challenged state law in regards to segregation, 
a significant challenge in a federal system, but also reversed social exclusion by violence 
and “tradition” so that black Americans could act upon their constitutional rights, like the 
right to vote, and participate in the “demos”. The success of the movement, moreover, 
proved that there are no “natural” rights prior to society and its historical contexts, but that 
human and individual rights are carved out by a process based on conflict and 
confrontation, and not one based on a democratic system of consensus and coercive unity. 
These hard won rights moreover require a constant vigilance in their protection. While there 
has been much progress since the Civil Rights Movement in constitutionally guaranteeing 
the human rights of black Americans, many are still not able to fully participate in American 
democracy as a result of continued racist exclusion from educational, political and economic 
opportunities, for example, as is evidenced by the allegations of widespread election fraud 
committed in both American presidential elections in 2000 and 20045. In fact inclusiveness 
in the “demos” has been out of reach for a majority of people throughout the history of
5 For a detailed analysis of the ongoing legal suits against the state of Florida for widespread intimidation and 
disenfranchisement of black Floridian voters, see The Guardian's Greg Palast’s five-year coverage of both 
elections. For more information about voter intimidation and election fraud in the 2004 presidential elections, 
this time in Ohio, see "Preserving democracy: What went wrong in Ohio." The US House of Representatives, 
House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff, Washington DC, 5 January 2005. Available for download at: 
www.house.gov/judiciary_democrats/ohiostatusrept1505.pdf.
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democracy either because of acts of constitutional law or by social exclusion or both. In 
Switzerland, for example, as late as 1971, women were disenfranchised from the 
democratic process by their country’s constitution. It wasn’t until that year that they were 
legally allowed the vote and of course it was the same case for all black South Africans in 
1994 (Pateman 1989:211; Worden 2000:160). So even where there are representative, 
democratic, albeit non-inclusive, political systems firmly in place, tyranny can still prevail. In 
the next section I will explore more the models of modern democracy but here let me 
conclude on the concept of “rule by the people” by saying that this fundamental idea, as with 
all the other ideas in democratic theories, has been contested and the ideal of a pluralistic, 
inclusive democratic rule has rarely, if ever, been realised.
Democracy means more than suffrage for most political theorists (and for that 
matter non-theorists), however, and the rule of law, the recognition for and protection of civil 
rights, and the presence of civil institutions, including not only churches or community 
organisations but also, for some thinkers, a market-based economy, are all argued to 
constitute a democratic society. Political scientist Anthony Arblaster points out that, 
“...democracy necessarily has implications for social life, and is better regarded as a way of 
life, and a way of running a whole society, than a mere political device or method” (2002:
60). Yet, concepts about the definition of democracy become even more muddled when 
terms like “choice” or “freedom” enter into the debate. Part of the confusion often arises 
when terms around democratic practice are conflated with terms describing capitalism. This 
is hardly surprising given that the revolutions in European thought and societies, and the 
spread of these changes to other parts of the world sparked the move from feudalism to 
democratic governance which enabled the growth of the fledgling capitalist economic 
system and the advancement of capitalist states (Barber 2003). The lexicon of market 
economics permeates the conceptual terminology of democracy and has taken over 
discussions of online democracy as I will show in Chapter Four. It is often said that 
democracies contain within them a “free market of ideas” and the media are necessary in 
the trading, selling and buying of information. The free market, however, is not democracy 
and indeed it is antithetical to it. Democratic political theorist Benjamin Barber asserts that 
“[mjarket relations are simply not a surrogate for social relations, let alone for democratic 
social relations” and that capitalist economies are solely dependent upon the subsidies, tax
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incentives and robust private sector that democratic governments provide for their success 
(Barber 2003:237-238). While capitalism did broaden certain freedoms in democracies, 
argues Ralph Miliband, “capitalism, for most of its history, was not associated with 
democracy in any sense at all; and that most of the conservative and liberal defenders of 
the system were utterly determined to oppose the advancement of democratic reforms” 
(Miliband 1994:24, italics in the original). Indeed as I have already shown, the freedoms 
and individual rights enjoyed in and often attributed to advanced “capitalist democracies” 
were not secured by those in management, ownership or government but hard fought for 
and won by minority rights and labour movements. Left theorists of democracy often critique 
the rhetoric of democracy positioned as a straw man by advocates of the neo-liberal free 
market, such as economists Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, and those politicians who 
have adapted their economic theories to determine and justify policy, so much so that “... 
the confidence in the omnipotence of markets has been transformed into a foreign policy 
that assumes internationalising markets is tantamount to democratising them” (Barber 2003: 
239). As I will show in Chapter Four which explores e-democracy, the rhetoric that frames 
the democratic potentials of online technologies is often similar to the discussions that 
conceptualise democracy as a “free market”.
2.2 Liberal and Islamic models of democracy
There are several examples of democratic political systems before the democratic 
revolutions that swept through Europe in the 17th century and a century later in North 
America: the Sumerian city-states had organised assemblies; Europe’s oldest, working 
parliaments, the Tynwald founded in the early ninth century on the Isle of Man and the 
Althingi, established in Iceland in 930; and the Iroquois League established in 1450 to end 
warfare and which successfully kept the peace among the League’s five nations for 325 
years, are just a few (Bookchin 2005; Friedman 1979; Rousseau and Mueller 1995). I would 
like my focus here, however, to remain on the Western liberal democratic model as it has 
developed in the past century since this is within the scope of my thesis and it is the model 
that has been most criticised by both advocates of Islamically based and radical democracy. 
Furthermore, it is often a Western, liberal democratic model that is used to conceptualise e-
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democracy. In subsequent chapters, primarily in Chapters Six and Seven which concentrate 
on the Republican Brothers, I will pay closer attention to the history and model of Islamic 
democracy as proposed by Mahmoud Mohamed Taha. I will present here an introduction to 
a few key concepts in order to define the differences between the Western liberal and 
Islamic models of democracy.
2.2.1 Liberal individualism and consensus
Although there is much debate among philosophers, theorists, political scientists, and 
sociologists as to the different forms that a democracy can and should take, when debates 
on what democracy is take place in larger public forums outside of academia (but also 
within), such as in mainstream media, often the definitional framework to discuss 
“democracy” is modelled upon liberal democratic theory as it has developed in the West. As 
Carole Pateman argues not only is the term “democracy” assumed to mean “liberal 
democracy” but that the two terms themselves are often conflated. To avoid these blind 
spots when conceptualising democracy she proposes that when thinking of liberal 
democracies we should consider liberal societies as having one democratic element to 
them, universal suffrage (Pateman 1979,1985:5). Here I shall concentrate on “liberal 
democratic theory” as it is popularly assumed and critiqued.
The groundwork for modern, liberal Western democracies was laid when European 
societies’ political structures moved from city-states to nation-states, which were more 
commonly organised around political boundaries rather than a shared ethnic or linguistic 
identity (this is especially poignant for the states carved out by European colonial powers in 
Africa or Asia). At the same time as these political transformations were occurring, societies’ 
social economic configuration transmuted from feudalism to capitalism, most notably 
catalysed by the English and French revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The French and American revolutions of the eighteenth century are said to have 
heralded a second wave of legitimacy for and enactment of democratic political systems and 
the third wave started in the mid-seventies of the twentieth century with the transition to 
democracy in Greece, Portugal and Spain (Haynes 2001). But it was the philosophies of the 
Enlightenment where rationality, the idea that an absolute truth exists in the universe that 
can be uncovered by empirical study, or the scientific method, and that this scientific method
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could also be applied to societies which led to the development of the modern, liberal 
democratic model in the West and the concept of “modernity”. The Enlightenment sloughed 
off old ideas and practices, including the reliance on religious faith to explain the world, and 
helped to shape the modern secular state and liberal democracies (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 
16).
This model of liberal democracy places at its core the individual as primary and 
above all else including the larger society. Anthony Arblaster describes it as “attaching a 
higher moral value to the individual than to society or to any collective group.... [The 
individual] is more real than society” (Arblaster 1984:15). David Trend (1997:5) points to 
the Western notion of the “autonomous subject, capable of free choice and motivated by 
capitalistic self-interest” as lying at the core of the liberal democratic ethos. Essential to the 
liberal theory of democracy is that this autonomous subject leads two lives, one public, one 
private: the “separability of existence into public and private domains” (1997:5). The 
isolation of the “individual” from her social context and familial networks is fundamental to 
liberal democratic theory and its dichotomisation of the public and the private (Pateman 
1989:122). Pateman (1989) notes that often the liberal democratic “individual” is configured 
as a male “private” individual that enacts his private rights publicly; “he needs a sphere in 
which he can exercise his rights and opportunities, pursue his (private) interests and protect 
and increase his property” (122: italics my emphasis). Benjamin Barber describes the 
“thinness” of liberal, representative democratic theory: “It is concerned more to promote 
individual liberty than to secure public justice, to advance interests rather than to discover 
[public] goods, and to keep men safely apart rather than to bring them fruitfully together. As 
a consequence, it is capable of fiercely resisting every assault on the individual—his 
privacy, his property, his interests, and his rights—but is far less effective in resisting 
assaults on community or justice or citizenship or participation” (Barber 1984:5).
Within liberal democratic theory the rights of the individual are enshrined in the 
constitution, and defended and refined through the legal system. Accordingly, consensus 
building on the rights of the individual occurs through public institutionalised deliberations. 
The deliberation on those rights occur within the “administrative state” or the legislatures 
and courts in liberal democracies (Dryzek 2000:26). Ordinary people do not have a direct 
influence on the administrative state outside of registering their preferences through voting
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and developing public opinion that has an indirect influence on policy decisions. In Between 
facts and norms (1996a), Jurgen Habermas’s credits the real power of democracy to be 
contained within judicial and legislative deliberations. He gives more weight to deliberations 
that occur in legislatures by theorising that it is through the transformation of 
‘“communicative power’ generated in the public sphere into the ‘administrative power’ of the 
state” that democracy takes place (Dryzek 2000:25). His emphasis on the deliberative 
process that occurs behind the closed doors of legislative chambers relegates public opinion 
(grown from deliberations outside the state) to an alienated or subordinate position within 
the political system:
“Set communicatively aflow, sovereignty makes itself felt in the power of 
public discourses. Although such power originates in autonomous public 
spheres, it must take shape in the decisions of democratic institutions of 
opinion- and will-formation ... [cjommunicative power is exercised in the 
manner of a siege. It influences the premises of judgement and decision 
making in the political system without intending to conquer the system 
itself' (Habermas 1996a: 486-487, italics my emphasis).
The sole goal of deliberation in liberal democracies is to form consensus on policy that 
reaffirms the democratic institution’s sovereignty. Deliberations are used to smooth out 
differences, to find commonalities and to reach a common ground. Criticism of this liberal 
deliberative model often falls on the universalising of communicative influence. The unfair 
advantage of corporate power, say, in the communicative influence on democratic decision 
making means that individuals with far less power and reach than a corporation will not have 
the same (or any) influence on how the state makes decisions on policy. It is in these ways 
that critics of liberal democracy see that the liberal democratic model reinforces the status 
quo by using the rhetoric of democracy to justify outcomes of legislative procedures that are 
at best remotely influenced by public opinion and alienated from the “will of the people” 
(Dryzek 2000; Pateman 1979,1985).
Western governments and the private industries these governments protect believe 
resolutely in the legitimacy of the liberal democratic model, perhaps since liberal
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democracies have been so successful in creating vast wealth for the Western elites who run 
those institutions, and who vigorously market (and some say impose) it globally. Western 
democracies when confronted about their narrow definition by other democracies in Eastern 
Europe, Africa, Asia, et cetera, often are viewed as taking the low road: “In the current 
global context, most who advocate democratisation still do not recognize it as an essentially 
contested concept” and this perceived attitude of the West, either real or imagined, 
undermines alternative and equally valid interpretations of democracy (Esposito and Voll 
1996:14).
2.2.2 The Umma
Sacrificing the community and the common good, as well as God, for the sake of the 
individual is precisely what conflicts with Islamic models of democracy. Many in non- 
Western societies, furthermore, especially those with first-hand experience of Western 
“democracy” through Western governments’ hegemonic practices both during the periods of 
colonisation as well as under Cold War and post-Cold War policies, view the predominance 
of this narrow definition of democracy with suspicion. A common argument held by both Left 
and Right Islamic political theorists is that the return to Islamic sources to theorise 
democracy is a reaction against Western hegemony. It is out of the crises of postcolonial 
and post-Cold War conditions, philosophers and political thinkers such as Al-Afghani, 
‘Abdou, Mohammed Iqbal, and Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, conceptualised Islamically based 
models of democracy, where Islam and modernity are reconciled through a return to the 
original sources of Islam and Islamic governance and, specifically in Taha’s conception, a 
scientific application of Islam and a reunification of the individual with society (Ali 2002; 
Keddie 1983; Mahmoud 2003). It is a return to the sources of identity and cultural practice 
that those in Islamic societies employ to find their own solutions to the problems of 
governance in modern societies. Islamic democratic theories maintain that Western 
democracies have failed not only to live up to their potentials, but have also failed citizens 
for two reasons: secularism and materialism. According to theories on Islamic democracy a 
society cannot be just without God or without the umma, an equitable community under God 
and this is true of Islamic states. As I have outlined in the previous section, part of the 
confusion over the terminology of Western democracy arises from liberal ideas about
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economics. These ideas are summoned to justify what many in Muslim societies see as 
very undemocratic and nonliberai social practices and policies. Democratic theorist Abdou 
Filali-Ansary argues for a clarification of the terminology surrounding democracy in general, 
a clarification first proposed by Mohamed Abed Jabri, which was originally met with great 
resistance since it was believed his proposal to replace the term “secularisation” with 
“rational management of collective affairs” and “democratisation” was really a justification for 
“Westernisation”. Filali-Ansary defends Jabri’s position by suggesting that when the 
terminology is extricated from its historical and political contexts, people will be able to 
understand the true meanings of these terms and not confuse them with Westernisation 
(Filali-Ansary 1999: 27).
Islamic theories of a just society based on equity are sourced from an early 
philosopher, al-Farabi (870/256-950/339)6. A falsafa philosopher, or a Muslim scholar 
strongly influenced by Greek philosophy, al-Farabi is credited with being the first Muslim 
philosopher to formulate an Islamic political philosophy and his work is considered a 
cornerstone of Islamic governance (along with the revealed texts, the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah). Influenced by Plato’s and Aristotle’s political theories, al-Farabi built his philosophy 
on governance for a particular purpose, to govern cities so that the inhabitants live 
prosperous and happily fulfilling lives (al-Farabi 2001: x, preface). He describes in his 
aphorisms 57-93 the virtuous city and its inhabitants, built within the framework of his 
philosophy. For example, in aphorism 58, he explains that the perfect ruler or king would 
possess all of these qualities: “wisdom, complete prudence, excellent persuasion, excellent 
imaginative evocation, bodily capability for struggle, and having nothing in his body that 
prevents him from carrying out the things pertaining to struggle” (2001:37). Since no one 
person can carry all of these qualities to perfection, he says therefore that the city should be 
ruled by a council of “superior rulers and possessors of virtues” and that these qualities are 
dispersed among this group (2001:38). This concept is closely aligned with the concept of a 
caliphate, or representation of God’s will through the umma or Muslim community. In 
aphorism 62, he says that justice has to do with primarily “dividing the shared goods that 
belong to the inhabitants of the city among them all” (2001:40). What are these goods and
6 The first number, the year 870, refers to the Gregorian calendar, and the second number, year 256, refers to 
the Islamic calendar.
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how, exactly, are the goods divided justly? He says that the goods include monies, honour, 
ranks, security, and any other goods that people can share and that they are divided among 
the inhabitants in proportion to what each inhabitant deserves to have. “His falling short of 
that or exceeding is an injustice. His falling short is an injustice upon himself, and his 
exceeding is an injustice upon the inhabitants of the city. And perhaps his falling short is 
also an injustice upon the inhabitants of the city” (2001:41). Al-Farabi’s idea of a just society 
directly contrasts with the individualism prevalent in Western conceptions of democracy: a 
grave social injustice is done when even one member of the society is either left behind or 
exceeding in wealth, status or power.
The three principles in Islam that are cited as the foundations of Islamic democratic 
practice are: shura (consultation), ijma (consensus) and ijtihad (independent interpretative 
judgement). The concepts of shura, ijma and ijtihad are of particular interest here as the first 
term, shura means that no decision, public or private, can be made without a mutual 
consultation and a mutual, collective judgement, or the second concept of ijma. Decisions 
can also not be made without having the necessary information and knowledge to make 
them. Ijtihad refers to how those decisions are informed by the interpretative judgement of 
individual Muslims, and that through ijtihad, Islam is a living religion. Interpretative practices 
ensure that the broad principles and guidance as handed down by God centuries ago 
remain relevant to contemporary Islamic communities. Pakistani political thinker Muhammad 
Iqbal made the link between consensus, democracy and ijtihad: “The growth of republican 
spirit, and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great 
step in advance” (quoted in Esposito and Voll 1996:29). Iqbal thought that these shifts in 
decision-making power from the religious elite to the laity were the only way that ijma could 
exist in modernity and was necessary in reconciling Islam with modernity. The importance of 
an Islamic democracy’s basis existing on ijma is so significant that the “legitimacy of state 
institutions is not derived from textual sources but is based primarily on the principle of ijma” 
(1996:30). This means the laws governing Islamic societies, or Shari’a, should be the result 
of the three cornerstones, shura, ijma and ijtihad, of Islamic democracy and that rules, laws, 
and codes are open to debate, interpretation and contestation within an open, public forum.
Another core difference between Western liberal and Islamic conceptions of 
democracy is based on sovereignty: in the West the individual is sovereign, in Islam
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sovereignty is God’s alone. There is a profound link between God, political legitimacy and 
Islamic democracy and this is based on the concepts of tawhid (Unity of God), and khilafat 
(caliphate, or representation) where the sovereignty of God is enacted by people on Earth 
(1996:23-24). Political theorist Sayyid Abul a’la Mawdudi suggests that we should conceive 
of this as a theo-democracy, or that under God, all Muslims should have a say in 
interpreting Islamic law and that it is through the caliphate, “where democracy begins in 
Islam. Every person in an Islamic society enjoys the rights and powers of the caliphate of 
God and in this respect all individuals are equal” (quoted in Esposito and Voll 1996:26). Yet 
this theory assumes that the society is unified and monolithic under Islam. Spiritual and 
intellectual leaders and reformers, such as Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, the executed leader 
of the Sudanese Republican Brotherhood, one of the groups understudy in this thesis, 
challenged this monolithic conception of Islam in contemporary societies and called for 
reforms to practices to reflect the realities of a pluralistic and diverse society made up of 
individuals (and the human rights that are enjoyed by individuals), such as the one in 
Sudan. The Prophet Muhammad, indeed, proposed a constitution for a pluralistic society at 
Medina, which has become known as the Constitution of Medina and laid down guidelines 
for conflict resolution and community action, for both Muslims and non-Muslims (1996:40). 
Some believe that this constitution includes the Qur’an and the Sunnah, while others believe 
that Shari’a encompasses the whole of the constitution, but there is general agreement that 
the “basic principles of Islam represent a ‘constitution’ for Muslim societies” (1996:41). 
Islamic democracy it is argued, therefore, can trace its roots not only through the revelations 
given to the Prophet but also directly from God through the caliphate.
Despite some fundamental differences between Western and Islamic models of 
democracy, such as whether societies should be organised around individualism and 
secularism, or based on religious morality and social equity, there are some core principles 
that are shared. The process of deliberation, of registering one’s opinion, and of political 
legitimacy gained through consensus is shared by both models. Indeed Turkish democratic 
scholar Bora Kanra argues that the Sufi tradition (in Turkish: tasawuf), due to its practice of 
“dialoguing with God”, has greatly benefited deliberative democracy not only in Islam but in 
secular democracies as well (2005:524). The Sufi practice of intensive self-interrogation
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and a communion with God through discourse will be explored in Chapter Six on the 
spiritual traditions of the Republican Brothers.
In the following section we will explore one aspect of democracies in general, how 
information and deliberation are theorised and foster political legitimacy in democratic 
societies and in particular the radical democratic model and its implication for discourse.
2.3 Two turns: Radical democracy and deliberative democracy
2.3.1 Discourse and democracy: The Habermasian public sphere and its critics 
In the last decade and a half, political thinkers theorising democracy have taken a decidedly 
deliberative and radical turn (Dryzek 2000:1). Inspired by the explosion of the new social 
movements based in difference and identity of the 1960s and 1970s, as well as critical 
theories such as poststructualism and postmodernism, and the troubling demise of 
socialism, many Left intellectuals in the 1990s sought to reconsider liberal democracy and 
difference through theories about discourse with the aim to develop a new theory of 
democracy: radical democracy (2000:57). In these discussions serious challenges to and 
rethinking of the dominance of liberal democratic theory on its premise of individualism, 
unity, state power and rationality and reconsideration of the nature of power and resistance 
to power continues through the nexus of deliberative democracy.
Habermas’s deliberation and communication theories, especially his idea of 
communicative action and a publicly enacted rational-critical discourse, have had a 
tremendous influence on current discussions on the nature of democracies, especially what 
is called “deliberative democracy”. We will return to the concept of deliberative democracy in 
Chapter Four within the literature review of e-democracy but it bears pointing out here that 
this theory, as well as Habermas’s conception of the “public sphere” has an undeniable 
prominence within the theoretical, sociological framework of online democracy. Habermas’s 
(1962,1989) often cited theory of social change concerns the formation of a bourgeois 
public sphere and its relationship to the development of democracy and capitalism in 
modern Europe. Through his examination of the bourgeois public sphere he explores the 
interplay between information accessibility, deliberation among peers of equal status outside 
of state control, the rise of public opinion resulting from these interplays and the impact of
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public opinion on the democratic process. Primary to his argument is that this deliberation, 
what he calls “rational-critical discourse”, occurs within a public sphere of equals, 
information (primarily obtained from the news media) is utilised to inform and to validate 
argued positions, and that the highest and most valued speech that is considered legitimate 
is one that is rational, fair and balanced (Wilhelm 1999:169). This deliberative public 
sphere, according to Habermas, culminated in the eighteenth century when, at its zenith, the 
“ascending bourgeois classes... in struggling against the powers of an absolutist state” 
created a new basis of political power (Dahlgren 1991:3). Habermas asserts that the 
rational-critical discourse is the foundation of public opinion and the public sphere as well as 
being fundamental to modern democratic societies. Public opinion goes onto influence the 
deliberative action of state legislators and the decisions they make. Yet, the public sphere 
also keeps a watchful eye on and confronts the state and the power it wields, through 
access to and use of an “objective” and nonaligned news media. In the liberal democratic 
and the Habermasian models media fulfils its role as the fourth estate of government. As I 
have already discussed earlier, Habermas argues that while the deliberations which occur 
outside of state institutions in the public sphere are critically important to the legitimacy of 
democracy, they do not form the core of that legitimacy. Ultimately it is the deliberations 
made by jurists and legislators who enact policy based, in part, on those deliberations that 
happen in the public sphere (but which cannot determine policy), that is the heart of 
democracy (Habermas 1996b: 28). The Frankfurt School, of which Habermas is often cited 
as being a member (as well as a critic of), considered the media’s fundamental power to be 
in its shaping public opinion and building a consensus of legitimacy (Sharrock and Coleman 
1999:1). For Habermas public deliberations now only occur through the mass media which 
arose during the twentieth century, and this fact signals the decline and demise of the public 
sphere.
This public is a discursive one constructed through an intersubjective deliberation 
that has become sheared of any subjectivity upon entering the public sphere, and out of 
which rationality and consensus arise. “The Habermasian epistemological framework holds 
that knowledge is not a neutral representation of an objective world “out there”, but it is 
realised through discourse determined by interests" (Chilton and Schaffner 2002:14, italics 
in the original). Rationality does not exist in one mind alone or in the way that a single
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person argues her position but it is a coordinated construction between people through 
discourse with the goal towards consensus. This view of the Habermasian public sphere, 
one that claims he did consider the subject positions of speakers throughout his analysis is 
not the one held by a majority of his critics. The more common criticism of Habermas’s 
theory is in his universalising of difference.
It is on this quality that Habermas’s conception of the public sphere has been 
criticised for its shortcomings, especially by feminist scholars, and most notably his 
assumption that rational-critical discourse within the public sphere is one of equity and full 
access. Most adherents and critics of the Habermasian rational-critical public sphere tend to 
rely solely on this aspect of his theory to conceptualise democratic culture: that the ideal 
democratic discourse is one that is disinterested, objective and universalist, and occurs in a 
public forum accessible to all. Habermas’s public sphere, according to Russ Castronovo 
(2002:118) for instance, make spectres out of citizens:
“Democratic subjects are narrowed to a thin, historyless performance by 
dematerialising imperatives that assign a generic personhood to facilitate 
incorporation into national publics. As Jurgen Habermas explains, persons 
enter a public sphere in accordance with an “abstract universality” that 
recognises individuals as equals by subsuming them “in equally abstract 
fashion, as common human beings”. ... A ghost gains admittance to the 
public sphere: what enters is a shadowy outline of the historically rich 
human actor, in short, a spectral citizen in which the texture of memory 
and particularistic identity are without substance and rendered historically 
dead” (Castronovo is quoting Habermas 1989:54).
Nancy Fraser, in another example, cites Habermas’s failure to examine the existence of 
multiple public spheres in confrontation with each other and their role in discourse that 
successfully challenges state institutions as a major flaw in his theory. Fraser points out 
that by solely examining the rise and decline of the liberal bourgeois public sphere, the focal 
point remains obscured and too exclusionary to conceptualise the “plurality of competing 
publics,” or counterpublics composed of workers, of women, of queers, of slaves, of minority
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religions, etc., that exist in democratic as well as nondemocratic societies (Fraser 1992: 
111-118). These counterpublics “contested the exclusionary norms of the bourgeois public, 
elaborating alternative styles of political behaviour and alternative norms of public speech” 
(116). In his excellent analysis of the Habermasian public sphere through theorising 
counterpublics Michael Warner (2002) does not reject Habermas's public sphere outright 
but rather develops a theory of what he calls counterpublics. Warner’s starting point is a 
“public”, and not a public sphere, and this starting point helps to explain counterpubWcs. For 
Warner both publics and counterpublics constitute more than a “space” where strangers 
converge and deliberate, rather it is a group identity constructed through discourse. Both 
publics and counterpublics share the same traits: the circulation of a group’s ideology 
through discourse is fundamental to the transformation of that group into a “counterpublic” 
within “the public” and to exert their influence on “the public” (106). Some of Warner’s 
criteria for the social construction of a counterpublic are necessarily circular: that 
counterpublics are discursive; they self-organise through discourse; they entreat their 
discourse to strangers; there is ambiguity in who is being addressed (the discourse 
addresses a particular and a universal at the same time); and inclusiveness in the 
counterpublic occurs simply by paying attention (89). It is through Warner’s counterpublics 
that Fraser’s “subaltern” speak.
Another problem with the Habermasian public sphere, these critics say, is its 
construction of false boundaries between the “public” and the “private”, and how this 
distinction between the two not only determines who can speak but what can be spoken 
about and in what ways can issues be discussed. If the bourgeois public sphere that 
Habermas theorised was a place where private citizens came together to discuss political 
and economic issues within an Enlightenment framework of a public sphere of rational 
disinterestedness and universality, and not one of subjectivity or particularity, as an ideal 
form of discourse, this meant that the discourses of women, the very subjective experience 
of being female in male dominated societies, were automatically excluded from influencing 
public opinion. Joan Landes notes that “Habermas overlooks the strong association of 
women’s discourse and their interests with “particularity”, and conversely the alignment of 
masculine speech with truth, objectivity and reason. Thus, he misses the masquerade 
through which the (male) particular was able to posture behind the veil of the universal”
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(Landes 1995:98). In other words Habermas never addressed or scrutinised his own 
modernist assumptions about rationality and universality and their utilisation in discourse, at 
least in Structural Transformation. Habermas himself, however, is critical of how bourgeois 
discourse developed and acknowledges that there are several public spheres, some that 
seek to be legitimised by the state, others that react against it (1989:129-140). But 
Habermas’s taking for granted a public sphere where the discourse exists among equals 
has been challenged by feminists theorists for whom the blatant inequality of the bourgeois 
public is too obvious to ignore (Benhabib 1995,1997; Dean 2001; Landes 1995).
Seyla Benhabib (1997), for instance, challenges Habermas’s contention that in late- 
capital societies the distinction between private and public lives is breaking down due to 
state and capitalistic intervention and suggests, rather, that this blurring of borders between 
public and private is due to the agency of oppressed groups challenging institutions of 
power, and shifting and renegotiating those boundaries. She asserts that the “struggle to 
make something public is a struggle for justice” (79). Benhabib makes a few assumptions 
that are necessary to conceptualising a deliberative model of democracy. Firstly, that there 
is a “value-pluralism” or a diverse universe of ideas of what is “good”. Secondly, she asserts 
that the deliberative model proceeds not only from a conflict over values, but also a conflict 
of interests. Thirdly, she assumes that in contemporary societies it is impossible to carry out 
these deliberations on a publicly massive and collective scale. She argues that the 
legitimacy of the plurality of discourses, which occur in many places and at different levels 
that cross and intersect each other in a network of contestation, must be maintained in a 
deliberative model (Benhabib 1996:73). She calls the network a “plurality of modes of 
association” and describes the procedure of deliberation there as an overlapping and 
interlocking network of contestation and argumentation (74). Deliberation is a process to be 
informed, since no individual can possibly possess all the necessary knowledge on a given 
issue or perspective; it is through deliberation that we gain more information and clarify 
interpretations (71).
Democratic theorist Iris Marion Young takes the Habermasian public sphere to task 
on this issue of valued speech, where certain argumentational styles and a command of 
learned argumentative behaviours are privileged. For example, the model sets out that “the 
most reasoned and best argument wins”. This means that certain styles of speech are
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privileged over others, primarily a more “confrontational and assertive” style (read: male) 
rather than a style that is “tentative, exploratory, or conciliatory” (read: female) (Young 
1996:123; comments in parentheses mine). Instead of conceiving politics within a 
deliberative model, she suggests a more inclusive and more accurate description would be 
a communicative democracy which is not based on argumentation alone but privileges all 
forms of communication to reach understanding (1996:125). Whereas the Habermasian 
deliberative democracy assumes a starting position of unity, because the theory “brackets” 
or suspends differences and inequities in order to engage in deliberation, communicative 
democracy assumes a position of plurality and recognises that difference and inequality are 
never suspended. A pluralistic, diverse, and contested public sphere is preferable in 
deliberative democracies, Young contends, where there is often little or no unity, and where 
the goal of deliberations is not necessarily to reach a consensus but rather to reach an 
understanding of one’s own position, to clarify, to deepen and to engage in critical self­
reflection on personal views. Indeed, in his examinations of deliberative democracy in 
Turkey, Bora Kanra contends that more consideration needs to be given to the social 
learning and “interpretative actions of participants” within deliberative democratic systems 
with less emphasis on decision making outcomes (Kanra 2005:519). For Kanra and other 
deliberative democratic theorists, it is the interpretative process rather than a means to an 
end that is most significant.
These feminist challenges (and those of other social movements that employ 
protest and actions to “speak”) to reconsider rationality and argumentation, and the terms 
that make discourse “democratic”, are often met with hostility by the state. Let us for a 
moment consider the following statement: When asked his opinion of political satire aimed 
at US President George W. Bush on the BBC’s Radio 4, Frank Gaffney, assistant secretary 
of defence under the Reagan Administration had this to say: “It cheapens the political 
debates, it obscures the political debate. I think it affords people an outlet for their anger that 
is rather less susceptible to constructive action. Whereas if you’re talking about the policy 
choices and you can debate those on their merits that seems to me to be what a functioning 
and responsible democracy is all about”. Gaffey’s opinion falls in line with many who 
believe that, within democratic public spheres, there is only room for one kind of 
deliberation, one way of speaking. Many argue that deliberations should always be rational,
40
but what if certain forms of deliberation that are considered irrational—like terrorism, 
violence, protest, or satire—are in fact just as rational. Vail and White show in their research 
on the history of Southern African praise poetry, for example, court praise poets risked their 
lives when they criticised despotic kings through the satirical metaphors in their poetry even 
though it was the only acceptable way for the king’s subjects’ complaints to be heard (Vail 
and White 1991). The praise poets, who were very aware of the sufferings of the people 
under their despotic ruler, used the only means available to them to have the voices of the 
community heard. In fact there may be much rationality underlying the decision to invoke 
violence to engage in a conversation with societies and states: it sends a strong message 
and demands some kind of response, albeit usually an equally violent one. In her essay 
“Debating Muslims”, in which Adeline Masquelier describes a conflict that occurred in a 
mosque in a Nigerien town between traditionalists (the Tijian Sufi order) and reformists 
(“Izala” an Islamic fundamentalist group) to speak to larger issues of Islamic identity, civil 
society and pluralism in Niger, she argues that in order to discuss these issues within a 
Nigerien context, a definition based on a:
“more extensive and diffuse domain of social discourse and practice in 
which ordinary Nigeriens have the possibility of imagining an alternative 
modernity. Broadening the concept in such a way allows us to focus on 
issues of power and gender, identity and morality, citizenship and 
egalitarianism that are emerging and contemplated in the context of the 
Izala discourse. And if the concept of civil society is to be of any value to 
an analysis of the politics of Islamic identity in Niger, it must define and 
describe a plural—rather than a uniform and unitary—political space” 
(Masquelier 1999:226).
So Masquelier suggests that it is only by broadening a discursive space that is pluralistic, 
where issues about power and democracy within an Islamic identity can be addressed.
What is also suggested is that when discourse is agonistic, a struggle over the interpretation 
of social life and politics between adversaries, new knowledge and understanding is 
constructed and allowed to arise. Furthermore, it is through the process of deliberation for
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its own sake, and not necessarily for the sake of making decisions, that social learning can 
take place (Kanra 2005:519).
It is a democracy based on pluralism, not only in a diversity of individuals but in a 
diversity of “subject positions”, and conflict that theorist Chantal Mouffe describes as a 
“radical and plural democracy”, one that “rejects the very possibility of a nonexclusive public 
sphere of rational argumentation where a noncoercive consensus could be attained. By 
showing that such a consensus is a conceptual impossibility, it does not put in jeopardy the 
democratic ideal as some would argue... In a democratic polity, conflicts and 
confrontations, far from being a sign of imperfection, indicate that democracy is alive and 
inhabited by pluralism” (Mouffe 1996a: 255). Setting limits on what should be considered 
rational and legitimate deliberation as well as where those deliberations should take place is 
in direct opposition to the positions of thinkers like Benhabib, Fraser, Young and Mouffe.
The plurality of political expression from all sectors of society—both those who are equal 
and less so—is precisely what makes a democracy vigorous, its ability to tolerate and 
accommodate many different ways of engaging in the conversation, many different kinds of 
conversations, modes of addressing the public and stating one’s viewpoint.
A feature worthy to note in the analysis of deliberative democracy is that throughout 
the literature the “deliberation" part of the democratic model is never explained. What is 
deliberation in the first place? It is rarely made explicit. A reader of the literature, of course, 
assumes that deliberation means people speaking to one another, but how and in what 
context—this is not explicated in the theory. Is it spoken conversations occurring face to 
face among familiars or is the political speeches of politicians broadcast on television or 
posts written on a political online bulletin board, or is it all of these? Habermas in the second 
half of his Structural Transformation is clear about what kind of deliberations were more 
empowering than others, ones that occur face to face as opposed to those that are 
mediated. In the twentieth century Habermas claims that these deliberations were mediated 
by mass media, especially television, to detrimental effect. Deliberative democratic theorists 
have honed in on the weaknesses they see in Habermas’s analysis, primarily what they call 
the bracketing of difference but they rarely ever address how deliberations occur in late 
twentieth and early twenty-first societies, that is, that nowadays deliberations are not always 
spoken, rarely occur face to face and are highly mediated either through text, images, or
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through a communications technology, such as the Internet. This analytical lacuna is most 
apparent in the e-democracy literature as will be explored more deeply in Chapter Seven on 
the online discursive culture of the Republican Brothers.
2.3.2 Radical democracy and its implications for deliberative democracy 
The concept of radical democracy was first theorised and suggested by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe in their seminal work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985,2001). In their 
examination of twentieth century political hegemony and socialist democracy, Laclau and 
Mouffe proposed that radical democracy is an ideology that unifies liberal democracy and 
socialism, where both have failed as systems on their own. Liberal democracy grew out of a 
perception that state power encroaches on individual liberty and underlines the autonomy of 
the individual whereas socialism envisioned a transition from a capitalist-based political 
system to one that is based on equitable material distribution and the interests of the society 
as a whole.
The struggles over identity and difference have overshadowed debates about social 
justice since the 1960s when the new social movements which were centred on difference 
and human rights, such as feminism, the Black Power and indigenous peoples’ rights 
movements, had a tremendous influence on radical social theorists during the last decade of 
the twentieth century. It is around these struggles over identity and recognition that the 
discursive nature of Warner’s counterpublics are organised (2002). Recognising the 
subjective complexities of counterpublics, Laclau and Mouffe suggest that relationships of 
power and subjugation are not described in a simple binary terminology and antagonism 
primarily since subject positions are relative and shift and, significantly, until the terminology 
of rights exist, there is no conflict with subjugated positions: “ ‘Serf, ‘slave’, and so on, do 
not designate in themselves antagonistic positions; it is only in the terms of a different 
discursive formation, such as ‘the rights inherent to every human being’, that the differential 
positivity of these categories can be subverted and the subordination be constructed as 
oppression” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985,2001:154). Separately, Mouffe has challenged 
essentialist positions to describe identity, particularly those identities that are subjugated, for 
the reason that “there can never be a closed system of differences ... [rather] approach it as 
a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through which it is constituted within
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various discursive formations. The “identity” of such a multiple and contradictory subject is 
therefore always contingent and precarious” (Mouffe 1992:372, italics my emphasis). In 
order to understand how radical democratic politics work, “abandoning the idea of a unity 
subject, and its source and the origins of its meanings ... it requires conceiving the social 
agent as constituted by a multiplicity of subject positions whose articulation is always 
precarious and temporary” (Mouffe 1996b: 25). Bruce Baum employs the example of the 
conflict over meanings about female genital mutilation between Western and African 
feminists to show that the essentialist category of “woman” is problematic for the very 
reason that the subject positions of being a “woman” are mutable (Baum 2004:1081-1085).
Above all else, as Laclau and Mouffe theorise it, discourse is the fundamental and 
totalising element in the radical democratic model. Discourse constructs not only the field of 
discussion but the object of discussion; there is no reality or truth external to discourse:
“The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse had 
nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the 
realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an 
event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, 
independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is 
constructed in terms of “natural phenomena” or “expressions of the wrath 
of God”, depends upon the structuring of the discursive field. What is 
denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but rather the 
different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside 
any discursive conditions of emergence” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 2001:
108, italics in the original).
Laclau and Mouffe suggest that it is only when the discursive milieu becomes democratic 
that subordination becomes untenable, “[ojur thesis is that it is only from the moment when 
the democratic discourse becomes available to articulate the different forms of resistance to 
subordination that the conditions will exist to make possible the struggle against different 
types of inequality” (154). It is only when we have the terms to describe oppression and, at 
the same time, idealise what should be for all of us that we can resist oppression. The
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conditions for discourse as weii as the discourse itself are central to radical democratic 
theory. What these radical democratic thinkers suggest is that it is not the state that 
oppresses individuals but it is culture above all else that is oppressive, that we are all 
complicit in subordinating others, and that this subordination is expressed discursively 
(Baum 2004).
Furthermore it is around struggles over difference, and recognition and respect by 
the larger society of those differences that resistance against this diffuse power (which is 
nonetheless hegemonic) is most apparent. For groups such as those fighting for gender 
rights, as one example, this point is exceptionally poignant. The cultural politics surrounding 
the 2004 US presidential election where President George W. Bush was awarded a second 
term provides an excellent example of how discursive constructions intercede politically and 
culturally. When exit pollsters asked those who voted for Bush why they voted for him, 35 
percent of those who responded said that they were voting for the moral agenda (2004)7. 
The phrase “moral agenda” in this election was popularly read as the issue of gay marriage, 
where Bush proposed to amend the American Constitution to state that marriage is only 
legally recognised as an institution between a man and a woman. During the election, 11 
states placed a gay marriage ban referendum on the presidential ballot which 
overwhelmingly passed in each state. Now, gay and lesbian rights groups as well as 
feminist groups concerned with challenging traditional gender roles have to continue to 
contend with an Administration that takes advantage of cultural issues to make political 
gains in a cultural environment that is openly hostile towards recognising their fundamental 
rights to the “good life” that is a given for straight people. Judith Butler challenged Nancy 
Fraser on this very point; whether the fight for gay and lesbian rights is a “merely” cultural 
struggle and not one over the gendered reproduction of capitalist modes of production and 
redistribution. Butler points out that by ensuring that the material benefits of heterosexual 
marriage can never be enjoyed by gay, lesbian and transgendered people, challenges to 
capitalist hegemony will never see the light of day (Butler 1997b: 272-273).
7 The Exit Polls were conducted by Edison Media Research and Mitofsky International for the National Election 
Pool, a coalition of six American mainstream media companies. The polls (N=12,219) were conducted in all 50 
states and in the District of Columbia at 250 polling stations by questionnaire or by telephone (for the 500 
voters polled who cast an absentee ballot). More information on the poll can be found at exit-poll.net.
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The radical democratic model is part of a larger trend in thinking about power and 
politics and forms part of what Kate Nash calls the new political sociology, where a seismic 
change in the social sciences has decentred and expanded the definition of politics away 
from a cohesive nation-state and to a diverse and conflictual society (Nash 2001b). No 
longer can politics be described as the state set against society, in the new political 
sociology, “politics is a potential in social life itself, where groups and individuals vie for 
recognition (2001b: xi). Furthermore, as Andrew Barry shows in Political Machines (2001: 
206-207), political institutions are resolutely “anti-political" in the sense that they seek to 
contain and restrict dissent, and validate only narrow conditions within which the “political” 
can occur. Therefore fresh considerations for what is political, outside of the old 
dichotomies, are necessary to comprehend the complexities of twenty-first century politics.
Some describe this new political sociology and democratic as post-Marxist and 
postliberal (Hekman 1996; Martin 2003). Post-Marxist in the sense that class struggle can 
no longer adequately provide all the answers for social transformation or be employed to 
describe sufficiently the new social movements emerging during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Postliberal in the sense that politics and the nation-state are not the only ways that societies 
are engaged in power relationships, as feminist theorists (based on Michel Foucault’s work 
on power) have argued that power is everywhere and nowhere in societies (Foucault 1980).
Nash attributes much of this definition to the influence of Michel Foucault’s notion of 
power, that power is productive of subjectivity or, in other words, of identity (Foucault 2000; 
Nash 2001 b). Foucault suggests that to understand power we should look at the forms of 
resistance and attempts made to disassociate these relations (Foucault 2000:11). This 
resistance is discursive (Laclau and Mouffe 1985,2001:152-153). He defines the subject 
“as someone who is subject to someone else by control and dependence; and as tied to his 
own identity by a conscience or self knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power 
which subjugates and makes subject to” (12). Foucault asserts that to understand power we 
need to understand how power is resisted, and he defines struggle as being “against forms 
of domination; against exploitation which separate individuals from what they produce; or 
against that which ties the individual to himself and submits him to others in this way 
(struggles against subjugation, subjectivity and submission)” (12). The power of the state 
previously, or mostly, is perceived as a power that ignores the individual and looks “only at
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the interests of the totality... the state’s power (and that’s one of the reasons for its strength) 
is both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power, [t]o govern in this sense is to 
structure the possible field of action of others” (13-21).
If, as I have discussed, Habermas’s public sphere is a site of persuasive 
deliberation and unity built through consensus, then radical democracy’s public sphere is a 
site of intense contention, crackling with strife, conflict, struggle and inconclusiveness; a 
discursive site where publics and counterpublics contend for a hegemonic positioning of 
their own ideology (Laclau and Mouffe 1985,2001; Warner 2002). Habermas’s public 
sphere is a gathering place, generally exclusive and reserved for those who speak rationally 
and for those who are media literate, free from state control where participants can 
challenge the state’s hegemony, especially its hegemonic discourse, in society. Radical 
democratic theorists do not recognise that hegemony is solely or exclusively held by the 
state, in fact, the entire notion of the singular sovereignty of the nation-state in an era of late 
capitalism and globalisation is in crisis since the state increasingly shares its power with 
other political (and globalised) institutions (Nash 2001a: 83-84). Power is everywhere and 
nowhere and participants in this public sphere struggle against the strictures of rationality, 
scientific knowledge of the Enlightenment and liberal democracy. The radical democratic 
public sphere is messy, cacophonic, and never an idealised place. At its core radical 
democracy seeks to describe a system rather than to idealise it. Deliberative democracy, 
then, according to radical democratic theory is a political and cultural process of contending 
discourses vying to become hegemonic and at the same time, resisting hegemony.
2.4 Conclusions
As I have previously suggested recognition of individual and group human rights does not 
grow out of a consensus society but is carved out in a space of intense contention. It is 
precisely this societal conflict according to theorists of radical democracy that makes a 
society democratic. These struggles over recognition have been extensively discussed by 
several feminist democratic theorists (Benhabib 2002; Butler 1997b; Fraser 1997; Fraser 
and Honneth 2003; Gutmann and Taylor 1992). In fact, theories of recognition have come to 
dominate most contemporary discussions on democracy and pluralism. The politics of
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recognition are premised on the realities of a pluralistic society where minority groups or 
marginalised populations are no longer willing to pay the price of equality by assimilating to 
the values and norms of the majority (Fraser and Honneth 2003:7). Recognition is the 
struggle for social justice, no longer rooted in a redistribution of societies’ resources, but in 
the validation of different claims to truth and to existence. Public recognition is not just about 
fair distribution of resources or opportunities among all groups within a society, it is about 
how differences between groups are interpreted and valued by the society (Baum 2004: 
1073). These struggles could not be possible without the twentieth century’s philosophical 
and political innovation in theorising and constituting universal human rights.
Mouffe in her discussion of radical democracy and the deepening of the “democratic 
project of modernity” suggests that the abandonment of the rational-critical public sphere is 
critical to understanding our social conditions in postmodernity:
“Our societies are confronted with the proliferation of political spheres 
which are radically new and different and which demand that we abandon 
the idea of a unique constitutive space of the constitution of the 
political...[mjany ... seem to believe that we belong only to one 
community, defined empirically and even geographically, and that this 
community could be unified by a single idea of the common good. But we 
are in fact always multiple and contradictory subjects, inhabitants of a 
diversity of communities...constructed by a variety of discourses, and 
precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of those subject 
positions. ...[The radical democratic project] requires us to abandon the 
abstract universalism of the Enlightenment, the essentialist conception of a 
social totality, and the myth of the unitary subject” (Mouffe 1993:20-21).
Her commentary is also suggestive of what we will be exploring in the following two 
chapters, on the role of mediated information and communication, and new communications 
technologies in democratic societies. Both chapters consider how the political is 
communicated through journalism and new technologies, especially the Internet. I will 
demonstrate that Mouffe’s suggestion that we abandon the Enlightenment’s “abstract
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universalism”, “social totality”, and the “unitary subject” in order to conceive of a more 
complex idea of democracy has been difficult to fulfil or even to consider by many social 
scientists considering mediated political communication in Western democracies.
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3 The Fourth Estate: Journalism and Information in 
Democracies
In large, dispersed and diverse societies, how do people engage politically, with each other 
and with the political system? One prevalent idea is that participation is necessarily 
mediated through journalism and mass media, and that through the sharing of common 
experiences through the media, people participate in democracy. We cannot be at every 
rally, every party conference or news event that journalists report on. As users of news 
journalism, we rely on journalists to act as our mediators between those who make the news 
and us. We rely on the media to understand the position of legislators who represent us in 
parliaments and congresses, and to communicate those positions to us. We can only know 
that something happened or something was said because it was reported in the news 
media. In this chapter, I will review very briefly the history of the development of modern 
journalism and the theories that link journalism and democracy. I also examine the liberal 
democratic ideals for journalism as the fourth estate and the critiques of this notion by 
journalists and media theorists calling for more radical approaches to news journalism.
3.1 Information and communication in democracies
The debates about the role of information and communication in democracies can be better 
understood by examining the development of the mass distribution of printed materials and 
journalism. This history is as long as democracy’s history as a philosophical entity and a 
political reality and as the history of both show, developed conterminously, with both having 
a common thread. Democracy and journalism within a large, diverse society mediate 
between people and between constituents and politicians, since given the enormity of the 
population, it is impossible for face-to-face political communication to take place. Media 
usage, therefore, is the primary way in which people in a mass society can engage
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politically with one another and with political institutions. Of course there are many different 
paths we could take to examine journalism and its position in democracies, such as the 
development of the underground press or media activism movements. I want to remain 
focused here, however, on two dominant features of the theories about news journalism: 
journalism as a confrontation with the state and its role in the formation of public opinion; 
and the other antithetical position that contends that the media reproduce the ideologies of 
the capitalist state apparatus, state here meaning the political and social institutions, such 
as governments and corporations, that collude to advance their own elitist agendas at the 
expense of a democratic political culture (Althusser 1971; Bagdikian 2004; Herman and 
Chomsky 1988; McChesney 1999; Schiller 1992).
Through the following examinations of the development of print journalism in 
Europe and its roles in societies I shall show that the poles between the two positions are 
not as wide as popularly asserted and, indeed, there is no “bright line” separating the two. 
Evidence of one information and communication technology, written language, dates back 
to at least 3500 BC when the Sumerians pressed signs into clay and thus recorded major 
events, primarily of the rulers, suggests that the ground work for a dichotomy to emerge 
between the official and countervailing positions propagated through media was laid early. 
Of course there were other systems that predate written language to record official history 
and events-hieroglyphics, bas-relief on buildings, monumental sculptures to name a few— 
but written language represents an early technological innovation in information distribution 
because it was much more efficient and portable compared with earlier conventions. In 
Europe before the advent of mass communications in the seventeenth century, for example, 
official power was represented by publicity or public, ostentatious displays of might and 
wealth, such as the wearing of heraldry, which was reserved only for the monarchy and 
aristocracy (Habermas 1989:1-12).
Johann Gutenberg invented moveable type in 1450, and while it is popularly 
considered the invention that radically transformed European communication, 
archaeological evidence in Crete shows that moveable type was invented as early as 1700 
BC, made from a clay disk holding 45 smaller pieces which were pressed into clay slabs. 
Similar inventions of moveable clay type were also employed China, Persia and Egypt as 
early as 1045 AD, but up until the Gutenberg press, most publications were made by a
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much slower process of either being copied by hand on vellum or paper or by being printed 
from large wooden or stone blocks (Emery, Emery, and Roberts 2000:3). These printing 
technologies meant that only a relatively few copies could be made at great expense, and 
as a result, only an elite few could read and have access to printed materials and 
subsequently, to information. Most information before moveable type was transmitted either 
by word of mouth or by private letters at markets, fairs, church gatherings, and other public 
events and private gatherings. Before the development of mass communications, formerly 
news distribution was directly tied to the state and political activities. One of the earliest 
news publications is Acta Diurna, a hand-written gazette of the Roman Forum, published 
regularly between 59 BC and 222 AD. The Acta Diurna reported on senate votes and 
general news, and were copied by scribes for redistribution across the Roman Empire 
(2000:1). In other parts of the world, such as countries under the control of the Ottoman 
Empire (1299 to 1923), official state information was transmitted through mosques during 
Friday prayers and by a network of munadi, public criers, employed throughout the empire 
to transmit official proclamations (Ayalon 1995:4). This system of official state information 
controlled the development of newspapers in Arabic speaking countries until the late 
nineteenth century (Ayalon 1995).
It was Gutenberg’s invention that revolutionised information distribution and since 
information was much more accessible to a larger population, more people became literate. 
The new literate mass audience ready and hungry for information hailed the emergence of 
news journalism. The invention of moveable type was also very timely. As European powers 
expanded their economic, political, and cultural influence globally through a new era of 
European colonisation, publication and distribution of information and news events was 
enabled on a massive scale by moveable type. Reports from far-off colonies, where new 
economic interests, such as plantations and mines, were vital for early capitalists concerned 
about their investments in land, slaves and natural resources to stay apprised of events 
affecting their interests. Flysheets, or small one-sided imprints on a single sheet of paper, 
were printed as early as 1415 and used woodblocks. Reproductions of letters allegedly 
written by Christopher Columbus were published as flysheets and distributed throughout 
Central Europe in 1493 and around the same time banking houses and other financial 
institutions regularly published newsletters through a similar method (Emery, Emery, and
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Roberts 2000:7). By 1490 every large European city had at least one moveable-type 
printing press. Most news travelled by the new, private postal system in the form of letters 
and single sheet bulletins and this information was highly prized and jealously guarded 
primarily by the new mercantile class that was emerging in the seventeenth century 
(Habermas 1989).
Resulting from these transformations news journalism arose in Europe in the first 
decades of the seventeenth century. Presses in several European countries were publishing 
corantos, or single page newssheets which only reported on foreign news (Emery, Emery, 
and Roberts 2000:7-10). The first domestic news reports to be printed and widely 
distributed began when Westminster clerks published the proceedings of Parliament in 
England in 1628. These early, published accounts grew to be known as diurnals, daily 
reports of local news (2000:12). A daily German newspaper established in 1616 is 
considered the world’s first and oldest newspaper. From its beginnings, news journalism 
arose not only as a direct result of improvements in printing technology but also as a 
consequence of several interacting factors such as changes in political culture and social 
structures, the rise of capitalism, the development and improvement of roads and postal 
services, a rise in literacy rates, and a growing popular desire to read reports on not only 
developments in government but also events affecting financial interests. It is safe to say, at 
least for the sake of the arguments here, that the development of capitalism helped to spur 
the growth of journalism as a definable and distinct institution and one that is intricately tied 
to the state and to capital, simply because information on daily events was needed by 
participants in the new economies to make both economic and political decisions.
While the advent of print was momentous for the rise of international commerce and 
considered to be the “connective tissue” of modernity, it was even more momentous for the 
masses of people who were not a part of the feudal elite or the Church. Quite early in the 
spread of the new printing technology after its invention in 1450, it became obvious that a 
revolution was under way which threatened the established power structures, so measures 
were taken to limit the powers of the press and indeed to co-opt them (Habermas 1989:20- 
21). William Tyndale was forced to print his version of the Bible, written in vernacular 
English which thus overturned Latin’s (and Rome’s) tight grip on the word of God, outside of 
his native England in 1526 in continental Europe and 6,000 copies were smuggled back into
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England (Bragg 2003:108). Tyndale lived the life of the hunted, on the run from both King 
Henry Vlll’s and the Church’s assassins, and was finally captured and executed for heresy 
in the Netherlands in 1536 (2003:111). Print and literacy offered the possibility to individuals 
not a part of the noble or religious classes to create their own interpretative communities, to 
develop their own knowledge and disperse that knowledge, and to challenge the feudal 
political system’s monopoly over interpretations (Ewen and Ewen 1997:4-7). In the words of 
media historians Stuart Ewen and Elizabeth Ewen (1997): “Literacy and access to the 
printed word were cardinal elements in the overturning of social systems predicated on 
popular ignorance” and the power elite of the day understood its significance (1997:7). 
Queen Mary attempted to control what was printed by founding the Stationers Company in 
1556, which served to regulate and control the work of printers (Emery, Emery, and Roberts 
2000: 9; SNMC2004).
Many authorities followed suit and thus developed a partisan press that was under 
official control until well into the eighteenth century with the rise of the commercially based 
“penny press” (Hackett and Zhao 1998). It was also during the pre-Revolutionary days in the 
British colonies in America or in European coffee houses and parliamentary reporters’ 
galleries that a counterpublic of dissent through print was emerging as the ideologies of 
republicanism, democracy and print were inextricably linked by the pamphleteers, court 
reporters and parliament ministers alike (Sparks 1992:278-279; Warner 1990:97-117). 
Michael Warner (1990) shows that the American revolutionary writer, printer and eventual 
president John Adams regarded printing as a technology of enlightenment (with a capital 
“E”): “while [Adams] argues that learning and the press bring about changes in the political 
world, Adams assumes that printing’s purposes, uses, and meaning do not themselves 
undergo change. If [the press] were variable in its nature, it might in some circumstances 
support despotism rather than liberty, and the history of enlightenment would lack a 
propulsive logic” (1990:4). Thus the concept of the inevitability of democratic politics and 
the press as well as a historic progression towards liberation through communication 
technologies were formulated hundreds of years ago. Warner eruditely shows how print is 
teleologically infused with republican ideology and an internal democratic logic was 
construed quite early in its development by the users and makers of print.
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Jurgen Habermas argues that a commercial press was only viable after the 
establishment of constitutionally based democratic states in places like Britain and France 
and notes that with this transition from a privately funded and ideologically based press to 
one that was in business to make a profit, polemical coverage of events was abandoned 
and replaced, comparatively, with more "objective” and balanced reporting. These changes 
meant that the press was considered more of a public organ, and as a result, was intricately 
implicated in external forces that looked to exert their own interests through the press 
(Habermas 1989:184-185).
3.2 Informed choices, distant politics, mediated democracy
From the start in the rise of communication and information technologies, the nature of 
media has been a site of power struggles. There is a multiplicity of the meaning for the 
printed word, that it could lead to, for example, a reordering of the power elite but that 
power, none the less, remains in the hands of a powerful minority or that it could lead a 
diffusion of power to the “masses”. That journalism over the last five centuries has taken on 
multiple and contested meanings as to what it should be is besides the point, the history of 
journalism shows that the institution as it is practiced has been intricately woven into the 
capitalistic economic fabric from its founding. In fact, according to many media theorists, the 
advancement of capitalism would not have occurred without journalism (Ewen and Ewen 
1997; Habermas 1989). Indeed it was the development of an independent (from the state), 
commercial press during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that finally liberated 
information and news from the hands of the state (Habermas 1989). Journalism according 
to liberal democratic theory acts as the fourth estate to governmental, and in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, corporate power. A prevalent idea advanced in many Western 
democracies is the notion that the press stands outside of political structures and 
institutions, making it therefore an objective and disinterested third party which acts as a 
watchdog of the power of governments and institutions (Sparrow 1999:3). This notion that 
the press are a fourth estate coincided with the rise of a commercial press in the nineteenth 
century. The term was introduced by T.B. Macaulay in 1828 when he wrote (rather 
negatively) of the press gallery in parliament: “The gallery in which the reporters sit has
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become a fourth estate to the realm. The publication of debates, a practice which seemed 
full of danger to the great safeguards of public liberty, is now regarded by many persons as 
a safeguard tantamount, and more than tantamount, to all the rest together” (cited in Sparks 
1992:278, italics my emphasis).
But within this history, as it took a turn in the twentieth century with the persistent 
rise of media monopolies, lies an incredible contradiction: that the commercial press would 
consider its primary goal of the news media to be a public service in a democracy rather 
than to consider itself as any other business in a capitalist economy, which is forced to 
make prudent decisions in order to maximise profits and remain competitive (Bagdikian 
2004; McChesney 1999, among others). This is of course not the case in the twenty-first 
century. The private news media are businesses first and foremost, their primary and 
ultimate goal is to provide profits for shareholders, and if there is a secondary benefit to the 
larger society then it is a residual effect. Moreover given the inextricable relationship in 
capitalist economies between business and the state, where the state acts for corporate 
interests, it is even more incongruous that the belief in a commercial news media that acts 
as a critical watchdog of state power continues to enjoy credence. Edward Herman and 
Noam Chomsky in their seminal work Manufacturing Consent (1988) present a wholly 
different picture of media’s role in democracies. They describe the commercial media as a 
propaganda model for the state and big business through several case studies on American 
media coverage of conflicts in Central America and Southeast Asia where US official foreign 
policy and covert operations were deeply entrenched and implicated in the regions’ political 
realities. Their conclusion, drawn from the research is that the media, while serving a 
“societal purpose” in Western democracies, is far from independently seeking the truth as a 
fourth estate, and are complicit in propagating the justifications of Western governments’ 
imperialistic policies in developing countries (1988:298). The media do this by making 
editorial decisions and framing news coverage and debates “within the bounds of 
acceptable premises” that favour the state (298). Furthermore, many critics see the rise of 
the political persuasion industries, namely the public relations and advertising industries, as 
detrimental to media’s democratic function, and call for an expansion on journalism’s role in 
society (Ewen 1996).
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James Curran describes two prevailing theories about journalism and its part in 
democracy, a classical liberal approach and a model based in radical democratic theory 
(1991). The classical liberal theory is the most familiar one, where journalism distributes 
information necessary for citizens of a democracy to make rational political choices during 
elections and support the development of independent public opinion by providing a space 
for deliberation free from state control—the fourth estate. Curran describes the radical 
approach’s view of media as “a battleground for contending forces” and not as a space for 
consensus (Curran 1991:29). Howard Tumber (2001) contends that journalism faces two 
pressures in its ability to perform this function. From one side it has pressure from media 
conglomerates and from the other side it faces extreme competition from the Internet for 
journalism’s, until now, exclusive role in providing information to citizens. Tumber blames 
the 24-hour news cycle, due to the demands of the “always-on” Internet and cable 
broadcast news, as exacerbating the problem of legitimacy in journalism, where the 
“information revolution” on the Internet emphasises “speculation and argument [rather] than 
about gathering information” (Tumber 2001:98). He suggests that journalists need to 
develop a stouter theory of democracy specifically to address their roles within democracies 
(109).
Curran observes, however, that the fourth estate theory of media oversimplifies 
notions of where power resides in a society, that is, the liberal theory assumes power is held 
solely by the state and not by other agents, such as capitalistic and paternalistic ones 
outside of government (Curran 1991:29). He suggests, rather, that the media are sites of 
competing forces, in a struggle over keeping a balance of all interests in a democratic 
society, especially those interests that have less access to the public sphere (30). From the 
radical democratic perspective, the media are a “complex articulation of vertical, horizontal 
and diagonal channels of communication between individuals, groups and power structures” 
(31). According to the radical democratic theory the media are a network of exchanges over 
which competing messages representing pluralistic interests vie for recognition and 
acceptance. This theory is related to a trend of the past decade in promoting “civic” or 
“public journalism” or news reporting that involves advocacy on issues and encourages 
community participation in local issues. The claim of public journalism is that it provides a 
“voice to the voiceless" and this concept will be explored more in Chapter Eight. Civic
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journalism dovetails into another theory of journalism’s role in a democracy, that journalism 
provides citizens with information necessary to formulate public opinions and make informed 
political decisions. Alexis de Tocqueville believed that both democracy and journalism were 
necessarily intertwined, that without newspapers unifying the activities and opinions of 
citizens in a democratic culture there could be no functioning democratic system. When he 
examined the role of newspapers in the burgeoning American democracy he found that the 
more numerous the local powers the more prolific the newspapers (de Tocqueville 1994: 
vol. 2,111-114). Another example can be found in the relatively recent development of 
opinion pages in newspapers. In 1970 The New York Times published its first opinion- 
editorial (op-ed) page in decades, which had been unpopular (and virtually nonexistent) with 
most American newspapers, in order to reinvigorate the public political dialogue. The 
section’s popularity quickly set a trend; it is unimaginable today that a newspaper would not 
have an op-ed page (Rosen 1996:1). Journalism can, therefore, provide a forum where 
people can “consider their different, and potentially conflicting, interests” and enrich political 
democratic culture (Haas 2001:127).
3.3 Media’s reproduction of ideology: Laying the foundations for Babel
As I have already shown in Chapter Two, liberal democratic theory tends to determine the 
discussions over the nature of democracy, which pitches politics in a narrowly defined, 
dichotomist relationship between state institutions, namely government and private 
enterprise, and its citizens. In this model the media as it exists in the public sphere is a 
neutral space from which citizens check the state’s power and which mediates between the 
two polar positions of “the rulers” and “the ruled”.
This approach to power extends to the liberal democratic theory of journalism which 
is premised on notions of an objective truth, much like the Enlightenment notion of truth, 
existing “out there” and which only requires a journalist using a scientific methodology to 
uncover it for the benefit of the unknowing public. While many journalists argue that 
objectivity is fundamental to their practice and is what distinguishes their work from the work 
of propagandists, media critics and sociologists of journalism have roiled the rational waters 
of news reporting by questioning their notions of objectivity. While there is an extensive
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body of sociological work on ideology and objectivity, as well as analytical work on ideology 
in the media, in the following discussion I will only focus on a few examples that are most 
relevant to the context of this thesis.
Employing what he calls a Bakhtinian critique, based on literary theorist Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s work on discourse, Stuart Allan troubles the journalistic notion of “objectivity” and 
truth in reporting practice that claims to be “a factual translation of reality” (Allan 1998:127, 
italics in the original). He contends that only voices that validate certain (hegemonic) truth- 
claims make it into the media and are heard, therefore a journalist’s position of being “value- 
free” by employing objectivity can really be seen as a “instance of definitional power” since 
any truth-claims that do not validate certain positions are bracketed and excluded (129). 
Gaye Tuchman demonstrates, furthermore, that the claims of professional objectivity 
employed by journalists, which are ritualised in practices such as only quoting newsworthy 
and trusted sources, are employed to protect themselves from blame, and have little to do 
with the “truth” or “objectivity reality” (Tuchman 1972). Radical democratic theory, on the 
other hand, does not even contend that there is a singular truth but rather there are 
contending interpretations of truth fighting one another for acknowledgment and recognition 
by the public.
While British media studies and the sociology of media are faulted sometimes for 
relying too heavily on a Marxist critique of the cultural reproduction of capitalist material 
conditions, they have been very effective in providing robust work on media production of 
ideology and power (Stevenson 2002). John Fiske, for example, in his examination of the 
British tabloid press observed that the media not only reproduce ideology but produce it:
“The problem with much of the cultural production of the power bloc is 
that it remains insufficiently polysemic and too concerned with the 
discovery of objective truth. The search for a final universal truth, which 
this position implies, is totalitarian rather than democratic. The result is 
the closing down of the plurality of truths that should be allowed 
expression under a democratic order. Arguments that the news should 
be more accurate and objective are actually supportive of the discursive 
practices of the power bloc” (cited in Stevenson 2002:93).
59
In Stuart Hall’s (et. al.) seminal work on British media and social control, Policing the Crisis, 
the authors defined the police, or news sources, the primary definers of an event, and by 
extension the truth of the event, and that the media are the secondary definers, that they act 
as filters of a news event (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Robert 1978). “The media, 
then, do not simply ‘create’ the news; nor do they simple transmit the ideology of the ‘ruling 
classes’ in a conspiratorial fashion. Indeed, we have suggested that, in a critical sense, the 
media are frequently not the ‘primary definers’ of news events at all; but their structured 
relationship to power has the effect of making them play a crucial secondary role in 
reproducing the definitions of those who have privileged access, as of right to the media as 
‘accredited sources’. From this point of view, in the moment of news production, the media 
stand in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers” (Hall et al. 1978:59, 
quoted in Schlesinger 1990:67). Hall argues that ideology of the dominant classes are 
replayed and dispersed through mass media, and while the media play a subordinate role 
within the process they are the main ideological institution of capitalistic, liberal democratic 
political system:
“...[T]he legitimacy of the continued leadership and authority of the 
dominant classes in capitalist society derives from their accountability to 
the opinions of the popular majority -  “the sovereign will of the people”. In 
the formal mechanisms of election and the universal franchise they are 
required to submit themselves at regular intervals to the will or consensus 
of the majority. One of the means by which the powerful can continue to 
rule with consent and legitimacy is, therefore, if the interests of a particular 
class or power bloc can be aligned with or made equivalent to the general 
interests of the majority. ...The consensus is the medium, the regulator, by 
means of which this necessary alignment (or equalisation) between power 
and consent is accomplished. But if the consensus of the majority can be 
so shaped that it squares with the will of the powerful, then particular 
(class) interests can be represented as identical with the will of the people.
...Now consider the media -the means of representation. To be impartial
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and independent ...they cannot be seen to take directives from the 
powerful... but they must be sensitive to, and can only survive legitimately 
by operating within, the general boundaries or framework of ‘what 
everyone agrees’ to: consensus” (Hall 1996:86-87).
Hall shows that through the formation of a consensus, or a majority agreement to the 
frameworks of the discourse on a given issue, that the media are able to maintain that they 
are impartial at the same time that they maintain the frameworks through which they frame 
stories, and thus represent and reproduce the ideology of the powerful. This analysis, 
however, maintains a rather static understanding of how power and ideology operate within 
society.
The production of ideology through the media and its effects on audience has been 
a central area of concern and research for the Glasgow Media Group. One of the significant 
British research groups to study media effects, audience reception and media power, it has 
addressed media coverage of the 1984-85 miners’ strike, HIV/AIDS in the media, science 
and health risk reporting, and popular media such as soap operas. The group (1993) show 
in their work on the media coverage of HIV/Aids in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in 
contradiction to Hall’s contention that the media are subordinate to the definers of news 
events, that the news story (and its construction of truth) is a reflection of the contested 
relationship between a journalist and her source. “What appears in the news is the outcome 
of a process of negotiation between reporter and the source of information” (Miller and 
Williams 1993:126, italics in original).
Furthermore, the group’s research on media audiences has shown how audiences 
actively reinterpret and negotiate media messages. One of the criticisms of focusing on 
audience reception and media effects is the underlying assumption that audiences are 
culturally duped (Kitzinger 1999).The theory that audiences passively consume the ideology 
that is administered via the media is part of a larger mass culture critique which started with 
the Frankfurt School. Thinkers such as Adorno and Marcuse believed that mass popular 
culture, in which art and culture are industrialised and commercialised on a massive scale 
due to advances in productive technologies such as film, the press and broadcast, signalled 
the rise of fascism (Curran and Seaton 1985:254-255). The determinist conclusion drawn
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by the Frankfurt School was that through industrial standardisation, the individual was 
absorbed and dissolved by a mass media that vulgarises culture and serves not to empower 
but to enslave individuals (256). The Frankfurt School did not give much credit to audiences’ 
ability to think for themselves, or their creativity or independence of thought and action, and 
rather believed that through the media we are marching on the road to totalitarianism, 
indeed that the sole reason for mass media’s existence is totalitarianism (257). While 
Habermas was a later contributor to the Frankfurt School, his theory on the public sphere 
and media, much criticised as I have already mentioned, also squares with earlier Frankfurt 
members in regards to their critique of mass media, especially television. Although the 
Habermasian public sphere and media analysis is part of a larger deterministic critique that 
posits the contemporary media as a powerful force of social control, his theory opened up a 
space for critics like Foucault to suggest that where there is power there is resistance which 
was one of the foundations for Laclau and Mouffe to propose a radical democratic theory 
(Curran and Seaton 1985:280). These critiques, from the Frankfurt School through to 
Marshall McLuhan’s “the medium is the message”, were rarely based in empirical research 
of media effects on and meaning making by audiences, however, and although based on 
meticulous historical research, rarely asked audiences what they think about the media that 
they watch, read and listen to. A landmark feminist media analysis of the night-time soap 
based on audience reception, for instance, Watching Dallas by len Ang (1985), did not rely 
on cultural theorists’ interpretations of the cultural imperialism of media but interviewed 
female fans of Dallas to understand how audiences interpret popular media. Ang found that 
far from women being passive consumers of patriarchal ideology and cultural imperialism as 
portrayed by the women characters of Dallas, women actively interpreted and integrated the 
patriarchal stories of jealousy, frustration and lack of self-control, in ironic ways. As Nick 
Stevenson (2002) suggests audiences do not just blindly accept the media “truth” being sold 
to them, “[wjhen people consume media, they assimilate new information into their 
preexisting, perceptual frameworks. It is not so much that the information imposes meaning 
onto people but that people impose meaning onto texts” (30).
The field of media studies, especially as it has been pioneered in Britain, through 
evidence gleaned from research with audiences, show that audiences deserve to be given a 
different and less deterministic look at how they construct meaning and truth-claims from
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mass media, and thus build political knowledge and opinions that contribute to democratic 
culture. How does radical democratic theory conceptualise the media? If power is not 
always situated in the state, and in fact, if power is something that shifts and mutates among 
people, situations, relationships and it is seen in the everyday lives of people, then that 
means the classical liberal model of journalism and media in a democracy can no longer be 
described as a place where the press checks the power of the state and acts in the interest 
of the citizenry. The radical democratic model, then, conceptualises the media as a site of 
contention between pluralistic interests, a place where competing interests fight over 
representations, meanings and recognition. These media struggles are also over who is 
legitimised, and who is not, to become the “definers of truth” through the media. As we shall 
see in the following chapter on e-democracy, the potentials of new media for audiences (or 
users, as audiences are reconfigured as such online) to have more control over media 
frameworks are complicated by their usage of online technologies.
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4 A Fourth Way?: E-democracy
In this chapter on e-democracy, I review the recent history and the social science literature 
of the past three decades on e-democracy. In the review I focus primarily on the e- 
democracy literature that discusses online technologies and its usage in deliberative 
democracy. I also discuss how the examinations of online democracy have not adequately 
challenged liberal democracy and have taken the model as a given in online democratic 
culture. That is, the underlying assumption in discussions around e-democracy has primarily 
centred on institutional politics and political communication in regards to established politics, 
has not questioned or problematised discussions on the legitimacy of the nation-state, and 
considers hegemony as an instrument only utilised by the state and that the Internet has the 
potential to be a space free of state hegemony where (liberal) democracy can be 
strengthened. The social science literature on e-democracy has failed to consider 
sufficiently alternative meanings of democracy which have occupied the ongoing 
discussions over the last twenty years in other intellectual disciplines such as philosophy, 
political science, feminism and culture studies on the nature of hegemony and power, and 
the struggle for justice in societies.
4.1 Technology’s progress marches us towards Utopia (or dystopia?)
In the sociological thinking on technologies technological determinism and the social 
construction of technology are two of several theories that have emerged to explain 
technological usage in societies (Grint and Woolgar 1997; MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999; 
Marcuse 1998; McLuhan 1964). I focus on the technological determinism and the social 
constructivism theories to help outline the key issues that arise in the e-democracy 
literature. In The Machine at Work (1997) Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar set out to define 
the contending theories of technology in order to present some new ways of thinking about
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the relationships between technologies and societies. They define technological 
determinism as a theory that “holds that humans (human behaviour and even the course of 
history) are largely determined by, rather than having influence over, technology” (1997:7). 
For the last thirty years critiques of technological determinism have preoccupied, as well 
have invigorated, sociological scholarship on technology.
According to technological essentialists or determinists the Internet is said to have 
inherent qualities that will either fulfil the promises of democracy or be detrimental to the 
democracy that already exists: transparency, equal access to unmediated information, direct 
communication and direct involvement in the political process, freedom to express oneself, 
or it will encourage undemocratic speech and systems since the technology allows users to 
hide their identities, falsify information, and manipulate the truth (For some examples of this, 
see: Bimber 2003; Howard 2003; McLuhan and Fiore 1967; Sunstein 2002)8. While on the 
one hand the Internet has liberal democratic values embedded into the technology itself 
those very same qualities allow for the technology to be misused and exploited for nefarious 
ends. The technology embodies these qualities and determines how users of this 
technology will employ it based on these inherent qualities. How the users construct the 
technology through the meanings that they give it is generally not considered in the e- 
democracy literature. What is more common is the assumption that there are prior systems 
and values that are imposed onto the technology, such as the values of liberal democracy, 
and users of the technology either validate or inhibit those values.
The social construction of technology, in contrast, theorises that “technology does 
not have any influence which can be gauged independently of human interpretation. Instead 
the influence of technology is constructed through human interpretation” (Grint and Woolgar 
1997:10). By looking at technology through a social constructivist lens, technologies are 
understood to be subjective and open to “radically different interpretations that are 
coextensive with social groups” (Kline and Pinch 1999:114). The Internet then, according to 
the social constructivists, is a result of the enmeshed meanings and uses that the people 
using the Internet give it, and this is reflexive, the meanings reflecting back on how people 
utilise the technology. The Internet has no prior values outside of “the nexus of social
8 While Marshall McLuhan was writing before the emergence of ARPANET and the Internet, technological and 
media determinism is considered to have laid the groundwork for contemporary deterministic discussions about 
the Internet, often labelled ‘NeoMcLuhanism’ (Robins and Webster, 1999:72-75).
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actions” of which it is a part (Grint and Woolgar 1997:10). In the case of the development of 
the Internet, for example, social actions may include the initial conception of a network of 
distributed computers and its design and implementation by US universities and the military, 
and its eventual commercialisation and global application. If the Internet is democratic, it is 
for the reason that the users of the Internet endow that meaning to it and employ it in that 
way, and not because the Internet possesses some intrinsic democratic quality. This is also 
a mutual effect; the Internet becomes democratic since people say that its capacities are 
democratic and this makes people behave democratically online, or, at least, this is how 
they imagine they should behave.
The robust debates and the work that has been done on technological determinism, 
essentialism and social constructivism in the sociological studies of science and technology 
have unfortunately not seemed to have made much of an impact on the discussions of e- 
democracy (Grint and Woolgar 1997; Robins and Webster 1999). As we will see in the 
following review of the e-democracy literature most of the sociological inquiry into 
democracy and communication technologies have implicitly made some deterministic 
assumptions about what the technology, and specifically the Internet, can promise 
democracy.
4.1.1 The beginnings of e-democracv
Journalism and information distribution underwent a transformation in nineteenth century 
which we are still grappling with in the twenty-first century: the invention of the electronic 
telegraph by Cooke and Wheatstone in 1840 (Winston 1998:24). Not only did telegraphic 
communication enable the more timely distribution of information, it also enabled one-to-one 
communication and flattened hierarchies of information distribution. This flattening was most 
evident in the creation of news wire services such as those developed in England that could 
distribute news and information instantaneously to subscribers in regional news markets 
and leapfrog over the political and centralising control of the postal service that, up until the 
widespread deployment of the telegraph, was the sole distributor of news information 
(McLuhan 1964:277). Not only could news now be more “free” of state control through the 
utilisation of this new communications technology, it also shifted the hierarchical dynamics 
of information distribution and access from London to provincial newspapers (277). 
Information and knowledge, furthermore, could be universally distributed from many-to-
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many and this threatened the predominance of the hierarchical one-to-many distribution 
model (Blondheim 1994). Control over information was shifted, fragmented and 
decentralised from the centre to the margins but, as with the printing press before it, there 
were continuing power struggles over the technology. However for every analysis that 
configures a new communications technology as diffusing power and thus a technology that 
supports democracy, there is often another analysis that counters this and contends that the 
technology enables more consolidation of power. Consider for a moment how the telegraph 
transformed information control through the development of the wire news service, Reuters. 
In 1851 British banker Baron Paul Julius de Reuter founded Reuters News Service, using 
the new telegraphic technology. Based on concessions from several governments in 
Europe, the Middle East and North America he won the right to build and control railroads, 
street car lines, exports of oil and minerals, and of course, telegraphic cable (Mowlana 
1992:42). Through both the cooperation of governments and its control of vital enterprises, 
such as transportation and communications in several markets, Reuters maintained a 
monopoly over information and news distribution in many parts of Europe well into the 
twentieth century. Furthermore, Stuart Ewen (1996:52-54) shows that in the early twentieth 
century through the advancement of wire services, far from destroying information 
hierarchies, the widespread emergence of telegraphically distributed news destroyed small, 
locally owned newspapers that were prevalent at the time, which led to a reconfiguration of 
media ownership on a chain basis and a few very powerful families consolidated the 
nationwide newspaper industry. Considering these instances of monopolistic control over 
news information through the diffusion of the telegraph, new players were introduced into 
the field but the presence of the technology did not significantly alter hierarchal power 
relationships concerning news and information distribution. The technology alone did not 
change the informational political landscape and, rather, it was a confluence of several 
factors that altered dynamics but power over information still remained consolidated.
The notion of a decentralised fragmentation of political agency and power through 
technology in many ways endures in contemporary thinking on the nature of the Internet. 
Scholarly discussions continue to posit that the transformative power of online technology 
can change the shape of democratic political culture. “Technological innovations radically 
can alter the organisation of power in politics” is a claim heard quite often in the e-
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democracy literature even though there is little empirical evidence to support it (Howard 
2003:213). The assertion is hardly surprising; virtually every communications medium 
developed during the twentieth century and before it was imbued with the hope that it would 
ultimately fulfil the promise of enhancing robust and universal democratic participation. 
Moreover, this hope willingly ignores the context that each technological innovation was 
developed in; somehow these innovations are tabula rasa that will revolutionise human 
existence. Hans Enzensberger declared in the pre-Internet days (or, at least, in the days 
before its wide usage) of the mid-seventies, for instance, that “[f]or the first time in history, 
the media are making possible mass participation in a social and socialized productive 
process, the practical means of which are in the hands of the masses themselves,” when he 
anointed the transistor radio as the liberating medium of the masses (Enzensberger 1976: 
22). Ideas about popular empowerment and participatory democracy through technology are 
prevalent in the scholarly examinations of e-democracy or online technology’s role in 
democratic communication and politics. I employ the term as it has come to signify at the 
turn of this century: Internet-based technologies used popularly through personal computers 
that enable citizens within a democratic political system to interact with the political 
establishment and with each other. I will show in the next several pages that this idea has 
had several iterations and different monikers as each new communications technology has 
developed, such as the predecessor “teledemocracy”, when from the 1960s and well into 
the 1990s it was believed that cable television (and later, Web and interactive television) 
would transform democratic institutions and politics. For the purposes of my thesis, I will 
limit the scope to the current scholarship on the notions of a web-based e-democracy.
A theme emergent in the development of e-democracy is the prospect online 
technologies have for either deliberative or plebiscitary democracy. From its beginnings as a 
field of study, this dichotomy continues to overshadow the conversation, that is, either online 
technologies will strengthen political discourse between citizens within a democracy or 
online technologies will fortify the election process by making voting and communication 
within established political institutions easier. Both positions claim that through the Internet, 
political information and communication can finally be “liberated” and unmediated by the 
distorting effects of journalism and big media as well as government (Tsagarousianou, 
Tambini, and Bryan 1998; Tumber 2001). Moreover, e-democracy can somehow make
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politics more transparent, and force politicians to be more honest because online 
technologies, such as email or bulletin boards, cut out spin doctoring, allowing citizens to 
communicate directly with politicians. The underlying assumptions are that there exists a 
deep crisis in democracies, which suffer from widespread lethargy and alienation, and that 
Internet-based communication technologies, by their very nature, will resolve this crisis. But 
what is curious about the bulk of the e-democracy literature in this area is that while many 
social researchers make claims that online democratic practices, especially deliberative 
democracy, can exist outside of institutional politics, most of the e-democracy projects 
studied in the 1980s and 1990s were based on municipal or government-sponsored projects 
or on websites that in some way dovetailed into institutional politics.
As early as 1972 sociologist Amitai Etzioni envisioned a networked, real-time, digital 
technology, which would enable citizens to have a dialogue with each other and to broaden 
their perspectives on political issues by collating information from a plurality of sources 
available through the network. He dubbed this imagined electronic network MINERVA. He 
proposed that MINERVA would enhance democratic processes in a “modern, mass society” 
and would ensure that “demagogic influences” would not sway a citizenry firmly engaged in 
a democratic dialogue with itself and with politicians (Etzioni 1972). In his book Strong 
Democracy (1984) Barber suggests a democracy can be strengthened with the help of 
teledemocracy technologies. By the decade of the eighties, civil networking and 
teledemocracy experiments were being conducted using interactive television and within his 
book Barber reviews several of these early projects (261-311). He cites televised town hall 
meetings in the early seventies and interactive television experiments (such as the US- 
based, commercially funded Warner/American Express’s QUBE) as the forerunners of new 
democratic communication and engagement. He envisions several initiatives that could 
revitalise democracy including electronic voting, reforming referenda to include choices that 
would register opinions beyond binary answers, and intensive civil education projects 
including what he calls Civic Videotex Service, which would provide viewers with news, 
information and interactive capabilities with other users to discuss issues all through a 
nationally (in the US) networked system (278-279). During the decades of the seventies and 
eighties, many European governments through state broadcasters and telecoms set up 
broadcast, cable and telephone text-distribution systems accessed through television sets to
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provide civic information. The British government supported the BBC’s development of 
Ceefax (first broadcast in 1974) and Teletext (which distributes textual information via the 
telephone to television sets) during the seventies; in France, the Minitel system employed 
similar technology in 1980; in Spain it was the Ibertex system in 1982; and another nine 
European countries developed similar technologies during the eighties (Carlson 2004). Most 
of these systems are still in use. Yet little over a decade later Barber was not as hopeful 
about the power of new media as he was in 1984. Writing in 1997, three years after the 
release of Mosaic, the first web browser technology to increase popular usage of the 
Internet, he was not convinced that information technologies could restore or strengthen 
democracies (Barber 1997). Media scholar John Street differs from Barber on this and 
argues that information technologies in a democracy do have the potential to change the 
nature of political communication. He suggests that political information and news are 
important only when given form and purpose to produce some action, and that this 
transforms mere information into knowledge. “The technical means employed in imparting 
knowledge actually changes the nature of the knowledge. The form of the technology can 
alter the kind of news reported” (Street 1992:191). In his examinations of 13 teledemocracy 
projects in the United States, F. Christopher Arterton found that while participation in these 
projects informed users and improved their political engagement, information technologies 
are not a complete answer. However, they still have potential: “[tjeledemocracy offers us 
improvements in democracy, not a major transformation nor a final fulfilment” (Arterton 
1987:204).
4.1.2 Online plebiscites
The experiments that broadcast textual information or employed networked, interactive 
television to transmit town hall meetings led to what is now called online “civic networks”. 
These online initiatives, either set up by local governments and municipalities or by private 
organisations, were launched to provide political and civic information, to enable 
communication with constituents and between citizens, and to encourage broader 
participation in institutionalised democratic processes through the Web. It is fair to 
characterise most of these projects as government initiatives, with a few, such as Minnesota 
E-Democracy (e-democracy.org) or The Democracy Network (Dnet, originally developed by
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the US-based Center for Governmental Studies, now maintained by the League of Women 
Voters), being citizen or privately supported projects (Docter and Dutton 1999). One of the 
first and oldest computer-based civic networking projects is in Santa Monica, California. The 
Santa Monica city council first launched the Public Electronic Network (PEN) in 1989 to 
provide public access to governmental information, contact agencies, departments and 
officials as well as provide an electronic citizens’ forum. PEN is maintained by the city’s 
information systems department and was accessible on public terminals within the council’s 
building and in libraries until it was moved to the Internet (Docter and Dutton 1998:126). It 
was during the nineties, however, due to the combined effects of a “user-friendly” interface 
developed for the Internet through browser technology, more widespread usage of cheaper 
personal computers, and a growth in civic organisations, that civic networking projects 
began to flourish (Tambini 1999). In 1993 Manchester hosted a conference on civil 
networking attended by member cities of the “Eurocities” network (an association of cities 
from European Union states), and was the first city in the United Kingdom to implement a 
civil networking programme, called “Telecities” (Carter 1997:147). By 1996 there were 
several examples, by some estimates close to 300 worldwide, of government initiatives on 
civil networking and e-democracy projects and, now, many local and national governments 
have websites that enable citizens to interact with government through online technologies 
as well as offering the possibility to “deliberate” through bulletin boards. Many of these 
government initiatives declare that their mission is to bring every citizen online so that they 
can “fully” participate in democracy. The next step in the evolution of plebiscitary democracy 
is to move voting online and many governments and private organisations maintain that by 
doing so, the problems with voting, namely low voter turnout and efforts to reform campaign 
finance will be solved. Dick Morris (2001) proposes, for example, that the growing popular 
usage of the Internet, which will soon outstrip television news consumption, will force more 
political election campaigns online and will profoundly transform political systems that 
currently rely on high-priced television campaigning to win elections. Morris suggests that 
online campaigns are much cheaper than on-air ones, thus online voting and campaigning 
could solve the dilemma of the spiralling costs (and the high bar of entry to third party 
candidates) of political campaigns. An early example of online campaigning by a political 
outsider comes from the United States. Minnesota’s former governor Jesse Ventura was a
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professional wrestler and joined politics as a Reform Party (third party) candidate whose 
online campaign is credited for winning him the gubernatorial election in 1998. Another more 
recent American example is Howard Dean’s failed campaign in the 2004 Democratic Party’s 
presidential primary race. Despite the fact he failed to win the Democratic Party’s 
nomination, his astounding success in online fundraising, estimated at more than $40 
million, is considered to be a significant challenge to the campaign finance machine 
(Cornfield 2003). While online voting is still not a reality, digital voting machines were 
deployed in both the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections in the United States to 
controversial effect.
Many Western governments have formalised plans to move political campaigns and 
voting online. For instance the British government has a directive from its E-Government 
Unit (EGU) within the Cabinet Office (formerly the Office of e-Envoy reorganised in July 
2004 as the EGU) to have online voting ready for the 2006 elections. The fraud committed 
in Birmingham with postal ballots during the May 2005 elections has implications for how 
reliable the system will be when e-voting is made available (Laville and Muir 2005:5). The 
British government through the EGU, furthermore, declared its mission was to have all 
government services online by 2005. Some of these services include enabling online 
communication with representatives. However, at the time of writing many government 
services have yet to be made available online and assessment on whether citizens actually 
prefer to engage with government bureaucracy online is sketchy at best (Johnson and 
Cross 2005:12)9. In 1998 the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) was successful 
in placing its Resolution 73 which called for a United Nations World Summit on the 
Information Society on the UN General Assembly’s agenda. The UN held the first World 
Summit on the Information Society in December 2003 and as a result of Resolution 56/183,
9 1 worked as the content editor for a local borough council website during 2004-05. While some government 
personnel within the council were very keen to communicate with their constituency and tried to ensure that 
they made all of their documents and services available online and written in plain English, I experienced 
serious resistance most of the time when I asked that responsible departments make more information and 
services available on the council’s website. Furthermore there was no budget to conduct full-scale focus 
groups or surveys to include user input into the design and functionality of the site. In another example Kris 
Cohen, a researcher at INCITE (sociology, University of Surrey) conducted fieldwork on Internet usage in a 
homeless women’s shelter in west London. In a personal communication he told me that the women who were 
awaiting council housing used online government services available on the municipal website to check their 
cases and verify that they were allocated to correct points needed to obtain housing. The women often did not 
trust that their case workers were accurate with points allocation and used government websites to catch 
incompetence in the provision of government services, and not to ‘engage in the democratic process’.
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linked its Charter on Human Rights with people having access to information and 
communication technologies. According to this resolution, one step that brings us closer to 
realising full human rights for all people is being online (Hamelink 2004:76). What is 
prevalent in the literature on online plebiscites and civil networking is a willing acceptance of 
the assumption that simply being online will solve some of the problems of low voter turnout. 
The literature rarely confronts the assertion made by political institutions that low voter 
turnout is a question of convenience and has nothing to do with larger issues of voter 
contempt or a lack of political legitimacy or mistrust of established political institutions. A 
question scarcely raised in the literature is why are governments, municipalities, and official 
political institutions willing to invest so many resources towards the development of civic 
networking and e-democracy programmes in the first place? Could it be, for instance, that 
one of the motivations to invest in these initiatives is that the benefits are really for 
government or the political party in power, and not necessarily felt by citizens? Eileen Milner 
argues that it is governments that benefit since the technological enhancements are 
perceived to be a cost-savings and improve the governments’ bottom-lines (Milner 1999:67- 
69). These online efforts may also be a part of an overall image strategy to improve the 
legitimacy of governance in people’s minds. A report by the Guardian on the millions of 
pounds spent on creating and maintaining government websites that are not utilised by 
constituents seems to contradict Milner’s contention, at least in governments’ motivations for 
cost-savings. In the article Sarah Teather, a Liberal Democrat MP for Brent East, opines on 
the chaotic multitude of government websites: “Instead of a clear and precise structure, 
government websites look like a ball of string with never-ending trails and threads seemingly 
leading to nowhere.... At the moment, government websites look like they are specifically 
designed to make government more opaque, rather than more open and accessible” 
(Johnson and Cross 2005). A more cynical example of suspected nefarious motivations 
behind government enthusiasm for e-voting, as another example, can be found in the 
alleged fraud and misuse of electronic voting in the 2004 US presidential elections.
Miliband shows that parliaments themselves enshrine a “division of labour” where 
professional politicians are left to attend to the business of governance and are “not be 
expected to suffer more interference than they themselves [think] appropriate until the next 
election” (Miliband 1982:39). Critics of online politics cite email as a culprit in the debilitating
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effects of two-way communication on politicians. In 2000 alone more than 6.5 million e-mail 
messages per month were received by members of the US Congress (Howard 2003:217).
In the context of Miliband’s critique of parliamentary democracy, more questions about e- 
government policies need to be asked, such as why would a politician earmark millions of 
pounds to develop and deploy tools for constituents to more easily communicate with them 
if, ultimately, politicians do not want two-way communication with their constituents in the 
first place?
4.1.3 Deliberative democracy online
As I have discussed earlier, many theorists maintain that voting is not the only feature that 
makes a society democratic and some argue it is the nature and quality of the deliberations 
among citizens that is more indicative of democratic societies. Many argue that while 
plebiscites can “quicken democracy” it is deliberation where reasoned judgements are made 
which enrich democracies (Abramson, Arterton, and Orren 1988). Others argue that while 
this may be true about deliberations, online technologies are not the best way to engage in 
democratic discourse, the Internet is good for registering preferences but not much else 
(Wilhelm 2000). A most striking omission in all of the research of online deliberative 
democracy is the fact that online “speech” is quite often spoken using “text”. Questions 
about what happens when deliberations are written and not spoken have never been asked 
in the literature on online deliberations. As we shall see later in this thesis, this is a 
significant dilemma for the Republican Brothers.
Stephen Coleman reminds us that deliberations, at least in Britain’s parliamentary 
democratic system, tend to be confined primarily to politicians, and citizens are spectators 
via the media (Coleman 1999:196). This, he suggests, is why there is widespread civil 
disengagement in politics, voters are bystanders and not participants in the democracy. 
Coleman suggests that “[t]he question, therefore, is not whether such technologies can 
make democratic governance more accountable, but what kind of political channels need to 
be created to enable ICTs to become sources of public empowerment” (1999:200). Indeed, 
providing ways for participation in political debates and communication with representatives 
can make or break a government’s online initiative. Take the example of the Bangalore City 
Corporation which when it attempted to communicate with citizens by developing a new
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website drew heavy criticism for two reasons, it failed to provide any tools on the website to 
enable two-way communication with politicians and it failed to consider the information 
needs of the website’s users, primarily the constituents (Madon and Sahay 2000:184).
Outside of government-based initiatives to provide a forum for public deliberations, 
there is much debate among scholars about whether online deliberations can be inclusive 
and of high quality. These arguments about the quality of deliberation relate to the larger 
debates around political communication in the public sphere, such as those arguments 
discussed earlier in Chapter Two on pluralism and inclusiveness. As (US) constitutional law 
and free speech scholar Cass Sunstein contends, the preconditions of a (liberal) 
information-based democracy must include that citizens have unplanned exposure to 
information and media that they would not have necessarily chosen for themselves and that 
through mass media a society must share in a number of common experiences (Sunstein 
2002:8-9). If either of these conditions is missing Sunstein claims democracy suffers 
because society will fragment into extremist groupings that seek out only the opinions and 
viewpoints of like minded others. According to him, the Internet is an information technology 
extraordinarily conditioned to promote this type of fragmentation since users can filter out 
unwanted information and only read the information they want, including the opinions of 
adversaries. This also extends to online deliberations where u[a]fter deliberation, people are 
likely to move toward a more extreme point in the direction to which the [online discussion] 
group’s members were originally inclined’ (65: italics in original).
In her review of some of the literature that addresses information and 
communication technologies and democratisation, Anna Malina concludes that while these 
technologies can broaden and deepen the democratic process, certain social dependencies 
will determine how well online technologies actually fare. The main dependency is whether 
information is packaged as a “social good” or as a “costly consumer product” and this will 
determine whether the promise of online technologies to improve democracies will actually 
happen (Malina 1999:38). When optimists envision how these technologies might enable a 
more robust democratic practice online, the unspoken assumption is that this ideal of 
democracy is already in place “offline” (1999:33). In terms of whether online forums 
encourage inclusiveness and “reasoned” debate, Jennifer Stromer-Galley (2003) found, 
contrary to the previous and unempirical musings of scholars like Sunstein, most users
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preferred a diverse range of arguments rather than finding people with similar opinions 
(Sunstein 2001; Sunstein 2002). Her findings, based on interviews with users of a public 
chat room, Usenet board and message board, show that users feel it is easier to find a more 
diverse set of opinions online rather than in face-to-face communication because people are 
less reluctant to share their honest opinions online (Stromer-Galley 2003). Interviewees 
revealed that if they have a different opinion from a neighbour that they may meet on the 
street, they would not voice that opinion face to face and find it easier to do so online. In a 
year-long study of online political discussion groups in the run-up to the 2000 US 
presidential elections organised as part of the Electronic Dialogue Project, Price, Cappella 
and Nir found a positive association between encountering and considering disagreement 
online and more deliberative opinions, which they define as “the ability to ground one’s 
viewpoints, not only in supportive arguments but also in an understanding of the kinds of 
arguments that others might make in taking an opposite stand” (Price, Cappella, and Nir 
2002:107). They point to the prevalence of deliberative opinions as evidence of “higher 
quality opinion” and “democracy”, and posit that exposure to disagreements which lead to 
deliberative opinions occur in “public”, including online (108).
Steffen Albrecht found in his research on deliberation on a bulletin board at a 
Hamburg municipal website that a posting gains legitimacy by the number of responses it 
receives and will receive more responses depending on three factors: originality, 
controversy, and personality. In his research findings, the data showed that posters self­
regulated the board, the quality of the debate was higher than other studies have predicted, 
and that while the discourse was not a free-flowing debate “associated with the deliberative 
idea”, it was more often dominated by a few posters or that a small number of postings 
received enormous response (Albrecht 2003:17; Albrecht 2006:75). Self-regulation and 
high expectations for users’ argumentation styles was also found by Zizi Papacharissi in her 
study of 287 discussion threads on several political newsgroups, and contradicts expressed 
fears that online political discussions are uncivil and undemocratic (Papacharissi 2004). The 
findings in the Papacharissi study, where users often engaged in impolite but civil 
discussions, suggest that a reconsideration of what makes discourse democratic, is it civil 
debate or a robust and heated one, is important to understand how it exists online (279- 
281).
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Through his examination of the success of Minnesota E-Democracy, Lincoln 
Dahlberg presents evidence that online technologies serve deliberative democracy very 
well. Since Minnesota E-Democracy set up several tools, including self-moderation, listservs 
and strict guidelines for discussion, users of the site were able to overcome the usual 
problems associated with online forums such as flaming and access (Dahlberg 2001b). He 
concludes by acknowledging that the Internet will not extend the rational-critical discourse 
alone but rather there must be a common will to expand and enrich participation in civil 
society. Testing Habermas’s theory that a robust democracy depends on the authentic 
argumentation and rational-critical discourse of non-state actors, and the results of that 
discourse influences policy, Anthony Wilhelm examines libertarian political bulletin boards 
on Usenet and AOL (Wilhelm 1999). His findings contradict what Stromer-Galley found that 
people utilise these bulletin boards to find diverse or heterophilic opinions. Wilhelm asserts, 
based on not what users said they do but by analysing their posts, that more than 70 
percent of messages could be considered homophilic, either showing strong or moderate 
support for a position (no opposing responses) and that 90 percent of posts on a libertarian 
bulletin board were sympathetic to Libertarian tenets and confirmed theories that people 
reduce information costs by finding information to bolster opinions from other like-minded 
individuals (1999:172). His conclusion that Metcalfe’s Law, which says that the value of a 
network increases by the square of its users, is not validated by his research for the reason 
that the bulletin boards seem to be more about talking and self-expression rather than about 
listening and therefore cannot support collective action, is perhaps nearsighted (1999:174). 
“This causal story of ubiquitous access to technology leading to an expanded interest in 
political matters on the part of the public is accepted, almost with blind faith, although there 
is scant empirical evidence to support such a lofty claim” (1999:157). Indeed, Kevin Hill and 
John Hughes (1998:182) found in their research of American left- and right-leaning Usenet 
groups, that rather than the Internet profoundly transforming politics, it is the politically active 
users of the Internet that will profoundly transform the technology.
There are growing examples of successful collective action using the Internet from 
the antiglobalisation movement, terrorist organizations, to the short-lived trend of 
flashmobbing and the media reform movement, to name a few. Whether these tactics are 
effective in influencing the desired policy, political and social changes on the part of these
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groups is another matter altogether, but there is a growing body of evidence that collective 
action is occurring online with some effect (Bennett 2003; Cleaver 1998; Froehling 1999; 
McChesney and Nichols 2004; Scott and Street 2000). Most of this research, however, is 
occurring in the scholarly work on social movements and not within the e-democracy 
research.
4.2 Liberal and essentialist assumptions
As I have shown many scholars have argued that the Internet and e-democracy are firmly 
enmeshed in the binds of media and media technology history (Allen and Miller 2000; 
Blumlerand Gurevitch 2001; Buchstein 1997; Carter 1997; Lessig 1999; McChesney 2000; 
Street 1999). That the Internet would not, and indeed could not, be controlled by 
government or by capitalist interests, that its very nature meant it would remain in the hands 
of “the people" is, despite of the evidence to the contrary, still given credence and is an 
implicit assumption made in much of the literature. Often there is a failure to recognise or 
acknowledge that the Internet was developed by the very state and capitalistic interests that 
optimists claim it to be in confrontation with, and that its development trajectory is deeply 
embedded in the previously existing media environment. It can easily be regulated and 
controlled by governments as well as commercial interests (as exemplified in the battles 
between the US communications company Verizon among other big media groups and 
American municipalities over community-based WiFi), and finally, it is following similar paths 
of coercion and cooption that all previous media and communication innovations have 
followed including print, radio and television (McChesney 1999; McChesney 2000; Neff 
2005). As MacKenzie and Wajcman have argued about the social shaping of technologies, 
new technologies (and in this case the Internet) do not develop outside their technological, 
social and political contexts but are enmeshed within them, so the Internet’s technologies 
were built upon previous innovations and all of the attendant social implications (MacKenzie 
and Wajcman 1999:9).
What seems to be a common thread in the literature on online democracy, and 
specifically those studies that focus on Internet-based deliberative tools such as bulletin 
boards or chat rooms, is a methodological choice to stay online and restrict analysis to
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discussion threads only. There are a few exceptions, the work of Stromer-Galliey comes to 
mind, but for the most part analysis has relied solely on the textual remnants of online 
discussions without further investigations with the people who left those remnants. In many 
ways by remaining online the studies produced laboratory conditions out of bulletin boards 
and very few give consideration to the social contexts of online political discussions.
Furthermore as this review of the literature on e-democracy shows, most research 
and thinking around online democracy has been confined to Western democracies (and 
institutions like the European Union) and Western theories about democracy as well as 
being overwhelmingly limited to examinations of established political institutions, such as 
voting and communication between politicians and constituents. There is a growing body of 
research on the effects of “netactivism” on politics, especially work that focuses on the 
(primarily) Western antiglobalisation movement’s utilisation of the Internet as well as related 
environmental groups to organise activities (Coopman 2005; Pickerill 2004). I will examine 
this writing further in Chapter Eight but let me say here that the research on net activism, 
while growing as instances of netactivism increase, remains separate from the larger 
discussions on e-democracy. Not only is my goal in the subsequent chapters to shift the 
focus from Western conceptions and realities in regards to both on and offline democracy 
within Islamic and African frameworks, I also aim to broaden the discussion to include 
democratic political culture, in direct contrast to institutionalised politics, and to consider 
alternatives to the liberal democratic model. As Anand Mitra found, the Internet provides a 
space crystallised by deliberations in the Indian diaspora outside “a dominate world view” of 
Indian identity and politics (Mitra 2001:45), it is often not at the centre but at the margins, or 
outside altogether, that interesting phenomena occur. To address political culture, my focus 
is on the margins of political power, such as in the case of the Republican Brothers who live 
in exile outside Sudan and independent, non-mainstream journalists working in the US 
media environment. If there still remains any credence to the assertion that this new 
technology can enable, even in small ways, political transformations to democratic culture, it 
becomes complicated by the meanings the technology is endowed with by the groups that I 
studied for this thesis and discuss in the following three chapters, the Republican Brothers 
and Democracy Now!.
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5 Methodologies
If I took away one lesson from my journalism training that I relied on heavily while 
conducting research for this thesis, it is this: don’t write the story before you go to the 
interview. In other words when I asked my original research questions, is the Internet 
democratic and can a communications technology support democratic culture, I had 
consciously tried not to draw any conclusions on the questions. I did not develop any 
theories beforehand to “test” out in the field and I did not formulate “hypotheses” prior to 
conducting research about the Internet and democracy. I wanted to wait and hear what 
people had to say to me about their own experiences, doubts, thoughts, beliefs and ideals 
for how the technology functions in their lives. What I did was to read a lot of previous 
studies on e-democracy and I did read a lot (maybe too much) on the competing democratic 
theories that have preoccupied the social and political sciences of the last three decades, 
primarily in Europe and the United States, all of which were reviewed in Chapters Two, 
Three and Four. I approached the field with a “wait and see” attitude, I suspended the desire 
to analyse and categorise, but there is no doubt that the literature did influence me in how I 
conceived of what I was learning in the field. Regardless, I wanted to remain open to 
whatever was said to me, to be surprised by what I found and above all, I did not want to 
close down any possible interpretations because they did not fit into a pre-existing 
hypothesis or theory. As I proceeded with the research, I adapted interpretative, 
ethnographic methods to data collection and analysis as I thought this approach seemed the 
most intuitive to me and would produce the richest data possible within the research 
framework.
In this chapter on the methodologies used in the research, I first examine some of 
the definitions that help to frame the research. Next I describe the participants that helped to 
form the two case studies under examination and the field sites where the data was 
collected. I then discuss the ethnographic methods that I used to collect and analyse the
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data, I discuss the data itself and the ethical issues that were considered or arose during the 
research. Finally I describe the processes that I used in analysing the data.
5.1 A study of discourses and frames
5.1.1 Framework of analysis
The literature reviewed in Chapters Three and Four was primarily focused on sociological 
understandings of democracy, information technologies and journalism. This literature, 
especially the previous social science research on “e-democracy”, was predominantly 
centred on what theorists call “deliberative democracy” or how people debate and engage 
with one another through conversation and argumentation on issues, for example, of social 
and political significance, or the present conditions of society. Much of the literature on e- 
democracy and its application in regards to deliberative democracy has been framed around 
Jurgen Habermas’s conception of the public sphere, where participants engage in 
discussions that are said to be critical, rational and where subjectivity is suspended for the 
sake of the argument. Since a part of my task as a social researcher is to address the 
previous literature on e-democracy and determine where my own research fits into or fills in 
a gap in the previous work, I chose to look at how people talk and how through their talk 
they organise horizons of meaning. I decided, however, to depart from what had been done 
in previous research and shift the research frame to analyse how people talk about being 
online and not necessarily to confine my analysis solely to what is actually “said” online.
Most work on e-democracy, for instance, has analysed online textual remnants of political 
deliberations, such as the text one finds on an online bulletin board, and submits this text to 
analysis to determine whether or not democracy can exist online based on this digital 
archaeological evidence alone (Stromer-Galley and Lebret 2005). What I believed was 
more significant to my specific research questions was to understand how people perceive 
online discursive behaviour, especially how it relates to their notions of “democracy”, and 
what this behaviour means to them. I believed that it was more important to the integrity of 
the research for people to explain why they think the Internet is “democratic” or it is not, 
rather than me determining from how people “talk” online, whether it is or is not. Along a 
similar vein I was also interested in learning how journalists, as mediators and gatekeepers
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of political information, conceive of their roles and how their discourse about what journalism 
is supposed to be constructs their roles.
5.1.2 A study of discourses, frames and ideologies
Within this context I was interested in how people make sense of ideologies, that is to say, 
how people organise a comprehensive vision of how society should operate and how is this 
vision constructed through their own discourse. Since I was looking at the political 
ideologies constructed by the discursive cultures of two groups, the Republican Brothers 
and journalists at Democracy Now!, I had to think critically about the definitions of 
“discourse” and “ideology”. Discourse in the context of the research reported in this thesis 
can be defined as being the words (either spoken or written) used by participants to 
construct frameworks that they use to interpret their understanding of the world. In short I 
am interested in looking at how people talk about the social contexts in which they live and 
how this talk constructs those contexts. I was interested in understanding discourse as “a 
system of representation” that produces meaning and knowledge (Hall 2001:72). In this 
sense it should be considered in the Volosinovian understanding of discourse, that it is 
“ideological in that it arises between socially organised individuals and cannot be 
understood outside its context” (Meinhof 2002:165). Within this definition, ideology is 
intertwined with discourse, and can be seen as a system of ideas or beliefs that are 
organised by discourse. My approach to the ideologies used by the Republican Brothers 
and journalists at Democracy Now! was to understand them as systems of thinking about 
the world, of organising it and ultimately, of constructing through discourse the horizons of 
what “should be”, their utopian visions of how society ought to be but which does not exist 
now.
In my analysis of the data I looked at how participants talked about (and what they 
did not talk about) and how they framed the topics under study: democracy, information 
technologies and journalism. I did not submit their discourses to a process of intensive 
discourse analysis such as has been suggested by Potter and Wetherell (1987); rather I 
used an interpretative ethnographic approach to analyse the discourse of the research 
participants, which I will explain in depth later in this chapter.
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5.2 Participants: two case studies
5.2.1 The Republican Brothers
When I was considering how to approach my research, I knew that I wanted to study a 
social group that lived outside their home country and who were using web-based 
communications to participate in political discourse about politics happening “back home”. I 
also knew that I wanted to study a group of web-based journalists on how they constructed 
and construed meaning about their roles within a democratic culture. With both case studies 
opportunities seemed to stumble into my path rather than be organised neatly around my 
research questions.
For example I first approached the Republican Brothers, the progressive Sufi 
brother and sisterhood from Sudan that forms the first of my two case studies, because their 
story seemed to embody some of the issues that I was grappling with regard to liberal and 
radical democratic theory and new information technologies. I learned of the group when I 
moved to London to pursue my postgraduate studies. My sole friend in London at the time, 
who, despite knowing him for years, had never told me of his religious affiliation with the 
Republicans, one night mentioned as I was leaving his flat that he and his wife would be 
interviewed by the BBC’s World Service about their marriage the following day. Intrigued, I 
asked what was so extraordinary about their marriage that the BBC would be interested in 
talking with them. This is when he sat me down and told me about Republican Thought, the 
execution of Ustadh Taha and how the Republicans were exiled. One of the reasons for the 
Republicans’ exile, he said, was due to their progressive ideology and reformist theology in 
regards to Islam, human rights and democracy. This is why the BBC was interested in them; 
their marriage represented an alternative to some of the Western media stereotypes about 
gender roles in Islam, women’s and minority rights, and presented a liberal, progressive 
Islamic answer to religious fundamentalism.
There were several factors that made the Republicans interesting for a case study 
for the purposes of my research on democratic cultures and online discourse. The first 
reason was that the group was politically marginalised by exile and conducted their political 
discourse outside of the establishment politics of Sudan. The second factor of interest was 
that due to exile, many members engaged in political discourse with Sudanese people
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outside of their own group, and that the majority of this engagement was online. My friend 
had told me that before exile the Republicans had become famous for their “speakers’ 
corners”, the daily discussion groups dubbed “al-rukun” established in various public spaces 
throughout Khartoum. He described how now in exile Republicans were continuing this 
project through online technologies. He also told me how the religion’s leader, Ustadh 
Taha, held daily discussions with members in his “saloon”, the sitting room in his Omdurman 
home. Because the Republicans were a politically marginalised group engaged in public, 
political discourse, both orally and through either paper-based or online media, about their 
visions of democratic justice in Sudan, they seemed to embody the counterpublics that I had 
been reading about in my review of the literature and I thought that their example may offer 
an interestingly alternative perspective on online democratic discourse and e-democracy.
From this one friend I was introduced to other Republicans who either lived in the 
United Kingdom or in the United States, or who were passing through London from a Gulf 
country (many Sudanese live in Dubai, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait) or Sudan on their way to 
a third country. For the Republican case study I interviewed 22 participants, 13 who were 
Republicans and nine who were non-Republican Sudanese exiles or Sudanese people 
living outside Sudan to work and to study, with the exception of two who lived in Khartoum. 
Of the Republicans interviewed all but one were exiled. Of the nine non-Republicans, most 
maintain friendships with individual Republican members while one non-Republican 
participant considered himself an adversary of the movement, but still maintained respectful 
but more formal friendships with individual Republicans. Most of the non-Republicans 
interviewed expressed a deep respect and admiration for the Republicans even though they 
did not necessarily agree with their theology. All of the Republicans and non-Republicans 
interviewed are professionals in the fields of psychiatry, medicine, computer engineering, 
human rights, linguistics, journalism, women’s studies, communications, business 
administration, fine arts, and law. All participants hold advanced degrees in their prospective 
fields except for one participant who is currently studying medicine at university. Most 
started their studies at a university in Sudan and after leaving, pursued advanced degrees in 
the US and the UK. Many of the participants had worked in their professions in Sudan and 
continued to work in their fields in exile since most of the participants were in their forties 
and fifties, with the exception of second generation Republicans who were in their late teens
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and early twenties. Nearly all participants have been highly mobile since the two waves of 
exile, in 1985-86 and again in 1989-90, with many spending time in the Gulf states and 
moving between the US and the UK. It has only been possible for some of the participants 
to return to Sudan for short visits as recently as 2004.
5.2.2 Democracy Now!
It was during an interview with one of the Republican participants who lived in the United 
States that I learned about the group that formed the second case study in this thesis, 
Democracy Now!. This participant mentioned that she watched the programme nearly daily 
on her local cable access station and since I had not heard of Democracy Now! until her 
mentioning it, I decided to look into them further. When I had originally decided that I should 
study both the Republicans and a group of journalists, my first choice was to study Voice of 
America (VOA) journalists and the Africa section of VOA’s website. Very early on in my 
research, however, I had great difficulty in gaining access to the organisation and it became 
apparent that I would not be able to gain the level of access to individual journalists that I 
needed in order to collect enough data to serve as balance against all of the rich data I was 
collecting on the Republicans. It was around the time that I realised that I could not study 
VOA that I came across Democracy Now! and felt that there was a strong enough link 
between the Republicans and Democracy Now! in my research, especially since none of the 
Republican participants had mentioned VOA as a programme they followed. Democracy 
Now! was also attractive to me in several other ways; its title explicitly references my 
research topic, democracy, it is a multimedia news programme with a large web presence, 
and it is an alternative, independent media outlet. Similar to the Republicans, the 
programme stands outside of mainstream, establishment politics in the United States. 
However, the significant difference for Democracy Now! journalists is that this is an 
ideological and conscious choice and not a forced marginalisation. All of these factors 
helped me to settle on researching Democracy Now! for the second group. When I 
approached Democracy Now!, despite the enthusiasm employees expressed about my 
project, it quickly became obvious that given how small the organisation is and how busy 
producers are as a result, the best way for me to understand the organisation was to 
volunteer and observe it from the inside. Producers just did not have the time to sit down
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with me to discuss their views and experiences at great length. In fact one producer who 
approached me was very interested in being interviewed but was always pressed for time.
He recommended that we conduct the interview on his day off for otherwise we would be 
constantly interrupted, which we did.
For the Democracy Now! study, I interviewed four producers and conducted onsite 
fieldwork at the studio for an intensive period of two weeks, and then embarked on “virtual” 
fieldwork primarily by email with occasional visits to the studio when I was in New York City 
during the seven-month virtual fieldwork period. Much of the data for the Democracy Now! 
case was gleaned from the programme’s production work in broadcast, online and in print. 
The programme at present employs 31 people, most of whom are in their twenties or early 
thirties, with the exception of senior journalists Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez who are 
both in their mid- to late forties. All participants hold bachelors or masters degrees in 
journalism, history, archiving, fine art, international studies, video production, and literature. 
Most participants came to Democracy Now! after having some journalistic or human rights 
work experience in developing countries or after having previously worked for mainstream 
media in the United States, and in some cases, having worked for other alternative media 
groups and independent radio.
For the study of the Republicans, most of the data I analysed came from interviews 
and some from listserv and bulletin board postings, and website content. Some data from 
the Republicans also came from books and pamphlets. The Democracy Now! data was 
much more dependent on produced content, either content that was broadcast, distributed 
on DVD, posted to the website and printed in magazines, newspapers and books. Because 
of my more restricted access, I could not rely as much on interview data from Democracy 
Now! producers as I had with the Republicans’ case study.
5.3 Field sites and access
Although much of my time spent in the field was online, most of my fieldwork was conducted 
offline over a 24-month period, with about 17 months spent with the Republicans and 10 
months with Democracy Now!. However there were plenty of overlapping moments when I 
was with both groups, especially during January 2005. A lot of my time in the field with
86
Republicans was spent on sofas in participant’s sitting rooms, and involved watching 
television, talking and eating. Discussions would vary from the distinctions between tea 
ceremonies among different Sudanese ethnic groups, to the ongoing events in Iraq where 
some participants because of their human rights work had first-hand experience of 
conditions of post-invasion Iraq. In between bites of warm bread and baba ganoush, we 
talked about the history of the Republican Brothers, the discussion corners and all of the 
conflicts and discussions on assaloon.org (the Republican closed, online bulletin board 
discussed in Chapter Seven) and sudaneseonline.com (a non-Republican, Sudanese 
bulletin board also discussed later). I was careful to restrict myself to quietly observe, asking 
questions but not offering too many of my own opinions, which was easy since I am a 
novice when it comes to understanding the complexities of Sudanese politics. Most of these 
visits occurred in sitting rooms in North London and Hastings.
I made two trips to the United States in October 2004 and January 2005. The first 
was to meet the webmaster and another Republican family living in Charlotte, North 
Carolina and while I was there, the webmaster showed me the physical archive that he has 
(books, pamphlets and audio tapes), the server that houses the digital archive, all the 
iterations of the website and a listserv archive. He allowed me to go through the English- 
language listserv archive and gave me copies of postings that were relevant to my research. 
First, however, he removed identifying information from all postings, including email 
addresses, aliases and names of people within the body text of postings.
The second trip was to attend the commemoration ceremonies that marked the 
twentieth anniversary of Taha’s death. I travelled to Iowa City, Iowa and spent three days in 
Republican and non-Republican homes. There I was able to interview several Republicans 
and non-Republican Sudanese and American people as well as to observe several 
performances of Inshad (sung, repetitive prayers or chants that are unique to the 
Republicans) and listen to lectures and presentations on Taha’s life and the Republican 
movement.
From the beginning of my fieldwork with the Republicans it was decided by the 
webmaster that I should not have access to the closed bulletin board, assaloon.org. Rather I 
was registered with the public bulletin board on the Republican website alfikra.org and 
introduced to the board members by the webmaster, after I had provided him with a
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summary of my research project, my contact information, my university’s name, address 
and department, and the names of my PhD supervisors. On the open board I was able to 
interview three participants who were interested in my project. Two were Republicans and 
one was a non-Republican Sudanese person living in Khartoum. For these interviews I used 
the private message function, which allows for total confidentiality, on the alfikra.org bulletin 
board to conduct the interviews. After each interview I copied and pasted the texts into Word 
documents and deleted the messages from my private portion of the bulletin board. Due to 
my limited abilities in Arabic, I was restricted to analysing the English-language postings and 
the English version of the website and I had to conduct interviews in English. English was a 
fluent, second language for virtually all participants except for second generation 
Republicans, for whom English was their first language.
At Democracy Now! I started volunteering at the studio in January 2005 and 
continued to volunteer at the studio periodically when I was in New York, mostly during the 
months of March, May and August 2005 or through email when I was in London, every week 
from February to May 2005. When I was in New York from May through August 2005,1 
volunteered weekly via email, with occasional visits to the studio. Before volunteering, I 
coordinated my presence as a researcher and as a volunteer with one of the outreach and 
community organisers and fully disclosed to him my research project. I then presented a 
summary of my research project to the volunteer coordinator and asked his permission to 
ask producers for interviews. He asked me to send emails to each producer to solicit 
interviews. Through this email and through personal contact with individual producers I was 
able to arrange four interviews. Before each interview I explained more about my research 
project and provided each interviewee with a statement of confidentiality. All supporting 
documents, including email invitations for interviews, copies of interview questions and 
confidentiality statements, appear in the Appendices.
During the observational period as a volunteer, I entered information on audience 
and supporter donations into a database, I put together orders of t-shirts, DVDs and coffee 
mugs for shipping, and I entered tape information into the archive database. My online 
volunteering participation was to edit show transcripts that were posted to the programme’s 
website, which I did once a week continuously for 30 weeks. This normally took one and half 
hours to complete and involved direct email communication with the volunteer coordinator
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every week. My other volunteer activities meant that I had direct interaction with the 
accountant, the archivist and the outreach coordinators. During January 20051 spent two 
weeks, eight hours each working day (Monday through Friday) volunteering at the 
Democracy Now! studio. During this period of observation, I was invited by Amy Goodman 
to attend a web meeting with the producers and the web consultant hired to revamp the 
website. I was able to observe discussions around the programme’s website and the 
constraints faced by producers in developing a robust and interactive site. I also spent one 
morning observing the production of a show in January and had many opportunities to 
observe how the back office work of the programme operates, from the type of music that 
was played in the office to the joking banter that occurred between volunteers and 
Democracy Now! employees. I decided to adopt this strategy with Democracy Now! due to 
several factors. The first priority was to guarantee access to the organisation itself. I wanted 
to observe first hand the daily operations of the programme and to see how journalists did 
their jobs. I needed to see for myself how the organisation is run on a day-to-day basis to 
appreciate how journalists produce news stories and the factors that influence the 
production of the website. Secondly, I wanted to have experience as a “virtual” volunteer 
since the programme at that time had just started recruiting volunteers to work offsite 
through the Internet. By volunteering both in the studio and “virtually” I developed a well 
rounded understanding of the organisation, at least from the perspective of a volunteer. 
During the web production meeting I was able to better understand why the website appears 
the way that it does. Most producers would love to have the website be more interactive but 
owing to a severe lack of time resources the website must remain less interactive. I would 
not have been able to gain this level of understanding without being an observer at 
meetings where these discussions were taking place. I also gained a much better 
understanding of just how thin resources are spread for the independent media 
organisation, most of the back-end work and even some production work (very light) is done 
by volunteers. I also gained valuable insight into the culture of the organisation, which 
helped to serve as a balance against all of the rich data that I had also gained by my time 
spent with the Republicans.
For both the Republicans and for Democracy Now! I maintained field notes and a 
journal that helped me to analyse data. For both groups I also collected digitised materials
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from their respective websites and I used archive.org extensively to analyse past iterations 
of both sites. In the case of Democracy Now! this proved to be particularly useful since the 
website has changed dramatically over the years, especially since September 2001 when 
the programme started its television broadcasts. After the beginning of television 
broadcasts, for instance, the website became more neutral in terms of partisan framing and 
the look and feel more professionalised and closer to the design standards used by 
mainstream news programmes. Through archive.org as well as the programme’s own 
archive on its current website I was also able to go back either to read transcripts or to 
watch programmes on significant stories, such as Democracy Nowl’s breaking story on the 
ousting of President Aristide, and to include transcripts of shows in my coding and analysis 
of the data from the website. In terms of the Republicans I relied heavily on interview 
transcripts for my analysis and on one listserv thread that was particularly pertinent to my 
specific topic of online deliberative democracy, which is discussed at length in Chapter 
Seven.
5.4 A grounded ethnographic approach to data and analysis online and off
While my research does involve a relatively new information technology, the Internet, the 
methodologies that I relied on to collect and analyse data are grounded in methods that 
have now become traditional and even “old standards” for qualitative research; participant 
observation, open-ended, semi-structured interviews, and content analysis (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2003:1-2). I should also mention that these methods were chosen for me by my 
own limitations, rather than by making a conscious choice over one method or another, at 
least when I first began my research project. My limited abilities in Arabic, for instance, 
forced me to choose methods, such as semi-structured interviews, to supplement the 
content analysis of online forum postings. These methods helped to return the richest data 
possible despite the language barriers. I also chose methods that seemed more familiar to 
me based on my previous training and experience as a journalist, although my professional 
background did little to prepare me for the complexities of qualitative and interpretative 
analysis.
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Most of the time that I spent in the field “researching the Internet” was actually not 
online at all but rather in peoples’ living rooms talking about the Internet over hot tea, 
Sudanese style, with a piece of cinnamon and lots of sugar, or an overgenerous portion of 
Umm Ali (literally: Ali’s mother), a delicious and very comforting warm dessert. When I 
approached participants for interviews, I often introduced myself as an “Internet researcher” 
and each time that I did, a pang of guilt would chill my veins. How could I call myself an 
Internet researcher? I spent most of my time in the “field” stuffing my face while sitting in 
front of, not a computer, but a turned-down television set airing satellite programmes from 
Dubai while someone talked about the latest argument blaring on sudaneseonline.com, an 
online bulletin board mostly in Arabic that I cannot read because I have only taken 
beginning Arabic and have very little chance of saying anything in Arabic beyond 
“Goodness, is it time to eat already?” and “Thanks for preparing such a wonderful meal” 
(Ebeling 2004). My lack of fluency in Arabic also meant that I could not analyse listserv and 
bulletin board postings written in Arabic on Sudanese sites using quantitative methods. 
Regardless of my limited language abilities, I was not interested in pursuing, say, the 
frequency or breadth of online political discourse among Sudanese web users. I was far 
more interested in the “socially constructed nature of reality [online], the intimate relationship 
between [myself as] the researcher and what is studied, and the situational constraints that 
shape inquiry” (Denzin and Lincoln 2003:13). What was important to me, as Denzin and 
Lincoln point out about qualitative researchers more generally, was how the social 
experiences and contexts of participants is created and endowed with meaning by them and 
how my own “value-ladenness” influences the research process (2003:13).
There were many points during this project that I felt like an Internet impostor, 
especially since I had read so many previous studies where researchers chose to restrict 
their research to online settings only and did not venture offline. Sometimes it seemed to me 
I took the opposite strategy, rarely venturing online. I knew, however, that by conducting my 
research in multiple sites, both online and off, I would understand better the social contexts 
within which the participants who agreed to take part in my study constructed and construed 
meanings about the Internet, democracy and public political discourse. When I looked at a 
string of postings they seemed flat for the reason that I did not understand the context in 
which they were composed. This underlined for me the more fundamental factor that
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influenced my application of ethnographic methods to the research; the ethnographic 
methods that I chose reflected my own political position towards social research. As 
Norman Denzin notes, the choice of one method over another is ultimately an intimately 
political one and my choice of qualitative methods meant that it was necessary for me to 
reengage “the promise of qualitative research and interpretative ethnography as forms of 
radical democratic practice” (2003:459). As a social researcher I was very uncomfortable 
with the prospect of approaching the field and social settings with a preconceived theory 
about what I would find. I was far more interested in hearing how people construed meaning 
from their own social realities and suspend theorising about what it meant for e-democracy 
until I was out of the field. I had read several e-democracy studies before embarking on my 
own field research that had tried to quantify or to find evidence for theories about online 
democracy and to me these studies reflected a positivist attitude towards empirical 
evidence. I felt it was important to let the data unfold itself, to allow it to tell its own story and 
I did not set out on my research to prove my own or other previous theories right or wrong. 
Ultimately I did not want to shut down possibilities for interpretation by obscuring the stories 
that the data could tell us by imposing my own or other pre-existing theories about 
democratic discourse or online democracy onto the data that I collected.
It was out of this concern to maintain openness to interpretation of the data that the 
decision to use ethnographic methods for my research was made. Paul Atkinson and 
Martyn Hammersley define ethnography as having:
“a strong emphasis on exploring the nature of particular social 
phenomena, rather than setting out to test hypotheses about them; a 
tendency to work primarily with “unstructured” data, that is, data that 
have not been coded at the point of data collection in terms of a closed 
set of analytic categories; investigation of a small number of cases; 
analysis of data that involves explicit interpretation of the meanings and 
functions of human actions, the product of which mainly takes the form of 
verbal descriptions and explanations, with quantification and statistical 
analysis playing a subordinate role at most” (Atkinson and Hammersley 
1994:248).
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The integration of ethnographic research with a grounded approach to data collection and 
analysis as proposed by Kathy Charmaz and Richard Mitchell seemed to be the best 
methodological decision to help me achieve my research goals (Charmaz and Mitchell 
2001). While suggesting that a social researcher should use an array of methodological 
tools available to her, they point to an integrated grounded ethnographic approach as 
providing the best of both methods. For ethnography a grounded approach can “sharpen the 
analytical edge and theoretical sophistication of ethnography” and ethnography “connect[s] 
theory with realities, not just with research” and thus helps researchers to delve deeper into 
social phenomena “to understand experience as their subjects live it, not simply talk about 
it” (Charmaz and Mitchell 2001:161).
Throughout the research process I was interested in understanding the social 
contexts of both groups, as they exist through the entire spectrum of the media 
environment, not just the online environment. I am not the first one to question the false 
categories and dichotomies of online and offline, real and virtual. In fact recently many 
social scientists have been showing through their research that the early enthusiasms or 
alarmist speculations around the Internet that created these dichotomies just do not hold up 
in the face of the growing empirical evidence, gleaned both on and offline (Ebeling 2004; 
Jordan 1999,2001; Miller and Slater 2000; Sunden 2003; Woolgar 2002). Christine Hine, for 
instance, recognised in her recent review of online research methodologies that social 
scientists who study the Internet have thankfully moved away from the expectation that 
there is a distinct social life online separate from other social realities and are more apt to 
view the Internet as “simply another context where social life is lived” (Hine 2004: section 
1.4). She also emphasises by pointing to recent ethnographic studies of online phenomena 
that use more conventional methods such as in-depth interviews, that “each localised study 
has its areas of selective attention, and that by focusing too far on online settings in their 
own right we may be forgetting factors which shape the availability and nature of those 
settings” (section 4.4). Citing a study by Pleace et al. (2000) she notes that the use of 
ethnographic methods offline are important in explaining how participants make sense of 
online interactions, something that cannot be gleaned from solely observing online 
interactions. Nina Wakeford, for instance, produced some of her richest ethnographic data
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about the Internet not by sitting in front of a computer screen but by sitting in telecentres and 
Internet cafes in North London (Wakeford 2003).
Perhaps more crucially, however, the use of offline ethnography helps social 
scientists “to explore the embedding of online interactions in other aspects of social life” 
(Hine 2004: section 2.3). So more sociological attention is being paid to understanding how 
the larger social contexts impact online culture and interaction, and vice versa. 
Ethnographers such as Hine or Daniel Miller and Don Slater with their work on Trinidadians 
and the Internet, as another example, have challenged the assumptions of the split between 
real and virtual and have shown that to understand social realities lived online, a researcher 
must abandon the notion of collecting data from a single, unified online field site and spend 
time in one or several “offline” sites (Hine 2000; Miller and Slater 2000). As Miller and Slater 
advise “...if you want to get to the Internet, don’t start from there”, and in terms of my own 
research I could second that with “if you want to get to online democracy, don’t start from 
either” (Miller and Slater 2000:5). In fact Miller and Slater turn the very notion of virtual on 
its head and claim it to be a completely inappropriate term when describing Trinidadians 
online, that their experience is part of a larger material culture. I would contend that is true 
for any group, not that being online is experienced in a universal way for every user but that 
going online is part of a larger material culture and pre-existing social context, much like as 
Steve Woolgar (2002) notes that online experience exists in parallel with other media and 
social experiences and it is through the study of the particularities and multiplicities of online 
and offline experience that online cultures can be better understood. My guilt about being an 
Internet impostor was the key to understanding what is happening online with the 
Republican Brothers and Democracy Now!. While I was sitting around, looking at photo 
albums, newspaper clippings, listening to members reminisce about how things used to be 
before the execution and ruminations on how things are different now, packing boxes or 
watching a show production, watching Al-Arabiyya television, and talking about the Internet 
but not spending time on the Internet, I was learning about the social context that 
Republicans and Democracy Now! use to engage in and make sense of online political 
discourse.
In their work Opening Pandora’s Box, a book about discursive strategies used by 
scientists, G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay defend their use of discourse analysis over
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observational techniques solely by arguing that “it seems best, then, to conceive of the 
meaning of social action, not as a unitary characteristic of acts which can be observed as 
they occur, but as a diverse potentiality of acts which can be realised in different ways 
through participants’ production of different interpretations in different social contexts” 
(Gilbert and Mulkay 1984:9). In the methodologies that I chose in my research, I too 
focused on the discourse of my participants but my analysis was strengthened by the use of 
observational ethnography to gain deeper insights into the social contexts of participants. So 
in a similar way to Gilbert and Mulkay, I found that to get to the bottom of democratic 
discourse online, I would not be able to determine what makes discourse democratic simply 
by observing discussion strings or bulletin board postings threads and declaring that due to 
the presence of xory, a particular line of online political discourse denoted or did not 
democratic speech. The analytical framework for understanding the discourse of 
participants was strengthened due to my experience with participants offline. In this way I 
could understand the meanings and interpretations that the participants themselves make of 
political opinion or discourse and of how they make sense of their experience of “being 
online”. If I remained online solely to observe these social interactions, I may have 
interpreted one posting that accuses the Republicans of being kaffirs (in English: 
nonbelievers; a very insulting word) as being undemocratic and missed the fact the 
Republicans themselves interpret these speech acts, what they call “violent”, democratic 
within their own interpretative framework. Observing “violent speech” online out of the social 
context of Republican sense-making and interpretation of that speech would provide me no 
deep insights and could lead to the false conclusion that Republican political discourse is 
nondemocratic. Additionally, by placing myself in offline field sites, I have a better 
understanding of the sense of loss and longing that comes with being in exile, something 
that is not readily apparent in Republican online culture.
I approached the Internet then through a side door. I used it as a talking point or 
springboard to discuss other issues such as the nature of democratic pluralism; the 
complexities, contradictions and painful realities of Sudanese identity or the alienation of 
American politics, and how these are the discussions on sites such as sudaneseonline.com 
or among American alternative media, and what exactly are the qualities of deliberations 
that make them “democratic”. I have collected data from multiple field sites, most of them
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not even remotely online but I have been emboldened by Nicola Green’s suggestion in her 
work about virtual reality and research methods, that we need to “disrupt the field” and 
shatter the illusion of a neat and tidy, bounded field site (Green 1999).
5.5 Ethical considerations
While I followed the ethical guidelines of both the British Sociological Association and the 
Association of Internet Researchers10 closely to guide my conduct during the research 
project, several ethical implications arose which caused me to reassess how to handle 
particularly thorny ethical issues. The most complicated ethical issues arose in my research 
with the Republican Brothers. Since I was being introduced to other Republicans by one 
member who was also a friend of mine, anonymity was a specific problem to be addressed 
early on. Obviously I could not promise this to any participants. What I could and did 
promise was confidentiality for anything they told me in interviews or anything they wrote to 
me, either in letters, online or through email. I changed all the names of participants, spoke 
of their occupations and where they live in general terms or changed their location 
altogether. Most participants, both Republicans and producers at Democracy Now!, 
however, wanted me to use their actual names in my final report. Some social scientists, 
especially feminists ethnographers such as Barbara Heyl (2001:373), have argued that 
when requested by informants, a researcher should use real names as a way of 
empowering interviewees and giving them more control over the process. Given the political 
context for most participants I interviewed, however, I was not comfortable with using 
informants’ real names or identifying information. I had heard too many stories during 
interviews of Sudanese government informants watching and reporting on exile 
communities to the authorities and, as a result, the physical dangers that people faced.
Even though I was fairly confident that no government informants would actually read my 
thesis, I felt compelled to protect informants’ identities as best as I could. I explained to 
those who asked me to use their real names, that as a social researcher, I did not feel 
comfortable to do this and all names and significant biographical data have been changed.
10 The guidelines can be downloaded from britsoc.co.uk and aoir.org respectively.
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I did not discuss the content of previous interviews with participants and I avoided 
raising information that was disclosed to me in one interview with other participants. There 
were occasions where this was unavoidable. For example, I learned in one interview that 
Republican members were no longer using the online meeting facilities on their website to 
conduct prayer meetings. This was a significant finding since it had been an erstwhile 
popular activity for Republicans. Once I learned of this phenomenon, in subsequent 
interviews I would specifically ask if the interviewee was participating in the online prayer 
meetings and why they chose to or not to. I was careful, however, not to explain how I 
learned about the drop in participation levels.
Some of my interviews were conducted with two or more Republicans together in 
one sitting. This was by the agreement of all those interviewed and members were quite 
candid during our conversations despite the presence of other Republicans. For those 
interviews that were conducted online through the private message function of the public 
bulletin board on alfikra.org, I copied all the messages to a Word file, changed the name of 
the interviewee and deleted the private messages immediately from the private message 
function. I provided each participant with a written statement of confidentiality as well as 
information about access to the transcripts of their interviews. Before starting each 
interview, I reiterated to the interviewee what my PhD thesis was about, the purpose of the 
interview, what I would do with the data collected from the interview, and how I would 
guarantee the interviewee’s confidentiality. I also reminded them that they could stop the 
interview at any time and if they changed their mind at a later date about what they told me, 
they could ask me not to use their interview data in my analysis. All data was kept on a 
secured laptop or paper files, with some data (larger photo and audio files) moved to CDs 
and kept in my sole possession. At no time did I share any original data with anyone, not 
even my supervisors.
Only one interviewee asked to see her transcript after I had transcribed the 
interview. I gave her a copy on which she added or clarified key comments she had made 
during the original interview. It was more important to me that she felt comfortable with what 
she had said than for me to have the original transcript unaltered. It was also important that 
she was assured that I had understood her intended meaning after she had amended the 
transcript. As with any other social situation, there are times that most of us look back on
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them and think, “Oh if only I had said this or that, I would have made myself clearer”. I did 
not want to deny her the opportunity to clarify herself. I believe that by having given her the 
transcript to amend it not only helped to clarify her intended meanings, but more importantly, 
it reinforced the bond of trust and respect that we had shared during the research process.
In the end I decided not to include her transcript in my final analysis because of other factors 
that I will explain shortly.
The development of trust between me and my informants was essential in my 
approach to the Republicans. Because my friend was willing to introduce me to others, 
through this relationship I had an “in” to the group as well as a certain level of trust since my 
friend was a well respected and trusted member of the group. Yet because of this 
friendship, I had to be extra vigilant that this relationship would not compromise 
confidentiality or personal boundaries of other participants. Most participants, however, were 
very excited and happy that I was interested in them as a group as well as individuals, and 
trusted me to respect their boundaries of privacy and to protect their identities, especially 
given the politically sensitive nature of our discussions. Many of the Republican participants 
were academics who had their own PhDs and were familiar with the qualitative research 
methods that I was using to collect data; some had used similar methods in their own 
research. Despite this I could not assume that just because they had also used similar 
research methods, that they would automatically agree to my use of these methods in 
regards to their participation. Before each interview I explained how I would use the data for 
my research, how I would transcribe the interviews, analyse what was said and develop 
findings from these data to apply to the larger issues of e-democracy under study.
Towards the end of my field research something occurred that devastated me 
personally, underlined the gravity of the reality faced by the research participants, and 
forced me to rethink how to handle confidentiality. One of the participants I interviewed was 
an oppositional political leader of great significance, and had returned to Sudan for a short 
visit months after our meeting. When this person arrived at Khartoum airport, they were 
separated from their family, who was also travelling with them, and “kidnapped” for a brief 
period by the authorities to prevent this person from participating in a rally of thousands of
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people planned to coincide with their arrival.11 The news of this happening devastated me 
and it deeply frightened me to understand exactly what the participants face even in the 
relative safety of exile. The helplessness and anger that I felt cannot begin to describe what 
exiled Sudanese people must feel and it underlined for me the real dangers that the 
participants who agreed to speak to me face and the risks that they took to share their 
stories. It deepened my respect for all those interviewees who participated but it also 
underlined my own privileges as an outsider and as a researcher; it was unlikely that I or my 
family would face similar dangers. Even though I was fairly confident that my thesis would 
not fall into the wrong hands (let’s face it, only four people are reading my thesis right now),
I did have to consider how harm could come to those who agreed to participate. As John 
and Lyn Lofland warn, when engaging in social research, consideration to avoid harm to 
participants must be the first ethical priority (Lofland and Lofland 1984:158).
The kidnapping incident made me much more cautious about protecting the 
identities of participants, and soon after I went back to notes and transcripts and replaced 
the pseudonyms that I had given participants with a numerical code. I could not guarantee 
that I protected the names of Republican participants from other Republicans because of 
the closeness (and openness) of the community, it was inevitable that one member might 
mention that I interviewed them to another member, but I was extremely careful not to 
disclose to other participants whom I had spoken with or any information on what was said 
during interviews. I also removed from my analysis this particular participant’s interview 
data. A less clear-cut issue in regards to harm also arose around some internal conflicts 
within the Republican Brotherhood and how to describe these with sensitivity. While I 
explore these conflicts at length in Chapter Seven, the issue posed some ethical problems 
for me. In my interviews, participants were very candid about the sources of the conflict but 
they were also careful not to name the particular individuals that they felt had caused the 
most serious rifts. Despite their judiciousness most Republicans were unequivocal about 
which members, even if left unnamed, were causing the biggest misunderstandings and it 
was relatively easy for me after a few interviews to deduce who those members were. 
Regardless of participants’ carefulness not to name names and my own prudence in
111 have significantly changed the identifying details of this story to protect the participant and the participant’s 
family, but I have kept true to the main facts of the story; a participant was kidnapped by authorities to prevent 
them from appearing at a rally in Khartoum.
generalising information and using pseudonyms, if Republicans read this thesis, it is likely 
that they will know who I am talking about, even if I never learned the name of this person 
myself and despite the great care that I took to protect identities. Non-Republicans who read 
this thesis, however, will not likely be able to identify anyone from the analysed data.
While I had to apply the same ethical codes and practices to my research with 
Democracy Now!, fewer ethical dilemmas arose during the process due to the analytical 
reliance on primarily published, web-based and broadcast materials that formed the bulk of 
the data and my lesser reliance on interview data from participants. I felt that since the 
materials I was analysing about Democracy Now! were primarily the published work of 
public figures in the public domain and not the private discourse of individual interviewees, 
the very publicness of the materials posed fewer ethical issues than the interview data of the 
Republicans. All of the same precautions that I used for the Republican case study, such as 
using a numerical code and not disclosing who I had spoken to or what was said in previous 
interviews, I also used with interviewees for the Democracy Now! study.
5.6 Data collections and analysis
5.6.1 The process of analysis
How does a researcher explain how her thoughts work in the process of analysis? How do I 
describe where the fine line between the end of coding and the beginning of analysis lies? Is 
it possible to map the intimate networks of my thoughts and make explicit all the ways that I 
arrived at a particular insight? Claire Haggett notes in her response to Potter and 
Wetherell’s (1987:168) own dilemma with this issue, that for most researchers “describing 
the process ...is difficult, especially because the movement between coding and analysis 
makes it hard to explicitly state when analysis takes place" (2004:57). In my own 
experience analysis begins well before a researcher sits down in front of her computer, in 
front of piles of notes, transcripts, print outs of websites and photographs to “code the data”. 
Sometimes it happens when you’re sitting down and talking with participants, or when you 
are surfing links through websites. Other times it can happen in unexpected contexts—riding 
a train, watching a film, looking at graffiti, reading poetry—all of these activities contain 
potential space for inspiration to occur, for insights to strike you, for analysis. Many social
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researchers who use qualitative methods to carry out research projects have remarked 
extensively on just how intuitive and amorphous the qualitative analytical process can be. 
Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln have observed that interpretative, qualitative analysis 
often “comes from the gut” and is largely intuitive (Denzin and Lincoln 2003).
While I was in the field and for the duration of the data collection phase I was 
already analysing the data, whether this was a deliberate act through the jotting down of 
notes or something that I was processing through my thoughts and never made explicit 
(until much later) on paper. As I conducted interviews, for instance, I was integrating and 
categorising new information based on what had been previously told to me in other 
interviews or what I had gleaned from websites or online texts. During this process I created 
a correspondence between the experiences of being “in the field”, my experiences with 
informants, the data that I collected (and what I went through collecting it) and what previous 
sociological work had to say about it (Charmaz and Mitchell 2001:165). Charmaz and 
Mitchell advise that when social researchers use a grounded ethnographic approach to 
coding, they should:
“...begin with open or initial coding and then try to code everything they 
see in the data. In contrast to Miles and Huberman’s (1994) advice to plan 
a set of codes beforehand, grounded theorists adhere to the basic premise 
of developing the codes directly from the data through an emergent 
process. Never force data into pre-existing codes” (165).
As I had observed in my review of the social science literature, much of the research 
seemed to work from the premise of forcing data taken from political websites and 
discussion boards into categories developed from pre-existing theories about 
communication or politics. In their paper on election websites in a number of Asian 
countries, Nicholas Jankowski and Randolph Kluver, for example, place the Tamil Tigers 
into the predefined category that they created for “NGOs” because as they note, they did not 
have a category for “terrorists” (Jankowski and Kluver 2005). In developing codes I wanted 
to avoid such analytical pitfalls that could distort or obscure the stories that had been told to 
me and the story that I wanted to tell. While the purpose of my analysis was not to build a
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theory of online democracy but rather to make sense of the experiences with democratic 
culture through the two groups in my study, I used an ethnographic method of analysis to 
interpret my research data in order to remain close to the data content. When I finally sat 
down to “analyse the data”, my experiences in the field coupled with what I already had 
learned from the literature did influence how I categorised bits of data, how I organised it, 
how I built codes and how those codes linked to larger themes but to build the codes and 
themes I continually referred back to the actual words and phrases used by participants.
One of the most significant themes to emerge from my coding of interview data with 
Republicans, for instance, was the split between spoken and written deliberation and how 
this split was alienating Republicans from engaging with each other online. This theme was 
built around what was told to me in interviews themselves, and the subsequent transcripts 
that resulted from those interviews as well as text from listserv postings. The theme grew, 
however, from earlier codes that i developed from the participants’ own words:
“Even in the vocal forum that same Brother would remain very calm, very 
easy, very respectful of others but when he writes he is violent and I think I 
am right to use that word” (Abdalla M., interview transcript, October 2004).
So one code that grew out of Abdalla’s discussion of Republican online behaviour was 
“violent text” , even though Abdalla did not use the word “text” , he was describing online 
writing which results in a textual artefact. Once I created that particular code, I found many 
instances of it in other interview transcripts of participants discussing the same 
phenomenon, even if they used different words to describe what was happening:
“[W]hen you talk to someone directly, face to face, he may use 
sometimes tough language but sometimes when people write, I don’t know what 
happens, they write things they would not say face to face”
(Abdel 0 ., interview transcript, October 2004).
Although Abdel did not specifically use the words “violent text” to describe the difference in 
language usage among members when they speak as opposed to when they write online, I
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could see a direct link to the code, not only from the transcript itself but from my own 
memories of our conversation and what I had learned from my years of spending time with 
Republicans. Once I developed the code “violent text”, I expanded my gaze to the broader 
contextual data of online Republicans and was able to link the code of “violent text” to the 
larger themes of the discursive split between written and spoken thought and online silences 
and how all of this related to Republicans’ own sense of their discursive culture and its 
perceived loss in exile.
By choosing to build codes from the ground up to the themes that emerged from the 
data, and by not forcing the data into predefined codes, I believe that the analysis remained 
close to the data that I collected and intimate with the subjects themselves.
5.6.2 Interview design and analysis
The research started with the Republicans and my first set of interview questions were 
designed open-endedly, that is, I designed questions that would capture essential data from 
each participant on the topic but allowed space for conversations to meander along courses 
that were unanticipated but potentially very interesting. Herbert and Irene Rubin describe 
the purpose of open-ended, qualitative interviewing as a research opportunity to develop "a 
solid, deep understanding of what is being studied, rather than breadth. Depth is achieved 
by going after context; dealing with complexity of multiple, overlapping, and sometimes 
conflicting themes...to get to depth, the researcher has to follow up, ask more questions ... 
[and] research design and questioning must remain flexible to accommodate new 
information, to adapt to the actual experiences that people have had, and to adjust to 
unexpected situations” (2005:35). As I conducted more interviews and learned more about 
Republicans and their online activities, I redesigned questions to follow certain paths that 
arose in previous interviews. For example it was not until I interviewed Abdalla M. that I 
learned about the phenomenon of violent text occurring on the Republican closed online 
forums, although before this interview I had already interviewed six people. After speaking 
at length with him about the phenomenon, I pursued a similar line of questioning in 
successive interviews with other Republicans. Each interview was designed for the specific 
purpose of obtaining contextual information from a participant at the very beginning and 
then to provide room for a conversation to evolve. I would ask the same questions 
pertaining to the participant’s level of education, the decision to become a Republican,
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participation levels, but if the participant offered new information that I had not heard 
previously, such as was the case with Abdalla, we would focus the rest of the conversation 
on that topic.
During one interview, however, I learned how important it was to most of the 
Republicans I interviewed to tell their own stories. As one informant and I sat on the floor 
talking and drinking tea, he tore the neatly printed question sheet from my lap, and said that 
if I wanted to understand the real story of the Republicans I should not follow a format, and 
then he said, “Put the questions aside and let me talk”. It was a big lesson for me. I was so 
worried about appearing “scientific” in my use of qualitative methods because I was new to 
sociology and felt I had to quantify my qualitative methods in order for my data to be 
“scientifically valid” that the method, at times, became more important than the data 
outcomes: the stories that people wanted me to hear. Due to my own worries and 
insecurities I was not able to see how the act of speaking about one’s own life and 
experiences could be an empowering and cathartic act for some of my informants and not 
only did I have something to gain from the research process, so did they. They wanted to 
share with me, they wanted to tell me their stories and they wanted their stories heard. Heyl 
(2001) notes in her review of ethnographic interviewing techniques the importance of letting 
the informant “name the world in their own terms” and allowing a collaboration to occur 
between oneself and the informant during the interview so that the researcher is “respectful 
of interviewees’ desire to control the telling of their stories” (375-376). Her suggestions 
underlined my own experience with this one informant. From that point forward in the 
research process I loosened the reins on my interview style and learned to let those whom I 
was interviewing guide the conversation, after having first set a few parameters. Most 
interviews lasted between one and two hours, with some interviews lasting over three hours. 
Sometimes, questions were broken up during an extended visit at a participant’s home, 
usually over a period of eight hours or more. Democracy Now! interviews were conducted 
within a similar framework. Interviews with Democracy Now! employees were considerable 
shorter but designed to capture consistent data across all interviews, and to be open-ended 
and semi-structured. Interviews were also conducted iteratively as I analysed data. While I 
was analysing older versions of the Democracy Now! website, for instance, new questions 
arose about objectivity and bias, and I included questions that addressed these issues in
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subsequent interviews. Interviews with Democracy Now! producers and employees 
averaged a half hour to 40 minutes in length, with the exception of one that lasted more than 
two hours. Two of the Democracy Now! interviews occurred in secluded areas of the studio 
(a storage room) and two occurred offsite. As with the Republicans, I could not guarantee 
total anonymity with Democracy Now! participants but I could guarantee confidentiality in 
anything they told me. I changed the names of all Democracy Now! interviewees in my data 
collection, analysis and reporting. Since I had promised this to the Republicans I felt that I 
needed to do this for Democracy Now! producers even though the political context within 
which they operate is less dangerous than for Republicans. Before I started every interview I 
asked permission to record the interview, to which all participants agreed. I did turn off my 
recorder during times when interviewees became very emotional and I wanted to be 
respectful of their emotions.
I coded interview transcripts following the guidance of a grounded ethnographic 
approach. I created codes based on words and phrases used in the discourse of 
participants and created themes from those codes. When I looked at the data, either 
onscreen or in print, I used the interviewees’ own words to construct codes and themes. I 
also analysed some data iteratively; as I collected and analysed it, I redesigned interview 
questions based on information emerging from the early analysis. Details on both sets of 
open-ended interview questions appear at the end of the thesis in the Appendices.
5.6.3 Listserv and bulletin board postings and analysis
I collected a string of postings in English from the assaloon listserv archive from a one 
month period in 1998 and a two month period in 1999. These postings were given to me by 
the webmaster and were anonymised by him before I received them. I also collected all 
English postings from the alfikra.org bulletin board. Both collections were analysed. During 
the entire research period, I was subscribed to two English language listservs, Sudanese-L 
and Sudan List. Both listservs are administered by universities based in the United States. I 
did not include postings from these lists in my analysis since I subscribed to them solely to 
stay abreast of current events in Sudan and to gain more background information on 
Sudanese politics. In addition to these two listservs, I was registered to sudanesonline.com 
by the owner of the bulletin board and he posted a message about me and my research
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project in Arabic to the board. I did not analyse postings from sudaneseonline.com either but 
used the bulletin board to learn more about current discussions among Sudanese people in 
general.
5.6.4 Website iterations and analysis
Through the use of the online archive, archive.org, I was able to collect and analyse several 
previous iterations of alfikra.org and democracynow.org. While it was interesting to see 
through the past iterations of alfikra.org small incremental changes to the site over the 
years, the most productive analysis came from understanding how the Republicans framed 
their descriptions of Ustadh Taha and downplayed descriptions of the movement. The 
analysis of past iterations of Democracy Now! revealed much greater changes and provided 
more insights. The most significant changes were apparent in how stories were ideologically 
framed by images and headlines. I was able to build codes and themes out the analysis of 
older website iterations and the analysis was based on news framing, the use of practices to 
ensure “balance” as well as finding evidence of professional biases. This analysis helped 
me understand better how changes in the larger political environment in the United States 
coupled with the programme’s growth of influence on mainstream media shaped the way 
Democracy Now! ideologically framed their web productions.
5.6.5 News archives
The selected stories from the news archives on both the present iteration of 
democracynow.org as well older archives available through archive.org were collected and 
analysed. I did not analyse these selected stories to the same depth as other Democracy 
Now! material, but I did use them for verification of Democracy Now! breaking coverage and 
to get a sense of how the programme covered controversial stories. I also used the Lexis- 
Nexis news archive database to examine how other media outlets covered the same stories 
that Democracy Now! broke.
5.6.6 Books and printed materials
I collected and examined several books and printed materials for both groups studied for 
analysis. For the Republicans I collected their primary text The Second Message of Islam
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as well as pamphlets and flyers that were available at the commemoration ceremony. I 
relied heavily on the Second Message to learn about Republican Thought that serves as the 
ideological base of the movement. The pamphlets and flyers were not analysed but helped 
to provide more of a context of the print culture of the movement. For Democracy Now! I 
collected Amy Goodman’s book, Exception to the Rulers, and analysed the text in depth to 
develop key codes and themes based on Goodman’s discourse concerning media politics in 
a democracy. I also collected promotional flyers from Democracy Now! but did not analyse 
these.
5.6.7 DVDs and CDs
I collected the DVD Independent media in the time of war from Democracy Now!. The DVD 
is a coproduction of Democracy Now! and Indymedia (Mohawk), and is sold through the 
website to help raise funds for the programme. The DVD features extensive coverage of 
Amy Goodman’s public addresses at peace rallies and an antiwar march in New York City. I 
analysed the transcript of this DVD in depth, especially Goodman’s discourse on 
mainstream and alternative media. From the Republicans I collected a self-produced music 
CD of Inshads. A collection of music CDs are for sale from the webmaster to cover the costs 
of production and are used to promote the spiritual music of the movement. While this CD 
was not included in the analysis, it was thoroughly enjoyed for its aesthetic qualities.
5.6.8 News clippings of Amy Goodman and Democracy Now!
I collected and analysed news clippings from other media outlets mentioned Amy Goodman 
and Democracy Now! or featured interviews with Amy Goodman. The clippings were found 
and downloaded from the Democracy Now! website section on media coverage of Amy 
Goodman and the programme, or were found from Lexis-Nexis and Academic Resource 
Primer. In all I downloaded and analysed 12 clippings and show transcripts that appeared in 
newspapers, periodicals and from news talk shows that Goodman was interviewed on. 
Again, I analysed Goodman’s discourse on media politics in all the clippings and transcripts.
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5.6.9 Field notes and research journals
I collected field notes each time I visited a participant or volunteered at the Democracy Now! 
studio. I also maintained a research journal during the entire process. Although field notes 
and the journals did not undergo the analytical process of coding and theme building that 
other data did, nevertheless I relied heavily on both to remind me of impressions, thoughts, 
insights that occurred to me at the time of the field experience and important details to help 
me reinforce and verify the analysis of other data.
5.6.10 Raw video footage in archives
While I was volunteering in the studio, I had access to several tapes of raw footage taken at 
various peace rallies and fundraising events where Amy Goodman spoke. I was not able to 
collect or analyse these tapes but viewing them did help to familiarise me with Goodman’s 
discourse on media and antiwar politics.
5.6.11 Computer-assisted analysis
Since I chose to collect and analyse research data using a qualitative, ethnographic and 
grounded-approach methodology, I used Nvivo, analytical software that enables the 
analysis of qualitative data and supports discourse analysis. Nvivo was used to develop 
codes and themes based on the words and phrases used by participants or appearing in the 
collected data, thus I developed codes in vivo or based in the language that the informants 
used themselves (Charmaz and Mitchell 2001; Strauss and Corbin 1998). From these codes 
and themes I was able to make connections between them to develop insights about what 
was happening through the participants’ discourses. I also used the software more generally 
to help organise my data and keep all my notes and thoughts in one place. In order to use 
Nvivo, I had to save all transcripts and textual data as Rich Text Format (.rtf) files. The 
program does not allow users to analyse images, audio or websites. For the analysis of 
these data, I relied on pen and paper or analysed directly onscreen and kept notes in my 
field notebook on findings.
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5.7 Conclusions
The following three chapters are the results of the analytical processes I used and which 
were described in this chapter. The analysis should be considered within the context of 
what Denzin and Lincoln call “the art and politics of interpretation” (2003). They remarked on 
how “qualitative interpretations are constructed” iteratively out of the field notes, transcripts 
and other bits of data in an attempt to document how the researcher makes sense of what 
she has learned and that there is no one “interpretative truth” (2003:26). The following 
chapters, then, should be considered as constructions, organised to tell a story of the 
Republican Brothers and of Democracy Now!. There are many other stories that could be 
told of both groups: the following are mine.
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6 Republican Brothers in Sudan and in Exile
“You are your thought, brother,
The rest of you is bone and fibre.
If you think of roses, you are a rosegarden.
If you think of thorns, you’re fuel for the furnace.”
—Rumi, Mathnawi II
It is Iowa’s bitterest month, January, and I am shocked at how much cold a body can bear in 
the crisp, icy winds that whip across the Midwestern plains. Over night all of Iowa City’s 
ranch-style houses and bare trees have been coated with a layer of ice that now shimmers 
in the weak winter sun. It is so cold that the few wispy clouds floating in the sky sputter and, 
finally, resigned to evaporate into invisible ice crystals, dissolve. It is in this unlikely 
landscape, on the campus of University of Iowa, that more than 50 Republicans and many 
more Sudanese, American and British people have gathered to commemorate Mahmoud 
Mohamed Taha’s execution which occurred 20 years ago on 18 January 1985.
Some Republicans have driven from their homes in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
Athens, Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, or Washington DC, risking a long-haul road trip in 
unpredictable January weather. Others have flown in from New York and London to 
celebrate the life of the movement’s revered leader. Those Brothers and Sisters who live in 
Iowa City have made sure that all visitors, including myself, have a place to sleep, food to 
eat and a ride across the sprawling suburbs to the campus. One Republican who lives in 
Germany and who was not granted a travel visa by the US government, along with another 
Brother who was unable to leave Oman, have been attending via the Internet and are able 
to participate at most of the weekend’s events despite the distance. There are photo exhibits 
depicting the movement, especially from the early 1980s, and a display of Taha’s personal 
items among them a shaving kit, a suitcase filled with his neatly folded white robe, and a 
Qur’an. So much of the exhibit reveals more than maybe it is intended to, a social 
movement frozen in time at the moment of its leader’s execution. There are lectures and
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seminars on Republican Thought and the history of the movement, the multimedia culture of 
Republicanism, and how Republican ideology fits into the current political and human rights 
situation in Sudan. The highlight of the weekend for most attendees is Saturday evening’s 
planned performance—and then the spontaneous one after most of the audience had gone 
home—of the Inshads, the repetitive chanting songs which praise the name of Allah, and 
are central to Republican Sufi practice. During the breaks between sessions warm, 
affectionate hugs are exchanged, as are reminiscences of a youth and life lost, and finally 
the relief of laughter comes after bitter tears are shared among Brothers and Sisters 
reunited following so many years of living separately..
How did this once very cohesive, religiously based, oppositional movement that 
started in the dusty streets of Khartoum, end up here gathered for a brief time in this 
American Midwestern city only to disperse again across the globe to their separate lives? 
Any attempt to describe and to provide an understanding of what exactly the Republican 
Brotherhood faced before and after exile can only be made clear after a very brief 
description of the historical social, religious, and political contexts of Sudan. In this chapter I 
present some background on the Sufi traditions that the Republicans form a part of, the 
ongoing social crisis over identity and sectarianism in Sudan which underlies virtually all of 
the conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and the military regimes that have 
made life as a Republican (or any Sudanese person for that matter) particularly difficult. I 
also describe some of the unique discursive and media cultures that the Republicans 
developed, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, in spite of the numerous bans on their 
public and media activities. Understanding how this discursive culture existed before exile 
is important to understanding the context of how it exists now in exile and online which we 
will explore in depth in Chapter Seven.
Since all ideologies, whether they are religious or political, are self-contained within 
their own intimate logics, it is necessary to provide a small but essential key to navigate 
Republican Thought. Therefore the chapter closes with some explanation of the core 
Republican democratic and religious ideology developed by Ustadh12 Mahmoud Mohamed 
Taha, the spiritual leader of the Republicans.
12 ‘Ustadh’ is a title often used by the Republicans for members of the leadership and it means ‘revered 
teacher’. There are several different transliteral ways to spell Arabic words with the English alphabet. In this 
case, the letterj can be spelled sometimes with ‘th’ or ‘dh’ but is pronounced with a sound close to the English
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6.1 The Republicans in Sudan
6.1.1 Sudan in brief
Sudan is Africa’s largest country with a diverse landscape that spans an area of 2.5 million 
square kilometres, and is situated south of Egypt and west of the Red Sea, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. Sudan shares its borders with those three countries and with Libya, Chad, the 
Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Kenya. The 
contemporary nation-state borders of Sudan were formed when the Turco-Egyptians 
invaded the country in 1820 and established the colonial borders of the Ottoman Empire 
that are in roughly the same area that exist today. While there was wrangling over the 
country between the British and the Ottoman Empire when the British occupied Egypt in 
1882, it was not until 1898, when the British won Omdurman (a suburb of the capital 
Khartoum) from the Mahdiyya state (the brief period of independence for Sudan), that the 
British colonised Sudan and they stayed until 1956 (Woodward 1990:13). As of 2004 the 
country has a population in excess of 27.5 million people who speak a variety of languages, 
with some estimates putting the number of languages at over 130. Seventy percent of the 
population practice Islam and close to 30 percent are either Christian or practice a 
traditional African religion that is customary among the diverse ethnic groups throughout the 
country (Home Office 2004).
The exiled Sudanese sociologist Mahgoub el-Tigani Mahmoud (2003) describes 
Sudan as being “gifted with a great diversity of cultures” which comprise multiple ethnicities 
including people who identify as Arab, Beja, Dinka, Nubian, Nuer and Nilotic (among almost 
500 others), and he points to the country’s Sufi traditions as being particularly open and 
tolerant of cultural differences (1,10-11; Home Office 2004:7). Sudan is a multicultural, 
multilingual and multireligious state despite the ongoing ideological struggles over 
Sudanese identity that continue largely to dictate the country’s politics, with the most recent 
and poignant evidence of this volatility being the genocide in Darfur. The issue of identity is 
so sensitive and divisive that it can turn a polite conversation among friends into a heated 
and hurtful argument and occupies a central position in the political discourse of both the
‘z’. I use the transliteral spelling ‘Ustadh’ because it is more often used on the Republican website, only 
changing the spelling to ‘Ustaz’ when directly quoting a member’s post or text (especially in Chapter Seven).
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ruling elite and oppositional groups. The issue over a contested Sudanese identity has 
fundamentally fuelled the world’s longest, contemporary civil war. Sudan’s ongoing conflicts 
are an extreme example of the dilemmas produced by developing a democratic culture and 
nationhood within a multicultural society fraught with incompatible interests.
The country is divided into several geographical (and ethnic) regions but the most 
obvious divide is between Northern and Southern Sudan, with the North encompassing the 
area where the Nile splits into the Blue and White Niles (around the capital Khartoum). 
Khartoum is the seat of political and social power, with many Northern elites entrenched in 
what is called “Northern Sudanese identity”. Northerners who identify as “Northerners” 
maintain they are Arab: they speak Arabic, they are Muslim and lastly, they are non-African 
Sudanese. The Northern identity does not recognise itself as being a part of Africa or as 
being black but rather sees itself as part of the larger Arab world east of the Red Sea and 
identifies as “Arab”. There are, of course, Northerners who refuse to identify themselves in 
this way and seek to align with an identity based on Sudanese nationhood rather than on 
Arab ethnicity and are generally those who are in the progressive intelligentsia and support 
the post-civil war “New Sudan”13 (Hale 2001:25). The Republican Brothers, for example, 
are comprised mostly of Northerners who reject the traditional Northern identity and opt to 
see themselves firstly as Sudanese rather than to align with ethnically based and sectarian 
factions, and to sympathise with Southerners.
The South encompasses the region starting just south of the Nuba Mountains and 
eventually reaches the Upper Nile. Within the South the majority of people are either 
Christian or practice one of the traditional African religions (although there are some who 
are Muslim); they do not speak Arabic as their first language, and identify themselves as 
both African and black. Al-Baqir al-Afif Mukhtar, a scholar who focuses on this cleavage 
within Sudanese identity, characterises it as a crisis, where “the North, feeling that it is Arab 
and Muslim, has always sought to define the whole country in these terms. It did not only 
resist any attempts by the non-Arab segment of the country to identify Sudan with black
13 Sondra Hale (2001) explains that there is debate over the term “New Sudan” which was originally coined by 
the Southern Sudan liberation movement the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The 
SPLM/A argue that the term should only refer to the southern areas controlled by the group and that any use of 
the term should include acknowledgement of the group. However, the term has entered into the Sudanese 
political parlance (and was used often by interviewees) and is used by progressives to describe a post-Islamist, 
democratic and multicultural Sudan based on statehood rather than on ethnically based sectarian politics.
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Africa, but also tried relentlessly to assimilate the South through Arabisation and 
Islamisation policies, and to turn the Southern identity into a distorted image of the Northern 
self (Mukhtar 1999:2). While the purpose of this thesis is not to detail all of the nuances, 
complexities and historical precedents that contribute to the construction of Sudanese 
identity, such as its role in Darfur (Darfurians are Muslim, non-Arab and black) or in the just 
ended 40-year civil war between the North and the South, it is important to the context of 
this thesis to emphasise that it is due to the conflicted Sudanese identity that the issue of 
imposing Shari’a is so fraught and is one of the fundamental issues for the Republican 
Brothers. Indeed, it is the main reason why the leader of the Republicans, Mahmoud 
Mohamed Taha, was executed.
6.1.2 Sudan’s Sufi traditions and the Republicans: The complexity of religious political 
engagement
During both colonial occupations a complex of religious-political alliances were established. 
When the Turco-Egyptians invaded Sudan, Sufism, the mystical and ascetic branch of 
Islam, had been well established in the country for more than 300 years after its introduction 
there by the Funj Sultanate beginning in the fifteenth century (Chittick 2000:3-5; Warburg 
2003:1). By the time of the invasion Sufism as both a religious and political force had 
fundamentally shaped Sudan’s society. Sufism flourished in Sudan during the sixteenth 
century when a number of Sufi turuq (in English: orders, brotherhoods)14 spread across 
Sudan, fuelled by a larger wave of Sufism that was breaking across the Muslim world and 
precipitated by the decline of the Arab empire which had spurred a growth in religious 
mysticism. These new Sufi orders found a willing receptiveness among the Sudanese 
population due in part, perhaps, because local people were already familiar with itinerate 
holy men (in Arabic: sing, faqih, pi. fuquha) from Arabia and Egypt who travelled with 
nomadic groups and preached Islam by integrating local customs into Muslim religious 
practice (2003:22). The new Sufi orders were headed by charismatic leaders15, or shaykhs, 
who also integrated local customs into their already flexible and inclusive religious practices,
14 Sing, ‘tariqa’, literally means ‘path’.
15 Leaders of Sufi orders are called ‘shaykhs’. The blessedness that they receive from God is called ‘baraka’. 
The shaykh’s baraka produces in him (rarely but sometimes her) saintliness and this is a unique and defining 
characteristic of Sufism.
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and offered something more than the fuquha had; a direct path to God through a process of 
intensive prayer and meditation. From the eighteenth century onwards, a new wave of 
Sufism (often called “neoSufism”) developed that featured even more doctrinal openness, 
greater internal organisation within turuq and better adaptability to outside political and 
social forces. Sufism was more relevant to people’s lives and experiences, especially in the 
rural areas, than the mainstream Islam associated with the Turkish colonisers. Sufi orders 
and their blessed leaders guided people on their personal spiritual paths and private 
relationships with Allah. The turuq in general were unconcerned with the state and were 
more involved with expanding their sphere of spiritual influence than with political revolt 
(Woodward 1990:34). Since the Turco-Egyptians were ruled by the Ottoman sultan, who 
was also the Caliph of Islam and the guardian of the more traditional practice, the occupiers 
disapproved of the turuq, except for one, the Khatmiyya tariqa, since the order collaborated 
closely with the occupiers. Most other turuq were either openly hostile to the Turco- 
Egyptians or indifferent, more interested in people’s spiritual salvation than liberating them 
from their colonisers (22). One tariqa to rise against both the Turco-Egyptian and the 
Egyptian-British colonisers, however, were the Madhiyya.
During the brief period between the fall of the Turco-Egyptian occupation in 1885 
and British colonisation in 1899, Sudan was an independent state and Islamic caliphate led 
by Ahmed al-Mahdi and his successor the Khalifa Abdallahi. The revolt that forced the 
Turco-Egyptians out and established the Madhist state was led by the messianic al-Mahdi 
(mahdi means “the Expected One” and it is believed that the Mahdi will cleanse and save 
the Muslim world) and his followers the Ansar, who, despite their own Sufi origins, were also 
anti-turuq in the sense that the Mahdist state sought to neutralise the power of Sufi shaykhs 
and to reintegrate Islam under the Ansar (El-Affendi 2002:1; Mahmoud 2003:18-19; 
Woodward 1990:22). The Mahdist state had fought the British and resisted their 
colonisation for years until the Ansar troops were utterly crushed at the battle of Omdurman 
in 1898. When the British-Egyptian Condominium state was established in 1899 the 
resistance against the new colonisers was simply a continuation of the insurgency project 
started against the country’s previous foreign rulers (25). During the twentieth century and 
post-independence, the Mahdists and their Umma Party maintained a central position in 
Sudanese politics, especially during the three brief democratic periods (1956-1958,1965-
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1969 and 1986-1989). The Khatmiyya tariqa went on to form the Democratic Unionist Party, 
DUP, which along with the Umma, were the two most influential political parties in 
independent Sudan, especially after 1968. In general, and with the exception of those 
parties that are Marxist or socialist, all of the influential parties (and those less so) in Sudan 
are also formidable religious groups. As we will see later in this chapter, Sudanese politics, 
at least among Northerners, are inextricably linked to Sufi orders or to Islamist movements.
6.1.3 The Republicans before and after independence
It was within this century-old continuum of resistance to colonial occupation as well as the 
much older Sufi political heritage that the beginnings of the Republican Brotherhood were 
forged. During the late 1930s and early 1940s Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, then an engineer 
with a thriving private practice, was active in the anticolonial struggle against the British. 
Taha established the Republican Party in 1945 with other like-minded intellectuals out of a 
sense of frustration with the existing, sectarian political groups, primarily the Ansar and the 
Khatmiyya, that were resisting British colonialism but at the same time were still willing to 
compromise with the colonisers (Warburg 2003:161). Taha’s ideology for the party was of 
total independence based on republicanism and he believed that any compromise with the 
colonisers would jeopardise all potential for Sudanese independence. While the Republican 
Party was secular in its early days, an inchoate version of Republican Thought based on a 
modernist and revisionist interpretation of Islam was already evident in the party’s 
pamphlets and publications (An-Na'im 1987a: 2-3). Most of the party’s members had 
advanced degrees and originated from lower-middle and middle-class urban families. From 
its earliest beginnings as an anticolonial political party, the Republicans forced a direct 
engagement with the pubic by distributing leaflets and books as well as addressing people 
in the streets, mosques and cafes of cities throughout Sudan (Mahmoud 2001:71,84). This 
open public engagement was to become the hallmark of the movement.
In 1946 Taha was sentenced twice to prison, in the first instance for organising 
against the colonial administration for which he spent fifty days in jail. Once released he 
organised a mass protest in his home town of Rufa’a where a woman had been imprisoned 
for submitting her daughter to a circumcision which was in direct violation of a colonial penal 
code outlawing the practice. While Taha and the Republican Party were firmly against all
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forms of female circumcision, they believed that the law, instead of protecting women, was 
counterproductive because the practice was so culturally embedded that it would continue 
despite a law banning it. Taha challenged the British by saying that if the administration was 
truly concerned with women’s welfare they would spend money on educating girls and 
women, who would then be empowered enough to abandon the practice voluntarily. The 
Republicans believed that the law was really a way for the colonial administration to 
delegitimatise indigenous claims for independence and to justify their own administration by 
contending that the Sudanese population was too backward to govern themselves as 
evidenced by their treatment of women. Taha led a group of men to the prison where the 
woman was held, broke in and freed her (An-Na'im 1987a: 3-4). In 1951 after serving a two- 
year term of imprisonment for his political activities in Rufa’a, Taha embarked on a self- 
imposed, three-year retreat (in Arabic: khalwa), a period during which he perfected his Sufi 
religious practice of intensive prayer, meditation, and fasting. It was at this time also that 
Taha formulated the foundations of Republican Thought: his theory of prayer and the 
Second Message of Islam (Mahmoud 1998:105). Taha emerged back into the public with a 
new vision for the Republican Party and he converted its mission from an anticolonial 
revolutionary party to a Sufi brotherhood, and changed the party’s name to the Republican 
Brothers (in Arabic: al-jumhuriyya) (1998:106). This transformation to a religiously focused 
order, however, retained the political engagement of the party, and became a fusion of the 
two through its ideology. Taha’s vision of democracy, solidly rooted in republicanism through 
a revitalisation of Islam, was to deepen over the years as he and the Republicans publicly 
proselytised Republican Thought.
For the life of the Brotherhood, membership was small compared to other influential 
religious orders or political groups. At the movement’s height during the 1980s, membership 
never exceeded 1,000 people. The Brotherhood’s sympathisers and supporters, however, 
numbered in the tens of thousands (An-Na'im 1987b: 41). Thirty-eight percent of members 
were university graduates and who had a high literacy rate with only about eight percent 
considered illiterate. The group was overwhelmingly male, with the highest number of 
Sisters never exceeding 30 members. Yet even this small presence of women should be 
considered revolutionary in the context of Sudanese politics: the only other groups to 
successfully recruit women were the Sudan Communist Party (SCP) and National Islamic
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Front (NIF), with the latter only accepting women who wore full Islamic dress (Hale 1996: 
193). Most members, 75 percent, were from central (or Northern) Sudan and were from 
lower middle or middle middle-class urban families. Due to these demographic factors, 
including an overwhelmingly young membership (85 percent were aged between 15-40 
years), the movement posed significant challenges, despite its size, to other political groups 
engaged in turf wars over which group would have more influence with the Northern urban 
elite (Mahmoud 1998:125-126, citing Sadig 1990).
The Republicans have been operating in an environment of extreme political and 
social repression since, at least, the group’s founding in 1945. After independence during 
the second brief period of civilian and democratic rule from 1964-1968, the Umma Party 
formed a coalition with the Islamic fundamentalists led by legal scholar Dr. Hasan al-Turabi. 
The move to bring the NIF into the mainstream political fold served to only intensify the 
marginalisation of smaller, progressive or radical groups such as the Republicans. Although 
the Republicans commanded a deep respect among most Sudanese, they were considered 
outside of the Islamic mainstream and though highly influential intellectually, the 
Brotherhood was not powerful politically. Within an increasingly volatile political 
environment, the Republicans maintained their vision of a non-sectarian and non-ethnically 
based statehood for Sudan and were steadfastly opposed to Shari’a being implemented in 
the multicultural country; a legal system they said explicitly discriminated against non- 
Muslims and all women. During the second brief period of democracy Turabi’s Islamic 
Charter Front (eventually to become the National Islamic Front, NIF) gained considerable 
power through its close ties with al-Sadiq and was an influential force behind the adoption of 
Shari’a (Warburg 2003:161). Since independence in 1956 Sudan had no constitution, the 
Permanent Constitution was not passed until 1973, leaving the nation without a codified 
instrument to ensure certain rights, protections and a governmental system for close to 20 
years. The lack of a constitution created a vacuum perfect for opportunistic fundamentalist 
groups to impose Shari’a on the religiously diverse population. The Republican’s anti- 
Shari’a position and their very public criticisms of fundamentalists created political tensions 
between the Republicans and the ruling Umma Party-led coalition government. In 1967, a 
year after Taha published his most famous book The Second Message of isiam he was 
sentenced in abstensia for apostasy and condemned to death. The court also dissolved his
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marriage. Taha refused to recognise the court’s authority since he believed that one could 
not be tried for his or her personal beliefs. His life was spared for the time being because 
the prevailing political instability of the period could not allow the sentence to be carried out 
(2003:160-162).
When the military dictatorship of General Ja’far Numeiri banned the Brotherhood’s 
public activities in 1973 (along with a general ban against all political parties), Taha was still 
at serious physical risk in spite of the continued, official tacit tolerance for Republican 
activities (An-Na'im 1987a: 9). Taha no longer spoke publicly but relied on other 
Republicans to spread the message of Republican Thought. Under the Numeiri regime, 
installed in 1969 when Numeiri led the Free Officers in May of that year (dubbed the May 
Revolution) through a coup that ousted the democratically elected government of Prime 
Minister Muhammed Ahmed Mahjoub, Sudan’s economy slumped downward and the 
population was terrorised by violent retributions against those opposing his regime. During 
the 1970s, al-Turabi as head of the NIF consciously groomed an alliance with the Numeiri 
regime, knowing that such an alliance could protect and grow the fundamentalist movement 
(Woodward 1990:153). When Numeiri suddenly announced the implementation of Shari’a 
in 1983 through the September Laws, making public spectacles of hudud laws (the more 
draconian sentences contained within Shari’a such as lashings, amputations, and 
beheadings for personal aberrations) were encouraged and were a strong indication of just 
how influential the NIF had become (Simone 1994:26). Soon after the implementation of 
the September Laws, 150 men were publicly executed or had their limbs amputated 
(Woodward 1990:157). The faithful were invited to attend public trials and the imposition of 
sentences, and for those who refused to accept the invitation, nightly radio and television 
broadcasts reported the amputations and executions (1990:157). Some saw the September 
Laws as the last ditch effort of a dictator to hold onto his dwindling power after many years 
in control, others saw it as a continuation of a path towards Islamisation that Numeiri had 
always envisioned. A more cynical view saw the laws as a short-term solution for Numeiri to 
control dissent and opposition, especially in the climate of economic decline and social 
unrest.
Until 1983 Numeiri tolerated the public activities of the Republicans, despite the 
Republicans posing a potentially serious threat to the NIF for control over the Northern
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Sudanese intelligentsia. Sadiq al-Madhi, the leader of the Umma Party and the 
democratically elected president after the fall of the Numeiri regime, reversed his own 
position and supported Taha and the Republicans in their opposition to the September Laws 
on the grounds that a just society is a prerequisite of Shari’a and that Sudan had not yet 
achieved this status (1990:157). Of course, al-Madhi had more political legitimacy within the 
realm of Sudanese politics as the leader of the more Islamic-centrist Umma Party as well as 
being a direct descendant of the Madhi, and his support only served to strengthen Taha’s 
and the Republicans’ stance against the September Laws.
6.2 Discussion corners, book distribution and multimedia: The public Republican 
discursive identity
At a time when most oppositional groups in Sudan would distribute their pamphlets secretly, 
forced to do so by the Numeiri regime, the Republicans openly defied the regime and 
distributed their books and pamphlets at their daily discussion corners (in Arabic: al-rukun). 
The first al-rukun was held in 1975 on the campus of the University of Khartoum, and as the 
al-rukun grew in popularity they were spread to the open-air markets of Khartoum and to 
strategic street corners, such as the one in front of the Ministry of Defence (Mahmoud 2001: 
84). Many of the Republicans were students at the University of Khartoum and became 
Republican followers after listening to Khatim A.16, the most famous and erudite conductor 
of the discussion corners. Even if people were not convinced by everything that Khatim said, 
his corners were the most popularly attended. While most sectarian or fundamentalist 
groups relied on the ethnic allegiance of their followers to make their appeal, or addressed 
their audiences in the closed spaces of mosques to gain influence over the Northern 
intelligentsia, the Republicans chose to conduct the al-rukun in the open, public spaces of 
Khartoum. The al-rukun and the arguments conducted within in them appealed particularly 
to the young, highly educated urban elite who valued the Republicans’ emphasis on 
independent thought. As the al-rukun grew, small groups of Republicans formed wavd
16 All the names of current and past members have been changed except for Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed 
Taha.
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(travelling groups) to go to towns and villages outside Khartoum to distribute books and 
conduct al-rukun to broaden their appeal in the more remote areas of Sudan.
The discussion corners lasted for a decade until the death of Taha and were 
organised primarily to force a public engagement on Islam and modernity, Republican 
ideology and the Republican position on political issues such as the implementation of 
Shari’a by the Numeiri regime, the ongoing Sudanese civil war, gender in Islam, and the 
politics of the Middle East. The al-rukun became the central and defining vehicle for 
Republicans’ discursive identity and the space within which they conceptualised and formed 
their counterpublic. The discussion corners were used to distribute and proselytize their 
ideology, and it was through them that the Republicans perfected the discursive culture 
based in critical, interactive argumentation for which they became famous. Holding 
discussions in a public forum was fundamental to Republican ideology—they believed that 
their discourse should be publicly interrogated--and demonstrates a characteristic that 
Warner says goes into the construction of a counterpublic: the public circulation of discourse 
seeks to extend the sphere of influence of a counterpublic (Warner 2002:90-91).
One Republican, Mustafa B. now in exile, described the argumentational culture of 
the al-rukun to me:
“...[W]e were so proud of it because we established a culture. And it is 
still going on despite the fact that we are no longer doing it . ... [N]ow it is 
an established culture at the universities and everybody knows that this 
was created by the Republican Brothers. So when everybody started to 
have their own platforms, we were very, very happy actually because 
one of our aims [wa]s to establish this kind of culture: [a] culture of 
debate, [a] culture of engaging the people, informing them, you know you 
find many, many people challenging your ideas and you have to respond 
and this will inform the public as a result, and it will make you more 
sharp. In a place which was not actually accustomed to such kind of a 
debate, in a place where the political culture was based on a political 
leader who would come, make a speech like a preacher and go, nobody 
would challenge him, nobody would say “wait let us ask you these
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questions, you said this and it contradicts with that”. But we came there, 
we stayed and we asked people to challenge us, we asked people to 
point out the weaknesses in our debate. So then others when they saw 
that we actually gained more membership, gained wider support, 
became respected by people, then they wanted to become like us so 
they established their own platforms. And the culture of debate, the 
culture that deplores and rejects violence, started to flourish at the 
universities. ... It was important because we felt that that was a 
component that is absent in the political, religious culture of not only 
Sudan but the rest of the Islamic world. Because preachers at mosques, 
what do they do? They try to arouse the emotions of people and they 
send their minds to sleep. They will speak about the enemies of Islam, 
how Muslims are badly treated here and there, how they are despised, 
how they are wronged by the superpowers...they will bring up the misery 
of Muslims but they will not mention what the Muslims d[o] to others. And 
at the same time they will call on the emotions about Islam and make 
people angry. The preachers in these mosques are not exposed, even 
their understanding of Islam is not adequate, they are spreading 
ignorance. ... So this is why we thought that we have an interest in 
combating this kind of [discourse] and injecting rationale and reason ... 
into the debate, and we succeed in that, absolutely. We have an interest 
in making people use their minds and think rather than arousing their 
emotions” (Mustafa B., interview transcript, August 2003).
Many non-Republicans that I spoke to who were young students at the University of 
Khartoum during the late seventies and early eighties remembered the al-rukun on the 
campus well and recalled that not only did the Republicans develop this unique discursive 
culture but that the movement’s members seemed to physically embody their ideology. One 
non-Republican woman, Zeinab H., who was not a student at the university until 1987 but 
who nonetheless listened to the al-rukun and who had also attended Taha’s execution 
recalled that she could always tell the difference between a Republican and a Muslim
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Brother by the corporality of their ideology. Republican Thought seemed to her to be 
embodied in the way Brothers and Sisters walked, the way they carried themselves, the way 
they interacted with others, the way, she said, they lived the pacifist philosophy of the 
movement in how they spoke and listened. She recalled that this contrasted sharply with the 
embodied ideology of the Muslim Brothers, who seemed to her to be hard, rigid and severe 
in the way they walked, talked and even in the way they wore their beards.
Another non-Republican, Abubakr E., at the University of Khartoum from 1978 to 
1980 and the leader of the Islamic Trend, the student branch of Turabi’s NIF, recalled his 
complex engagement with the Republicans and their discussion corners. By the time 
Abubakr arrived on campus he had already heard of the al-rukun and supported Mustafa’s 
claim that it was the Republicans who started a new trend in the political culture of 
Khartoum with the al-rukun. Abubakr founded the NIF’s discussion corners largely inspired 
by and in direct response to the Republican al-rukun. He felt that the presence of the 
Republican al-rukun enriched the intellectual environment of the campus. While political 
expression and intellectual engagements under Numeiri were being stifled in other sectors 
of Sudanese society, students enjoyed relative freedom on campus. Due to the influence of 
this openness, many other political student organisations, such as the Marxists and other 
Islamic groups, began to found their own corners in the early 1980s following the successes 
of the Republican al-rukun.
Abubakr would observe the daily al-rukun, paying close attention to their discursive 
strategies to learn more about the qualities that he would use or reject for his own 
discussion corners. Some advantages of the Republican al-rukun were, he noted, that they 
were persistent, quick to respond to current politics, and conducted by highly trained 
speakers, who would be apprenticed for two years before being allowed to speak in their 
own al-rukun. He recalled that during one campus speaking engagement for Turabi, one of 
the Republican Sisters challenged Turabi on the NIF’s position towards women and their 
human rights. Abubakr felt that Turabi rose to her challenge quite well and carefully 
addressed all of her complaints. Despite this, the next day a Republican pamphlet 
condemning Turabi’s speech and his position on women was already circulating on campus. 
While Abubakr fundamentally disagreed with the pamphlet, he did admire the persistence of 
the Republican methodology of constant verification of their discourse with Taha which
123
resulted in a quickly produced book explaining their own positions on current politics. But 
he also noted several disadvantages in the al-rukun, some that he considered to be very 
serious weaknesses. The most serious problem for him was the Republicans’ focus on 
politics, their special attacks reserved for Turabi and the NIF, and the lack of discussion or 
self-interrogation of their own ideology, which he believed was fundamentally flawed. He 
believed that they were strategically silent on this issue since if they did speak on it in an 
open forum, it would not hold up under scrutiny and the public would certainly reject it. He 
recalled that:
“The fundamental disadvantage of the Republican corners is that they 
never discussed the fundamental tenets of their ideology, which is very 
controversial. I think that if they had publicly discussed their ideology 
with the students it would have provoked a lot of shock. It was difficult for 
them to say that Taha worships God to the point that he had special 
rights to interpret the text of Qur’an, or that he could have a new 
interpretation or even a better interpretation of Islam than God’s Prophet.
There was a sort of collection of ideas and tools of analysis not familiar 
to the students, so mostly in their discussion corners they [resorted to] 
targeting us. ... You would find that they would discuss the current 
issues of politics and not their ideology. I challenged them several times 
on this” (Abubakr E., interview transcript, July 2005).
He said the NIF discussion corners differed greatly from the Republican al-rukun. Firstly 
they were held on Friday evenings only in the park of the Faculty of Medicine, and not in any 
other public areas, so they were relatively secluded and resulted in attendees participating 
by word-of-mouth instead of by simply being passer-bys. Secondly, they featured invited 
speakers who were not necessarily NIF members, discussing a variety of topics rather than 
having one NIF member conduct the discussion week in and out. But he credited the initial 
inspiration and impetus to have a NIF corner to the innovativeness and popularity of the 
Republicans’ al-rukun.
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“Publicness” was one fundamental quality of the Republican discursive culture that 
differed from the political culture of Khartoum that was prevalent at the time. Each night 
Republicans would gather in Taha’s Omdurman home after the evening zikr (prayers and 
chanting, usually chanting the name of Allah) and conduct a jalsa, a meeting that usually 
included prayers and discussions. The zikr is fundamental to Sufi mystical practice, where 
adherents repetitively chant Allah’s name (usually in seclusion with each other) to reach a 
higher level of consciousness. As William Chittick (2000) explains the zikr’s (literally: 
remembrance) purpose is to fill the mind with only God, and by doing so lead to a union (or 
reunion really) with God, the ultimate goal of the Sufi path (16). Taha’s practice diverged 
from the traditional Sufi one because he opened the Republican zikr to the public by holding 
them in the courtyard and street in front of his house.
Another cut with traditional Sufism, Islam, and indeed Sudan’s sectarian politics, 
was Taha’s refusal to play the shaykh role as the head of the Brotherhood, and rather to 
empower individual Republican members to have a direct relationship with God. As I explain 
more fully in Chapter Seven, however, Taha’s role as the leader of the Brotherhood was 
derived from an implicit authority bestowed upon him by the other Republican members who 
viewed Taha as the only legitimate source of Republican ideology. Taha’s legitimacy as the 
leader was derived from his Baraka, his charisma, by the perception that he seemed to 
embody his own ideology in a mystically derived way. Taha faithfully practiced until his 
death his own intensive daily prayer regime that he asked all of his followers to practice, he 
lived modestly despite having the means to live quite comfortably, he was an ardent 
vegetarian in a culture of meat eaters, and he conducted jalsas in openness where all 
opinions were considered in his own conclusions. He gained his legitimacy not through a 
democratic process of legitimisation but through his Baraka—blessings bestowed by God, 
the ultimate authority.
So even though he made no direct claims of leadership, it was understood by all, 
including the Numeiri regime, that Taha was head of the Republican Brothers. This 
produced a direct conflict with the ideals of republicanism where the goal is to remove 
legitimacy from hierarchical power structures and individuals who occupy those power 
positions (Warner 1990:73). This incongruity on the one hand between Taha’s charismatic 
leadership (a fact whether he was comfortable with it or not) and the way that the
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membership made decisions contingent upon his final approval, and on the other, his 
socially just democratic theory that was publicly enacted by Republicans, has been 
problematic for the group, especially in exile as we will see in Chapter Seven.
It was during these evening jalsas in Taha’s sitting room, which he called “The 
Saloon”, that the topic of the next day’s discussion corner would be decided upon and 
discussed. Members were free to suggest and argue for a topic but Taha would make the 
final decision and would guide them on how the discussion corner should be conducted 
within the teachings of Republican ideology. It was also during these nightly meetings that 
new books would be decided upon, and at times, books would be written and printed by 
members who would stay up through the night to complete the publication for distribution at 
the next day’s discussion corner. In my interviews with Republicans, all recalled and 
described the jalsas as having the same discursive culture as the al-rukun, that is, the jalsas 
were conducted with a way of talking and interacting that was based on a mutual respect, 
rational argumentation, critical inquiry, and affection. Although Taha had shirked the 
traditional shaykh role and encouraged independent thought and debate to occur during the 
jalsas, any final decisions resulting from the meetings were usually not arrived at by 
consensus alone and were verified with the movement’s elders and ultimately with Taha.
It was the popularity of the discussion corners that enabled the relatively wide 
circulation of Republican ideology and the Republicans to develop as a “counterpublic” with 
opinions that could exert some influence in the opposition to Numeiri and the 
fundamentalists. Some of Warner’s criteria for the social construction of publics and 
counterpublics were (and continue to be) put to use by Republicans in the constructing of 
their counterpublic: publics are discursive; they self-organise through discourse; they entreat 
their discourse to strangers; there is ambiguity in who is being addressed (the discourse 
addresses a particular and a universal at the same time); and inclusiveness in it occurs 
simply by paying attention (2002:89). It was the ingenious way of holding these discussions 
in the open that set the Republicans apart from other religious groups, who kept their 
discussions closed to outsiders. It was important that the Republican dialogue be inclusive 
and diverse since it was through confrontations with those who disagreed with them or had 
outright hostility towards their message that they were able to refine, expatiate and solidify 
their arguments. It was through conflict that the Republicans shaped their progressive
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message and ideas for Sudan and the larger Muslim community (in Arabic: umma). There 
was significant resistance to the Republicans’ message from the largely conservative 
society which put individual members at risk of violence, but the Republicans handled 
potential problems with sensitivity and above all with a pacifist’s principles of nonviolence.
By holding discussions in public, audience members also ensured that the violence of a few 
would not be allowed to spiral out of control. One member recalled that the Muslim Brothers 
(NIF) were particularly violent in their opposition towards the al-rukun, after the NIF’s initial 
strategy to ignore the discussion corners failed. NIF members would beat audience 
members and speakers alike. Khatim A. was specifically targeted and beaten close to death 
at one al-rukun. He was taken away by audience members to a doctor for treatment and two 
hours later returned to the al-rukun in bandages, physically supported by other Republicans, 
and continued his speech. After several attacks on the al-rukun, the NIF abandoned their 
strategy of violence and started their own discussion corners to compete with the 
Republicans, as Abubakr described earlier in this chapter.
The presence of women speakers at the al-rukun was particularly provocative and 
challenged the fundamentalist edicts governing women’s public behaviour that were 
increasingly enforced violently under Numeiri. One Republican that I interviewed recalled an 
incident involving a Sister who was conducting an al-rukun as part of a wavd in a rural area. 
While the Sister was speaking, an elderly man slammed his walking stick down onto the 
podium and closely missed hitting her face. She did not flinch and continued to speak 
without interruption. Her composure and her refusal to respond to hostility helped to 
legitimatise her presence as a public woman speaker among the crowd gathered to listen. 
An-Na’im illustrates another way the Brotherhood practiced their religious beliefs while 
maintaining respect for Sudanese customs and mainstream Islamic religious practice, 
specifically through their progressive marriage practices. When a Republican couple 
married, the groom paid only one Sudanese pound as the bride-price, which satisfied the 
stipulation for a payment within Shari’a but also symbolised that a wife cannot be purchased 
(An-Na'im 1987a: 7). The Republicans combined this sensitive subversion of “traditional” 
cultural practices with a reformist ideology that consistently referenced and reinterpreted the 
Qur’an to build their legitimacy within the social context of Sudan.
127
The Republicans also left a printed legacy. During its years in both legal and illegal 
existence, the Brotherhood produced over 270 books and pamphlets, on topics including 
core Republican ideology, commentary on Sudanese politics and politics of the Middle East, 
critiques of fundamentalist ideology especially on gender, fatwa on Shari'a and other issues 
concerning Islamic doctrine. Some of the most famous Jumhuri publications are A Treastise 
on Prayer (1966), The Second Message of Islam (1967), The Problem o f the Middle East 
(1967), The Path of Muhammad (undated), Marxism in a Balance (1973), and Either This or 
the Flood (1984). The Second Message of Islam is Taha’s most important work and serves 
as the primary text of Republican Thought. When these works were first produced they were 
all self-published. The Second Message was republished in 1987 by Syracuse University 
Press. Most of the publications that were described to me as books are actually pamphlets, 
single sheet flyers or small, staple-bound booklets of around 10 pages.
Books and pamphlets were published in response to current political events in 
Sudan or internationally, or to explain (and sometimes defend) a fundamental belief in 
Republicanism. They were produced by a collective of members who would contribute the 
different skills that each member possessed. To remain relevant to the political milieu, a 
swift Republican response to a given event was required and most books were published 
within a 24-hour period. The longest time a book took in production was two days, but most 
were put out within a day; from the book’s conception, to writing, printing, collating and 
boxing for distribution. The topic and content would be decided by all members. Then an 
individual or a committee consisting of two to five members, depending on the complexity, 
size and scope of the book’s subject, would be given the task of writing the book. When the 
text was complete, it would be given to Taha, who would approve and sign-off what was 
written. Then the book would be typed on the sole typewriter owned by the Brotherhood by 
the one efficient and accurate typist among the members. If he was busy, the book would 
be handwritten in a fine calligraphy and another Brother talented in art would design the 
jacket, with the whole book printed out on a hand-cranked mimeograph, collated by 20 to 30 
members working in an assembly line, and packaged for distribution at the next day’s 
discussion corners. All of the print production was conducted in one of the four group homes 
where some of the movement’s young, unmarried men lived in Omdurman, the same 
Khartoum suburb where Taha lived. Young Sisters lived either with their parents or, if they
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were married, lived with their husbands but would assemble in the male group houses for 
book production. The Republicans’ print culture interacted with the culture of the al-rukun 
and the wavd, and became fundamental to the overall discursive identity of the movement.
6.3 The execution of Taha and the Republican exile
Under the Numeiri regime’s “Islamisation” process, human rights were rolled back in the 
guise of the September Laws and in compliance with the version of an Islamic state 
advocated by the NIF, the real power behind the Numeiri regime (O'Sullivan 2001:48-52). 
Retribution for opposing the regime was severe, and in April 1984, when a state of 
emergency was declared, public floggings and amputations increased dramatically 
(Mahmoud 2001:80). It was within this repressive environment that Taha was charged 
again with apostasy on January 8,1985 for his small pamphlet Hadha...aw al-Tufan (in 
English: Either this ...or the Fiood) in which he criticised the September Laws and the 
imposition of Shari’a (Warburg 2003:163). A Supreme Court law suit against Taha’s 
sentence was considered by a special court of appeal, which upheld the original sentence 
on 15 January. President Numeiri confirmed the sentence on 17 January, ordering Taha’s 
execution to be carried out the following day (An-Na'im 1987a: 14-16). Taha was executed 
by hanging on 18 January (Mahmoud 2001; Taha 1985). While there is some debate about 
whether his execution precipitated the popular revolt that forced Numeiri out in April 1985, 
most agree that the execution of the 76-year-old pacifist was repugnant and caused global 
outrage against the Numeiri regime (Mahmoud 2001:81; Miller 1985).
Political pressure was mounting against the Numeiri regime after the September 
Laws, as the economy nosedived causing a harsh famine, and as the stakes in the civil war 
with the South increased. The Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) was formed in 
Ethiopia in 1983 by ex-Anya Nya (Southern-based guerrilla units that attacked the national 
army during the 1960s and 1970s) officer John Garang and mounted a formidable Southern 
front in the civil war. The SPLA’s political wing, the Sudanese Peoples’ Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) was formed later in 1984 and included both Southerners and Northerners alike, 
most of whom were living in exile (Woodward 1990:162). The SPLA/SPLM was more 
radical than the Sudanese socialist party and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP), yet
129
they were not secessionist, rather they sought to build one Sudanese state with either 
federal or devolved regional governments. On 6 April 1985, Numeiri was deposed by 
several senior army commanders after massive, popular demonstrations. Elections were 
held in March 1986 which brought back an Umma Party-led coalition under Sadiq al-Madhi. 
The elections marked a return to liberal, multiparty democracy, embodied not only in the 
elections themselves but also in the return to social practices that harkened back to the pre- 
Islamic fundamentalist days of the 1960s (1990:206). However, the strength of the NIF was 
now obvious when the party beat several rivals for the country’s intelligentsia, including the 
Communists (1990:207). The election results revealed that Sudanese politics had reverted 
to its "old ways”; to patron-client loyalties of the traditional parties with the NIF being the only 
exception: a relative newcomer winning in the elections (1990:208). It is widely believed 
that the NIF was the behind-the-scenes backer of the 30 June Revolution of 1989, the 
military coup that placed General Umar al-Bashir, who remains the current president, in 
power and heralded the end of the third period of short-lived democratic governance in 
Sudan.
The horrible shock and disbelief surrounding Taha’s death forced the Republicans 
to halt immediately all public activities. Some members chose to go into exile during 1985 
and 1986, either fleeing to neighbouring Gulf countries, Egypt or further afield to the United 
States and the United Kingdom. The second and largest wave of Republican exile came 
during 1989 and 1990 just after al-Bashir’s military coup and the NIF victory, when most 
Sudanese people sensed what was bound to come in a society yoked by the violent 
repression of a religious fundamentalist-backed dictatorship. One Republican explained to 
me why most Brothers and Sisters chose to leave Sudan in 1990 although they remained 
after Taha’s execution. The Numeiri regime had been threatened by Taha as an individual 
political force, and the regime had not been necessarily threatened by Republican ideology. 
In the year following the coup, the NIF set up a programme to cleanse the government as 
well as the universities of all of its ideological and political enemies: communists, socialists, 
feminists, Islamic sectarian parties, and anyone not sympathetic to the NIF’s fundamentalist 
vision. With the NIF’s growing political and ideological control of all branches of government 
between June 1989 and June 1990, the largest threat to them was from competing 
ideologies, especially Islamically rooted ones. With Taha now dead and no longer a threat to
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the NIF as an individual, the Republicans knew that it was only a matter of time before the 
NIF’s wrath would focus on the Brotherhood as a group, and fearing this, large numbers of 
Brothers and Sisters left before the end of June 1990. After that month it was impossible for 
any Sudanese person with a dissenting ideology to leave the country. Those in exile have 
secured asylum status from their host countries and due to this, most have permanently 
settled in these countries. Many exiled members have pursued their PhDs, or continued 
their careers in medicine, psychiatry, public health, Arabic language instruction and 
translation, journalism, computer science or human rights work. Most exiled members have 
not been able to return to Sudan for even short visits until very recently, as late as 2004.
It is at this juncture that I wish to return to the Republican past that is always within 
reach through the movement’s printed (and online) legacy and discuss the ideology, 
Republican Thought, as developed by Taha, that is enjoying a renaissance in exile as 
Republicans engage online with each other and with non-Republican Sudanese. Republican 
Thought is also being revisited by Sudanese moderates who, after living for more than 10 
years in a fundamentalist Islamic state, are looking for not only a progressive version of 
Islam but also a new vision of democracy.
6.4 Republican ideology: Islam is the science of knowing God and humanity’s 
organising principal
6.4.1 Reformation of Islam and democracy: “Freedom for Us and Others”
After the transformation from a political party to a Sufi Brotherhood, the Republicans 
theorised and advocated for a democratic political system rooted in the recognition of full 
and universal human rights, equity and socialist economic values, not derived from Western 
liberal democracies, but based in Islam. The word Islam literally means “submission” and 
Muslim means “one who has submitted”, what both words mean to most Muslims and 
certainly to Taha is that the submission is to God’s will, that all of creation, everything 
contained within the infinite universe, including humanity, submits to God. At the core of 
Republican Thought, however, as Mohamed Mahmoud, the pre-eminent scholar on the 
Republicans has shown, is a fundamentalist theology in the sense that Taha proposes a 
return to the original, fundamental (and inherent) sources of Islam, primarily God’s word 
revealed to the Prophet at Mecca to reform Islam.
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While Taha criticised Western democracies in his book The Second Message and 
appeared to propose what he called “social democracy” in opposition to a liberal democratic 
model, his democratic theory really should be understood within the context of Sudanese 
sectarian politics of the 1960s to 1980s. That is, Taha’s model was developed in a cauldron 
of ideological struggles over the building of a postindependent and multicultural state in 
Sudan, where many Northern political parties were either against a federal system or were 
steadfast on building an Islamic state under Shari’a (Mahmoud 2001:74-75). Taha and the 
Republicans first theorised this reformation in their pamphlet: Usus Dustur al-Sudan 
(Foundations of the Constitution of the Sudan, 1955). Based on the Qur’an, the pamphlet 
advocated a federally based, democratic-socialist republic be established in Sudan. In this 
publication the Republicans contended that the conflicting interests between the individual 
and society are reconciled through Islam enacted in a democratic-socialist political system 
(2001:74). This Islamic base is what made Republican ideology legitimate in Sudan (and 
the larger Muslim world); it was through a constant referral to and reinterpretation of verses 
of the Qur’an, and a close and “conscious imitation” (in Arabic: taqlid) of practices of the 
Prophet as stipulated in the Sunnah, that Taha formulated the ideology not only of 
revitalising Islam but of finally fulfilling the promises of democracy (Mahmoud 2001:85).
The core Republican criticism of the Western, liberal democratic model is that it is 
based predominately on capitalist economics, and as so, the values of a materialistic 
individualism and the accumulation of private wealth are so deeply entrenched within it that 
it can only produce an unjust society. Due to this “confusion of values”, in Taha’s opinion, all 
modern democratic states have failed miserably to realise democracy and rather have 
produced societies that are alienated from politics, highly individualistic and materialistic, 
and grossly unbalanced in their distribution of wealth and the basic necessities to live a 
“dignified human existence” (Mahmoud 1998:108; Taha 1987:155).
While the Republicans critiqued the West’s material individualism, the basis of their 
democratic ideology was centred on human rights and social justice that is only possible 
through the recognition of the absolute freedom for the individual. This “absoluteness” is in 
the Sufi sense of the individual’s pursuit of God and through it, her realisation of moral 
perfection through God’s absoluteness. This perfection is significant because within it is 
contained a reunification of the individual and society where a perfectly moral individual
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(who is absolutely liberated by her morality) fulfils her obligations to the greater good of 
society. It was the reunification of the individual and society—the core of Republican 
Though—Taha believed it possible to reconcile Islam with “modernity”. For Taha and the 
Republicans, the final goal is always the individual, and that individuals should not be used 
by ideology as a means to an end, rather all ideology and especially “the Qur’an, the religion 
of Islam itself, is a means to that end” (Taha 1987:62).
Taha believed that democracy is enacted culturally; a living system where 
individuals have “the right to make mistakes” (Mahmoud 1998:119). This focus on the 
individual underpinned Republican socialist-democratic theory where the individual’s 
freedom to make mistakes and her “ability and responsibility to take an active part in 
shaping [her] history” is vital to their theory of social justice within Islam (1998:122-123).
The Brotherhood’s main goal, then and now, is to reform Islam and reconcile the religion 
with modernity through the recognition of full human rights for all people, Muslims and non- 
Muslims, women and men, and this is achieved through the individual. One of their most 
quoted slogans: “Freedom for Us and Others” embodied the equity through republicanism 
that they advocated for. This is a revolutionary proposal in a country torn by a decades-long 
civil war in which close to two million died, and that fuelled a pernicious slave trade in non- 
Muslim Southerners. Those in power endeavoured to remake the diverse country in their 
own distorted image of Islam, yet the Republicans envisioned a united Sudan with no 
distinctions made between the North and South, an ideological reunification of all Sudanese 
people into one nation (Mahmoud 2001; Mukhtar 1996).
6.4.2 Reconciling Islam with Modernity and Democracy: The “Second Message” and the ill- 
fitting ialabiya
Taha and the Republicans claimed that a reinterpretation of Islam would solve what they 
saw as the problems of democracy as well as resolve the dichotomy between Islam and 
modernity; the conflict between an individual’s need for “absolute individual freedom” and 
society’s need for “complete social justice” (Taha 1987:52-53,63-112). The Republicans 
claimed that these could be unified under a reformation of Islam, primarily based on Taha’s 
contribution through his Second Message philosophy: that God’s message for Muslims, and 
indeed all of humanity, was handed by Him to the Prophet Muhammad at Mecca. The 
message given by God to the Prophet at Mecca was forgotten when he moved his
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community of Muslims to Medina. The revelations at Medina became the foundation on 
which Islam was built. God’s first message at Mecca, revelations Taha called the “Second 
Message”, preached the universality of humanity and the mutability of Shari’a through a 
return to the eternal laws of the Sunnah, laws considered by the Republicans to be more 
equitable and inclusive. Taha proposed that the Meccan revelations were God’s true 
message for humanity but that, until the twentieth century, humanity was not ready to hear 
it.
Part of Taha’s Second Message theology revolved around Shari’a, God’s laws 
enacted on earth. Shari’a, being a system of laws and edicts developed in the seventh 
century had to adapt and change as societies do. A Republican recalled that Taha had an 
example that he often used to explain his point about Shari’a. Taha would ask listeners to 
imagine a jalabiya (the long shirt and trouser suit worn by Sudanese men) that is perfectly 
tailored for a 7-year-old boy. It is comfortable on his small frame, protects him from the 
elements and serves him well. Now imagine this same boy, grown into a man at 21, trying to 
fit his matured body into this 7-year-old’s suit. It will not fit no matter how hard he tries to 
stretch and pull the fabric over his frame. In a similar way, Shari’a’s laws were perfectly 
tailored for seventh-century Islam but in the twenty-first century, with matured and advanced 
Muslim civilisations, these laws have to be stretched and distorted to make sense. The 
Republicans and Taha believed what God had truly intended for all of humanity through 
Islam was His first (and now Second) Meccan message (Mahmoud 2001:74; Mukhtar 1996: 
342). The Islamic religion as it developed when the Prophet settled in Medina and 
established the community of Muslims, the umma, was specialised and particular to the 
necessities of that historic moment in seventh-century Arabia. Humanity had moved on 
since then, and Taha believed that in the twentieth (and twenty-first) century humanity was 
ready to hear and fulfil God’s true Meccan intentions of universality, equality, and absolute, 
individual freedom to produce a just society.
The return to God’s true (second) message is the basis for the Republican, 
Islamically rooted democratic model. Since Islam is God’s perfect system within which the 
entirety of the universe is contained, the Republican’s socialist-democratic model would be 
understood as existing within the larger Islamic system.
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6.4.3 “The science of knowing Allah”
The organising principal of Taha’s Republican Thought was based on a belief in a 
methodical and critical self-interrogation and analysis—through the use of this method, a 
direct path to God is opened. This belief is rooted in the very Sufi tradition of methodological 
self knowledge; that in order to know God, you must know yourself. In the case of Sufism, 
the self is equivalent to the soul. The Qur’an says: “You, o God, know what is in myself but I 
do not know what is in Yourself (5:116) and it is through knowing God’s omnipotent 
knowledge of your own soul that you can know God; this is the Sufi (as well as the 
Republican) path, one that ultimately leads to a (re)union with God. In his book Al-Deen wa 
al-Tanmiya al-ljtima’iya (Religion and Social Development) Taha explains how Shari’a, or 
God’s absolute Will, is enacted through independent thought and self-interrogation: “This 
[sacred order that God created for man] is the cause of all causes, for man cannot sublime 
to the higher degree of dignity without thought. Religion [Islam] came to scrutinise thought, 
that it may not deviate from righteousness” (Taha 1974:50, cited in Mahmoud 2003:187).
Taha employed what he called a scientific methodology to practice this self 
knowledge and believed empiricism to be a substructure of religion (Islam). “Scientific 
investigation into the nature of things does not stand solely on the methods advocated by 
empirical science. Rather, it conjoins materialism and metaphysics. It is the science of 
knowing Allah, a science founded on every letter and word of the Qur’anic verse: ‘Soon will 
We show them Our Signs in the (furthest) Regions (of the earth) and in their souls’” (Taha 
1974:8, cited in Mahmoud 2003:87). He did not use the same methodology, however, to 
prove or disprove the existence of God. The explicit assumption is that all of human thought 
and all of existence is preceded by God’s existence and His perfection as realised in the 
absolutism of Islam. He demonstrated Islam’s (and God’s) absoluteness in his critique of 
Marxism and its denial of an antecedent Mind, when he says that “evolution, i.e., the fact 
that existence evolves in a continuous movement since it never rests, does not exist outside 
the facts of religion. Islam, indeed, is a total sum of all forms of activity in existence. Our 
Lord says in the Qur’an about Islam: “What other than the religion of Allah do they claim?” 
So, Marx, and whatever being is brought by Marx, is contained in the general Islam” (Taha 
1973:6, cited in Mahmoud 2003:76-77). The Republican religious ideology says that, 
ultimately, Islam is political in the sense that in Islam, through the application of God’s laws,
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all of society is organised into a perfect metaphysical and earthly system, and in the 
twentieth (and twenty-first) century is the perfect science to cleanse the earth of injustice. It 
is within this perfect and just system too that the Republican “Second Message” democratic 
model can finally be enacted.
6.5 Conclusions
This detailed account of the history of the Republican Brothers helps to explain how the 
movement fits into the larger context of the Sudanese tradition of Sufism as well as the 
sectarian nature of the country’s politics. This recounting of the Republican movement 
before exile demonstrates the societal context that forged Republican ideology and political 
culture, and helps to make sense of the pressures that forced many its members into exile. 
The Republicans’ influence in Sudanese politics was not as significant as those of the larger 
Umma, the DUP or the post-1989 NIF parties but their reformist ideas were well received by 
progressives and respected by mainstream Muslims. Their democratic visions for Islam, 
however, were so threatening to the Islamic political establishment and the fundamentalist 
power behind it, that Taha was executed.
In spite of the numerous, official bans on the public activities of the movement from 
the mid-1960s onwards, the Republicans developed a rich and unique discursive and print 
culture that is still considered to be the first of its kind in Sudan. Through the al-rukun 
(discussion corners), wavd (travelling book distribution groups), zikrs (public chanting 
prayers) and the jalsas (closed meetings for prayers and discussion), the Republicans 
honed a distinct, discursive identity of critical debate based on logical and dispassionate 
argumentation, that developed into the expected behaviour of the movement.
Through Taha’s theory about the Second Message of Islam, where he contended 
God’s true message for humanity is one of equality, pluralism and universality, the 
Republicans built their model of democracy to rectify the cleavages they saw between the 
individual and society, Islam and modernity, and democracy and social justice.
In Taha’s absence maintaining a unified Republican discursive identity has become 
problematic for the movement. It is in the suspended twilight of exile that many Republicans 
attempt to continue with the modernist, revisionist project started by Taha but as we will
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explore more in the next chapter on online Republicanism, this continuation is not withoutis 
complications.
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7 The Republican Brothers online
“There is no possibility that any perceptible change will 
happen within our own lifetime. We are dead. Our only 
true life is in the future. We shall take part in it as 
handfuls of dust and splinters of bone. But how far away 
that future may be, there is no knowing. It might be a 
thousand years. At present nothing is possible except to 
extend the area of sanity little by little. We cannot act 
collectively. We can only spread our knowledge 
outwards from individual to individual, generation to 
generation.”
—George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949,1950)
In this chapter I analyse the Republican Brotherhood’s online presence and activities 
through its website, its open and closed bulletin boards, and the non-Republican website 
sudaneseonline.com. As I have mentioned in Chapter Five on the research methods relied 
upon in this study, all of the analysed data that forms the basis of this chapter comes from 
interviews with Republican members about the activities occurring on the closed bulletin 
board assaloon.org and their participation in sudaneseonline.com. I have also analysed the 
postings in English on the open bulletin board on the Republican website alfikra.org, English 
postings by Republicans in the closed listserv as-saloon, and an analysis of the alfikra.org 
website itself. The first three sections of this chapter are detailed descriptions of the 
Republican websites and the ways that the Republicans enact discursive identity online.
The last four sections are the analysis of recurrent themes that emerged from the interview 
and textual data. In these sections I attempt to document the strategic ambivalence over 
engaging in political activity in exile, especially online, the splits between the oral and written 
argumentational styles, and the way that arguments are validated by referencing the primary 
sources of Taha and the Qur’an.
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7.1 The development of Al-Fikra and As-Saloon17
The Republican’s online presence through its website, alfikra.org, bulletin boards, both on 
alfikra.org and the movement’s closed site assaloon.org, and members’ postings to other 
bulletin boards is rooted in the Republicans’ established discursive culture that emerged 
from Sudan’s Sufi tradition, and one described at length in Chapter Six. As was 
demonstrated earlier, this discursive identity precedes the Republican usage of the Internet.
The alfikra.org website, the Republicans’ official, publicly accessible site, is itself an 
iteration of earlier online efforts to expand this discursive culture beyond the geographical 
limitations of exile as well as the time and participation constraints of a one-to-one 
telephone call. The current webmaster of alfikra.org, Abdel 0., a United States-based IT 
professional, started a listserv for members in 1995 and continues to work on the alfikra.org 
and assaloon.org sites in his spare time. Before the listserv was built, many members 
exchanged letters on political philosophy, theology and Republican Thought as a way of 
maintaining the dialogue that had been ongoing for decades and almost silenced by exile. In 
its beginnings, the listen/ functioned similarly to how Woolgar (2002:16-17) describes online 
technologies functioning in his rules of virtuality, that “virtual technologies supplement, [and 
do] not supplant real activities”. After the listserv was started, members continued to 
communicate with one another through letter writing and telephone calls in addition to 
posting to the listserv.
Until 1997 listserv postings were primarily in English or sometimes written 
transliterally in Arabic using an English alphabet, and the list was built without the use of a 
listserv program. To participate in the list, members kept a digital list of all the listserv’s 
email addresses and responses to posts were made by hitting the “reply all” button. When a 
listserv member wanted to write in Arabic, he or she did so by writing it in a word processing 
program that had an Arabic alphabet or language feature and emailed it to Abdel, who then 
converted the file to a .gif, or image file, and once converted, posted the file to the list as an 
attachment. It was not until reliable, web-based Arabic language programs became widely
17 The Republicans spell al-Saloon phonetically with the English alphabet as as-Saloon. Letters pronounced 
with the tongue at the front of the mouth, such as “s” or “n”, are called “sun letters”. With words starting with 
sun letters, the definite article “al” is pronounced with the sound of the first letter of the word that it modifies, so 
“al-saloon" is pronounced “as-saloon”, “al-noor” is pronounced “an-noor”, etc.
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available with the release of Windows XP and Internet Explorer 5.0 that members were able 
to communicate online or in emails directly written in Arabic.
The idea to have a website for the Brotherhood was sparked when one member, a 
computer science postgraduate student living in the United Kingdom, Tariq M., started a 
small website about the movement with the free server space allocated to him on his 
university’s server. Before building the website he was cautious of two things: the existence 
of the Sudanese government’s official ban of the Republican Brotherhood and the 
movement’s decision that after Taha’s execution all “external activities” conducted by 
members were suspended. The external activities were explicitly political, and indeed, quite 
often in our interviews many members emphasised that the external activities were the 
political activities of the Brotherhood, while the “internal activities” were characterised as 
more spiritual in nature. Before the ban external activities included the discussion corners 
(al-rukun), book distribution (wavd), releasing official announcements (fatwa, or Islamic 
scholarly opinions) on positions the Brotherhood held in response to current political or 
religious issues and events, especially Shari’a, and proselytising either religious or political 
ideology in general and especially through the publicly held prayer meetings (jalsa) and 
chants (zikr) (An-Na'im 1987a; Mahmoud 2003:128). This decision was made to protect 
members in exile, but more so, to shield those who remained in Sudan from further 
violence. The unstated and considerably more significant reason for the suspension of 
political activities may be for the reason that the movement lost its only legitimate voice 
when Taha died. I discuss this loss of the authority and legitimacy to speak at length later in 
this chapter, however, at this point I would like to emphasise that many of the individual 
members that I spoke with say they were and continue to be very uncomfortable with taking 
on the responsibility of continuing the public project of proselytising the ideology started by 
Taha.
In spite of the official ban, the present version of the alfikra.org website (figures 7.1 - 
7.3) continues to be stored on a server in the United States and therefore, stymies—in a 
way—the ban. Republicans take little comfort in this and in fact, being online heightens their 
awareness that their actions in exile are under constant surveillance by authorities, 
monitored remotely through government informants living within exile communities and 
through the Web. Evidence of political opinions or activities that is perceived to be
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Figure 7.3 Main navigation page (Arabic), www.alfikra.org, 2003
threatening by the authorities or informants that watch exiles online could have very serious 
consequences for members still living in Sudan. Before going ahead with the building and 
publishing of the site, Tariq sought and was granted permission to build it from one of the 
movement’s surviving elders, a founding member and, after Taha’s death, an unofficial 
leader, Ustadh Salam.18 Emboldened by Tariq’s online efforts, Abdel pitched in and built the 
first iteration of the current website in 1999.
Alfikra.org (al-fikra, in English: “thought”), the publicly accessible website, is the 
online public face of the Republican Brothers, the one that describes the history of the
18 When asked in interviews most Republicans told me that there is no longer any leadership and no hierarchy 
for decision making after Taha’s execution. However, in my analysis of listserv postings and interview 
transcripts, there are members who are considered to be leaders of the movement and who are referred to for 
making decisions for the entire movement. Some decisions, such as the one to stop all political activities, have 
been the source of intense hostility from some members and the leadership at times have been called cowards 
for the decisions they have made.
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movement, makes available some key writings of Taha and the Brotherhood, recordings of 
Taha’s public speeches as well as the Inshads and the public bulletin board. Throughout 
the site Abdel was careful not to make too many references to the Republicans as a 
movement or as a Brotherhood. The official name of the site is The Republican Thought and 
throughout the content, Taha and his life is emphasised while the history of the movement is 
downplayed. The private face of the movement and the reserve of the internal activities is 
the closed site assaloon.org.
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Figure 7.4 Entry page, www.assaloon.org, 2005
Assaloon.org19 (figure 7.4) was built by Abdel in August 2002 using the freeware bulletin 
board software phpBB. The forum derives its name from the living room in Taha’s 
Omdurman house, which he called the “saloon”; a name that evokes reference to the salon 
cultures of Europe that are said to have incubated the nascent foundations of modern 
democracy based in deliberation (Habermas 1989). It was in Taha’s “saloon” that all of the
19 In the Sudanese context as-Saloon is in general the name for a room where men gather for discussion and 
to socialise. Barbershops are also called “saloons” and again these places are restricted to men only. Women 
are banned from all such spaces. A Republican Sister explained that she had made several postings on the 
bulletin board challenging the use of as-saloon as the name for the Republican website. She argued that since 
for most Sudanese the word “saloon” conjures up a space only open to men, the name implicitly excludes 
women even if the Republican use of the word referred to Taha’s living room where all Republicans, men and 
women, sat together for deliberation. Interestingly, this one mention from the Sister was the only time the 
contention over the name came up in my interviews with Republican members.
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jalsas and zikrs were held. The Republicans held their spiritual meetings in the “saloon” 
within his home, where men and women prayed together, as opposed to in a mosque, 
where they would be forced to pray separately. Before assaloon.org was built with phpBB, 
Abdel used Impact, an audio bulletin board program, where members could record and post 
their messages.
The closed site (figure 7.5), which consists solely of the phpBB bulletin board, is 
divided into two sections: the text-based forum and the archive. The forum, which has more 
than 270 registered members, contains a general discussion forum, community news where 
members post wedding, birth and death announcements and other types of personal news, 
an audio and video archive where recordings of Inshads, speeches, jalsas and public 
gatherings are stored, an archive of digitised photographs from various personal collections, 
the “children’s corner” or information for Republican children, and a general news section 
including links to news articles on other websites. In the second, separate section Abdel has 
created an ever-expanding archive that contains digitised books that were originally 
published during the open period of the movement, mainly from 1964 to 1985. The books 
are either completely digitally transcribed or in the process of transcription. Some books are 
scanned completely to preserve the original calligraphy and artwork of the book. The 
archive also contains over 170 hours of digitised recordings.
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7.2 Zikr: Remembrance and archiving the movement
It is through the slow and laborious process of collaboratively typing and digitising the 
remaining copies of the movement’s books and pamphlets that the archive is being built. 
Efforts to collect, transcribe, and digitise the Republicans’ printed material started as early 
as 1995. The archiving process has gone through several iterations as more affordable and 
better archiving technology has become available. At all stages in its present development, 
the archive makes ample utilisation of bulletin board technology.
During the 1983 arrests and imprisonment of 50 Republicans, including Taha, the 
Numeiri regime confiscated and publicly burnt the movement’s many books. The books 
were collected from the group houses occupied by young, unmarried male members as well 
as Taha’s home when the houses were raided and the Brothers arrested (An-Na'im 1987a: 
7-9; Mahmoud 2001:81). The personal libraries of Republicans who lived in campus 
housing at the University of Khartoum were left untouched as were the books belonging to 
Republicans who did not live in the same Omdurman neighbourhood as Taha. It was from 
these secretly preserved libraries that the Republicans quickly cobbled together a book of 
Taha’s quotations to refute government propaganda that sought to justify the apostasy 
charge for which he was executed by discrediting Republican ideology. Global news 
coverage of the execution as well was collected from members and nonmembers living 
outside of Sudan and collated into a small pamphlet that was distributed throughout 
Khartoum.
Members fleeing Sudan during 1985 and 1986, and again in 1989 after the coup 
d’etat that brought Umar al-Bashir and the National Islamic Front to power, did not take the 
risk of being caught with Republican books in their possession as they crossed borders or 
left through the airport. As a result, many of the exiled Republicans have only a few books 
that they managed to smuggle out of Sudan and the archive has been growing piecemeal 
from the scattered remains of the Republican library. Members who still live in Sudan have 
access to recordings of some of Taha’s early public lectures stored in the archives at the 
University of Khartoum, and from those recordings are able to make digital copies available 
for the online archive.
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Figure 7.6 Analogue archive in webmaster’s home office, October 2004
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The digitising of the books (figures 7.6 and 7.7) is a collaborative process with several 
members contributing transcription work to a single book. A small handful of volunteers, as 
of October 2004, no more than six members, type up a book or edit the transcript of a book 
in a word processing program and post it or repost it to the bulletin board. Since a good 
number of Republican books were written in longhand, and often decorated with elaborate 
and complicated calligraphy, these books are scanned and saved as image files to digitally 
preserve their look. Once posted, others are free to download the file to add to or correct the 
digitised version. As a book is completed, it is moved to alfikra.org and made publicly 
available.
The online archiving project echoes a core feature of the Republican discursive 
identity: zikr, or remembrance, which is explicit in the practice of a continuous reference to 
the past to renew the present. The word zikr refers not only to the Sufi chanting practice but 
also to the Republican concept that when one chants the name of God, one is remembering 
what one already knows. You are remembering what has already been implanted in one’s 
memory by God: God’s eternal absoluteness and your own divineness because God made 
you through His omnipotence. By chanting in a zikr, you are remembering what you already 
know.
This referral to the past is also, in a way, a poignant reminder of the sense of 
trauma that Taha’s death has imprinted on and permeates the movement. This return to the 
past also validates Taha’s message for the Republicans. Members believe that decades 
ago before he died, Taha predicted the current conditions of politics in Sudan and the 
Middle East, and they substantiate this by referring to his past writing and their own 
recollections of what he said. Through this online renewal, where a new generation of 
Sudanese and non-Sudanese Muslims who came of age after the banning and who have no 
direct or first-hand experience of the discussion corners or the Republican books, is 
discovering Republican Thought. One Republican told me, for example, that she had 
recently met some young people, Sudanese and Egyptian, who said in their search for a 
progressive, alternative Islam, they stumbled upon Republican Thought through alfikra.org. 
She had heard of other cases where people living in Sudan’s rural areas, that tend to be 
very isolated with few media resources or technologies, have relied on urban relatives for 
access to alfikra.org and online Republicanism. Urban relatives download archived books
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from alfikra.org, photocopy them and distribute them in the rural areas, where people read 
the copied books by candle light. In this way, making the content of the Internet a physical 
artefact, people with low or nonexistent access to the Internet are able to get “online”. In 
these ways, this one Sister believes, the online presence of the Republicans is very 
powerful for the movement as a whole.
7.3 As-saloon al-kitabi wa as-saloon al-sawti: Written forums and online jalsas20
“One Brother remembered that Ustadh said, “One day everyone will 
participate in the jalsas from his own house.” So that was a prophecy. It 
was unthinkable at that time [when he said it]” (Abdel, interview 
transcript, October 2004).
At the end of August 2001, the first online jalsa—often referred to as the “audio forum” in 
interviews—used the shareware conferencing and chat program PalTalk (paltalk.com) and 
was organised by Abdel. This is not to say that technologically mediated jalsas did not occur 
before that year. Before implementing PalTalk for online jalsas, members would make 
conference telephone calls to participate in jalsas and Abdel documented these by 
recording them onto analogue tapes. When asked if the online jalsas resemble the jalsas 
before 1985, many Republicans mentioned that part of the appeal of the audio forum was 
the ability to hear each others’ voices after not hearing them for so long due to the 
conditions of exile. For many members, this helped to reinforce the sense that they are a 
religious community and at first, because of this, participation was high. Recently, however, 
regular involvement has dropped off significantly.
Abdel describes the move to PalTalk as both a blessing and a curse in terms of 
accessibility. Obviously the availability of this technology means that more members can 
participate at the same time in a jalsa, and helps to recreate, in some small way, the 
togetherness that was felt during the jalsas before exile. But while most Republicans in 
Sudan have access to telephones, they do not have access to computers or the Internet in
20 In Arabic words are built from one similar root: so, for example al-kitab means “book”, so al-kitabi means 
“writing”. Al-sawti means “sound” or “voice”.
148
the same way that exiled members do, now that the jalsas are online many Sudan-based 
members are excluded. The software itself also limits participation since only 10 terminals 
can be connected at a time, forcing many members to share connections by going to each 
others’ houses to participate as a group. For those Republicans who are the lone member in 
a town, or even in a country, it is much more difficult for them to participate online, again 
restrained by the limited number of connections that have to be shared.
In several senses alfikra.org and assaloon.org serves the double functions of 
internal and external activities of the movement, in spite of most members’ continued 
insistence that after the execution, the external activities have ceased. Many members 
explained to me, moreover, that even the “movement” per se no longer exists. All that 
remains is simply a loose affiliation of people who believe in and share in the Republican 
ideology and who also happen to have the shared experiences of being Republican during 
the height of the movement in the 1970s and 1980s. As I have already pointed out, this is 
reiterated in how the Republicans textually construct the (non)movement on alfikra.org. One 
member who was particularly emphatic about the nonexistence of the movement and its 
political activities quite clearly said that:
“After the tragic execution of Alustaz, the leading Republicans have 
preferred to dissolve the political and organizational movement rather 
than carry [on with] a meaningless confrontation with the authorities.
That step was opposed by some Republicans, but no[t] one of them took 
an active role in opposing the authority confrontationally, or was able to 
give a logical explanation why it was wise to defy an authority that 
succeeded in killing Alustaz. Most leading figures of the Republicans 
who advocated quiescence, were able to win the love and confidence of 
the rest of Republicans who began to gradually appreciate their wisdom 
in protecting the individuals and families from the wrath of the fanatic 
fundamentalists who were behind the conspiracy that lead to the 
execution of Alustaz Mahmoud. Since the military coup that was led by 
the Islamic fundamentalist Muslim Brothers in Sudan in 1989, until now,
2004, there seems to be no chance for spreading the Republican
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Thought publicly in Sudan without facing serious consequences” (Karim
E., online interview, April 2004).
During our online interview, Karim was careful to emphasise that this suspension of all 
external organisational and political activities, including distribution of Republican materials, 
is in full force despite having a public website, when he copied and pasted a caveat posted 
to the alfikra.org public forum, where he serves as its moderator:
“Dear visitors and members of the Forum 
Assalamu Alaikum
Welcome to this open and free board attached to the Alfikra.org, the web 
site that contains the heritage of Alustaz Mahmoud Mohammed Taha 
and his Republican Thought.
The administrator and moderators of this Forum neither represent an 
Organization of the Republicans nor do they speak on behalf of the 
Republicans.
This board is meant to be a forum that enables Republican individuals to 
write about their own understanding of the Republican Thought or 
answer the questions raised by visitors or members”
(Karim E., online interview, April 2004).
Yet while it may be true that the external activities as they were enacted before Taha’s 
execution are suspended in Sudan—there are no more discussion corners or book 
distribution trips—through the availability of these materials (or at least some of them) online 
as well as individual Republicans’ deliberative engagements on bulletin boards with a larger 
Sudanese public, the suspension of the political becomes ambiguous. In a sense it is as if 
by not calling the online activities “external” as such abdicates any responsibility for the fact 
that the activities are political for the very reason that they are public. Indeed one of the 
ongoing, contentious and highly charged debates on both the audio and text-based closed 
forums is whether or not the movement should start again with the external activities. This 
issue is so fundamental to the frustrations felt by some members from the self-imposed ban
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that a few have chosen to leave the Brotherhood altogether and some have founded new, 
independent political parties in exile alongside other disillusioned non-Republican ex­
members of the Sudan Communist Party and exiled Sudanese.21 Other members have 
chosen to quietly continue with the external activities in their own small ways through 
presenting conference papers, writing articles or PhD theses, and publicly speaking about 
Republican Thought and the movement. Others told me that while they employ the 
framework of Republican Thought to develop opinions publicly held and expressed, they are 
always careful to qualify their opinions as personal beliefs and that their opinions are not 
necessarily shared by the Republican Brotherhood as a group. Part of the issue is the fear 
of death, because of the accusation of apostasy and the execution of Taha, the fear of 
violence and death remain the core reason for the suspension of all external activities. 
Furthermore many members believe there is a very real danger for Republicans in using the 
Internet over any other medium due to its ability to transmit information across geographical 
and political borders so efficiently. As one Republican told me, the Internet has a unique 
tendency to “amplify opinions”. No one has forgotten that Taha’s death was due to a single 
sheet of paper and they are not willing to risk their lives and the lives of others in a similar 
way (An-Na'im 1987a: 18). To underline what Karim said in the previous quote, there is a 
palpable sense of profound trauma among Republicans that has not dissipated over 20 
years after the execution.
Yet the ambiguity that surrounds the self-imposed ban is more complicated than 
mourning the loss of Taha and the movement. The debates that are focused on the ban 
sustain a delicate tension between making a conclusive decision by consensus (but 
enforced by the leadership) and supporting a contingent, inconclusive openness. This is 
strategic. It is a strategy of ambivalence, a necessary strategy that guarantees the survival 
of the movement that is not a movement. If, as one member told me, the government comes 
after them, who will they go after? There is only one website, one webmaster; they can only
21 The New Democratic Forces (or HAQ, the party’s Arabic acronym; the word for “truth” in Arabic is “al-haqq”, 
thus the acronym serves a double meaning). The first meeting to form the party was held in London in 1995 
with one UK-based Republican member in attendance among several other Sudanese exiles. In the same year 
another Republican, based in the United States, also founded a new political party that was separate from 
HAQ. The second international HAQ meeting was held in Cairo in 2000. These political activities are not 
directly linked to the Republican Brotherhood in any way. The Republicans who are participating in these 
political parties and activities do so as individuals and do not claim to represent publicly the Republican 
Brotherhood.
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go after one person because there is no “group”. But this strategy also has repercussions 
for how Republicans interact with one another, bitter argument over the very raison d’etre of 
the movement has produced more than hurt feelings, it has caused fractious divisions pitting 
those for the resumption of the political activities against those who side with the leadership. 
While this issue produces the most divisive debates among members, the ambivalence of 
the debate surrounding it due to its inconclusiveness—making a decision by not making 
one—is just as strategic. As I hope to demonstrate in the remainder of this chapter, this 
strategic ambivalence threads throughout their interactions with each other and outsiders.
7.4 Digitising al-rukun, (re)opening the dialogue: the Republican bulletin board and 
sudaneseonline.com
Clicking into the Photo Album section, a visitor to alfikra.org will find close to two dozen 
digital images of fading photographs. Sudanese women and men, wrapped in the long, 
white fabric of the Republicans, wearing Afros and thick, black-framed eye glasses that 
were fashionable in the mid-1970s, with smiling, fresh faces that shine out from the past to 
the present through an amber-tinged photo. One image is of six young people, two women 
and four men, all clutching books in their arms, stopped as they walked down a street in the 
main shopping district of Khartoum and asked to pose for the picture by a seventh, 
anonymous member of the group who photographed them. Another image depicts a lone 
man, again wrapped in the long white Republican fabric and wearing a loose turban to cover 
his head, who addresses a crowd of over 100 men and women sitting in a semicircle around 
him on grass sheltered by shady trees from the stark Sudanese sun. This is the legendary 
Khatim A., the famous Republican orator of the al-rukun, who, through his logically 
constructed, incisive and persuasive arguments, convinced many young students to declare 
themselves Republicans.
As I described the al-rukun in Chapter Six, the Republicans knew that it was 
important to hold discussions about the Republican ideology in the open spaces of street 
corners or markets of Khartoum as opposed to the closed spaces of mosques or even 
Taha’s home, because they believed that it was in public spaces that dialogue becomes 
inclusive and diverse, and is safer for the speakers. Members were confident that the crowd 
would defend them against the violence of a few radicals. This strategy worked. People like
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Khatim A. and the discussion corners themselves were preceded by their reputations in 
urban centres like Khartoum. As described in the previous chapter, even presently, the 
Republicans are reputed to have forged a new culture of public speaking in Khartoum; many 
groups, both religious and political, followed the Republicans out of the mosques and into 
the streets, a public culture that continues to thrive today. One exiled Republican told me 
that on his return to Khartoum after a 10 year absence, he witnessed several public Sufi 
revival meetings conducted and attended by young people in the city streets. He pointed to 
this trend as evidence of how effective the Republican discussion corners were in the 
shaping of the public discursive culture in Khartoum.
With the advent of cheaper (and quite often free) web-based communication 
software and technology, Republicans have moved the project they started in the streets of 
Khartoum to the bulletin boards and listservs frequented by Sudanese people, both those 
who are exiled and to a lesser extent, those living in Sudan. For many of the Republicans 
that I spoke with, they reenact and reinscribe the al-rukun through their participation on 
these non-Republican Sudanese online forums and are circulating their discourse to a wider 
and more diverse audience than they were able to in Sudan. In my interview with Fatima A., 
a sympathetic non-Republican22 living in the United States, she described her view of the 
online discussions:
“I am now on the Sudanese discussion boards...I open 
sudaneseonline...but then again it resembles those discussion circles 
that [the Republicans] had in public. In a way where there are people 
with different opinions, there are people who will call them names, call 
them kaffirs23, ... and now it is online. So you have this huge [audience], 
the Internet made it possible for something like 2,000 people to either 
listen or participate whereas the discussion circle, the physical thing,
22 At the beginning of our interview Fatima wanted to be clear that the only reason she chooses not to call 
herself a Republican is because she does not sit in the Inshads or pray regularly and she felt that to call herself 
a full member of the Brother/Sisterhood without engaging in the intensive prayer regime practiced by the 
Republicans would be unfair to the other members.
23 In English “non-believer”. This is a very insulting word, for a Muslim to be called a kaffir the charge of 
apostasy or an accusation of leaving Islam can be implicitly understood and that accusation is not far behind 
the insult; under the current system of Shari’a in Sudan both charges are punishable by death. In this way, the 
use of the word kaffir is a threat of violence.
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would have 100 people. So I think the Internet had brought in more and 
more people to listen to these ideas. And [the Republicans have] kept 
the [al-rukun the] same way, it doesn’t matter that people are calling 
them names; they don’t call names back to people. They usually start 
from a very cordial, friendly basis which usually embarrasses the other 
party and attracts the other people who are on the board, reading and 
listening. And you find so many, hundreds and hundreds of people who 
are not Republicans, who are not even going to join, who have these 
encouraging messages that are being sent to the board (in defence of 
those Republicans being textually attacked). Sayings like: ‘You son of a 
bitch get off the board you should be embarrassed by your post!’ (The 
effect is) [t]hen even for those people who were calling them names last 
year, this year they’re coming to a sort of to an (apology or different 
position). ‘So you know we’ve been at odds but you know I respect you’.
And you see this happening a lot” (Fatima H., interview transcript,
January 2005).
While Fatima is discussing sudaneseonline.com, a bulletin board extremely popular with 
Sudanese people and often the topic of many offline discussions that take place in exiled 
Republicans’ living rooms, she does not discuss the public board on alfikra.org. By focusing 
solely on sudaneseonline.com where the forum is populated with people with a wide range 
of political opinions, she is emphasising the fundamental characteristic of the al-rukun, that 
despite the threat of violence, and in fact because of it, discussions should take place in 
open, non-Republican forums. Ahmed F. an exiled Republican living in the United States 
describes not only an expansion of the al-rukun in non-Republican online forums, but 
implies that there may be, possibly, a new definition for democracy, or at least democratic 
discourse that is grown from the contentious, combative, and rude discourse occurring on 
Sudanese bulletin boards:
“It’s a new era and this kind of freedom, maybe people might abuse 
freedom, maybe it will look very extreme. But the cure for mishandling
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freedom is more freedom, not censorship or control. Because people are 
so suppressed they are going to go to extremes but then they’ll become 
back to the middle and become moderates. Now on sudaneseonline 
there are very rude people, they write really irresponsible kind of 
language. There is a public opinion that is growing to [counteract] these.
People will come to the middle and become more responsible.... I think 
it’s a good experience in democratisation because we are not 
democratic. Everyone wants everyone else to see their point of view and 
agree with it. And sometimes you get angry because people don’t agree 
with you. People get angry and do character assassination and this is 
happening right now. But I think it will get better. Let people practice and 
then reflect on what they say and then create a public opinion that 
rejects bad things and accepts good things. I think these online forums 
are changing the world. I can’t say that all these online things are nice 
things, sometimes people just talk nonsense. But on the other side 
people who are serious about social issues and politics, this is a new 
avenue, it is a reshaping” (Ahmed F., interview transcript, January 2005).
What Ahmed is suggesting differs greatly from previous studies of online deliberations; that 
unless deliberations appear to be democratically conducted (defined in these studies as 
possessing a rational, objective argumentational style, allowing others to speak, politeness, 
etc.), online deliberations are not democratic (Albrecht 2003; Albrecht 2006; Papacharissi 
2004). Most definitions of online or e-democracy that emerged from the literature I reviewed 
in Chapter Four were framed by “already” existing institutionalised, liberal democratic 
systems and suggests that democratic culture (even if it is anaemic and needs to be 
revitalised) precedes online democracy. What is also argued in the literature is that 
democratic discourse should be (mostly) rational and fair, anything less than that is not 
democratic. What Ahmed argues is the exact opposite; for people who have no democratic 
culture (as he describes Sudanese people lacking in this quality), an online forum is the 
perfect place to experiment with and to develop democracy. Online deliberations allow 
Sudanese people to shape their own models of democracy. Furthermore, his description of
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what is happening on sudaneseonline.com suggests that a new kind of democratic 
discourse that accommodates “bad” speech with “good” speech is endogenous to online 
forums, or at least to online forums populated with Sudanese users. Given enough time and 
practice, Sudanese online forum users who are “new” to democratic deliberative practice will 
weed out the bad opinions from the good and settle somewhere in the middle. As I will show 
in the following section, however, a very different dynamic is occurring on the closed 
Republican forums, especially the assaloon.org’s al-kitabi (written) forum.
7.5 “Silence is a statement”
A curious and, at first glance, disappointing event occurred during my research with the 
Republicans. It was near the start of my fieldwork that I learned, much to my delight, that the 
Republicans had moved their jalsas online and close to 50 members regularly met on 
Saturdays (evenings London time) to sing Inshads and discuss Republican Thought, much 
like the morning and evening jalsas Taha conducted in his living room during the 1970s and 
1980s. I was told by one informant that once he had a broadband connection installed at 
home, he would invite me over to his house so that I too could participate. As these things 
often go, a few months turned into a year before he had broadband installed and in that 
time, participation in the online jalsas dramatically dropped from a high of 50 people to less 
than 10. As a result of this lower participation, the jalsas were meeting irregularly, down to 
less than once a month. Imagine the terror that I experienced on learning this. Not only 
would I not be able to observe an actual online jalsa, they in fact no longer exist to a large 
extent; a central element of my research topic and a site of data collection vaporised in an 
instant. As I progressed with interviews my sense of terror deepened as many Republicans 
told me they no longer post to the written forum on assaloon.org or that often they simply 
lurk online only to read postings but that they never, ever write anything themselves.
I was doomed. I thought that since there was “nothing going on” that there was 
nothing to research. I was wrong. Studying why people choose not to do something can be 
just as interesting, valid and rewarding as studying when they choose to act. Once I learned 
to ask the right questions I discovered that the reasons for the lack of participation were far 
more interesting than the reasons to participate. While the interview data show that
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problems emerged in both spoken and written forums, it was with the written forum that 
conflicts were the most pronounced and the most disconcerting for members, because, they 
said they had higher expectations for the level of written discourse. In light of this I will 
purposefully focus on the written forum.
Not long after the as-saloon listserv was implemented, member subscribers noticed 
a disturbing trend in the postings on more controversial topics: the tendency to forget 
Republican discursive identity and behaviour through the employment of highly emotive and 
aggressive language. Discussions about the very purpose of the listserv and if it should be 
allowed to continue were precipitated by a particularly alarming thread which featured 
vitriolic posts that accused the Brotherhood’s leadership of being cowardly for not renewing 
public political engagements. Abdel, as the list’s moderator, sent out a message asking the 
list’s members if a vote was needed to determine and enforce some writing guidelines that 
would regulate what was acceptable or unacceptable written behaviour for the list. He also 
asked if the listserv was no longer serving its purpose and was in fact causing harm and 
fractious debate, and if so, should the listserv be abandoned. While the resulting messages 
showed that a majority of members felt the listserv was doing much more good than harm, 
all members except one voted in favour of creating guidelines to help maintain the 
established Republican discursive culture on the listserv. Due to the one dissenting vote, 
however, the writing guidelines were never implemented and the debate was left in a state 
of suspension. The vote was called a little over 18 months after the listserv started and 
since then there has been one more vote conducted with similar results. Since the issue 
remains unresolved, members have been strategically silent online, opting only to read 
postings or not to log-on at all. “Silence is a statement” is how Abdel characterised 
members’ refusal to participate in the online forums. I address this phenomenon in the next 
section but here I would like to emphasise that the Republicans here are using this strategy 
of ambivalence in regards to the issue of emotive postings. Before I address the online 
silences, however, I would like to first explore what happens when deliberations become 
text.
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7.5.1 Purity of spoken thought and violent text
In my interviews with Republicans I was told that when arguments which begin in the written 
forum get “out-of-hand” (quite literally) they migrate to the audio forum. Members indicated 
that there is a certain amount of distrust around what is written as opposed to what is said. 
For Republicans when there are misunderstandings textually discussions are moved to the 
audio forum for clarification and for the true meaning and intention to be discerned. Why is it 
that what is written is more dubious than what is said? What happens to an opinion or an 
idea that is uttered when it is written down? Does the act of writing violently impose 
structure onto thought or does it force the thinker to be more self-reflective and interrogate 
their thoughts more diligently (Derrida 1976)? Is spoken argument more open to 
contingencies, revision and clarification; is it closer to “truth”? Why does there exist, either in 
perception or in practice, a split between the two? If we accept Chilton and Schaffner’s 
(2002:2-3) assertion that politics is language, how do the politics differ when the language 
is spoken or when it is written, both online?
There exists an analytical lacuna in the literature on online deliberative democracy 
that I reviewed in Chapter Four in regards to the phenomenon of writing online. Within the e- 
democracy scholarship there are no examples that explicitly address what happens when 
deliberations—or people sitting around talking about politics—are moved online and 
become people sitting around writing about politics (For some examples of this neglect see 
Dahlberg 2001b; Hill and Hughes 1998; Papacharissi 2004; Stromer-Galley 2003; Wilhelm 
1999). The literature fails to acknowledge that most online deliberations are written not 
spoken, nor does it grapple with the implications of this.
There is more focus on this dynamic between online writing and orality in other 
literatures, such as those within the fields of literary criticism or communication studies. For 
example, Jenny Sunden, in her excellent examination of online textual embodiment, argues 
that online discourse exist in the “rarely acknowledged borderland between talk and text, 
where the ephemerality of talk is tied down by the textual practices of inscription” (2003:44). 
This tying down of speech is what is said, by more deterministic historians and critics, to 
have plagued human thought since the invention of writing. Plato postulated through the 
Socratic dialogues with Phaedrus that the complexity of speech is simplified and deaden by 
writing and can only be “brought to life again by an encounter with its reader” (Burger 1980:
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96). But the reader must be in possession of a “complex soul” whose awareness of “the 
deceptive clarity and firmness of the written word is to recognise... its unacknowledged 
dependence [on the spoken word]” (96). According to this logic writing mediates thought and 
alienates the thinker from thought. The act of writing becomes a reductive and violent act, 
which chisels away at thought, and codifies it into black and white, into absolutes. The irony 
to all of this lies in the fact that the ancients were not able to formalise these ideas without 
writing them down (Ong 1982:79-83). According to this line of reasoning, writing is a 
contrivance with its own pre-existing logic that impinges on human consciousness (Warner 
1990:6-7).
Although this dichotomy between what is said and what is written, where orality 
affords a more pure and direct link to thought, is reductive and deterministic, how do we 
account for the Republican perception of this split, a split they say is real (Sunden 2003:47; 
Warner 2002:84)? One source may be the Sufi tradition of orality and poetics rooted in the 
ancients’ distrust of writing, who were loathe to calcify spirituality, and believed that writing 
codifies the spoken word, and by extension the divine, mystical ideas that are transmitted 
orally, into dogma. Where the written word is in the realm of the ‘ulama (Islamic jurists) who 
bicker over the nuances of Islamic law, the songs and spoken literature of the Sufis exist in 
the realm of spiritual devotional practice (Chittick 2000:27). William Chittick explains that 
within Sufism, the knowledge of God is revealed through what Sufis call “unveiling” and that 
this is achieved through poetry that is often sung (2000:34). Indeed poetry is considered 
“the ideal medium for expressing the truths of the most intimate and mysterious relationship 
that humans beings can achieve with God, that is, loving Him and being loved by Him" 
(2000:34). Another reason may be not that particular to the Republicans’ Sufi traditions or 
spirituality at all but rather a commonly held perception of online text held by many groups. 
Katja Cronauer (2004) found in her research on antiglobalisation groups using listservs for 
political mobilisation, most users felt that listserv postings, above all other ways to 
communicate, were most prone to be misunderstood or to be perceived as being hostile.
The perception of hostile text was a self-fulfilling prophesy for many participants who said 
they would respond to posts they perceived as hostile with an equally hostile post. The 
overwhelming consequence of hostile posts in her study, however, was silence or a 
withdrawal from the listserv altogether (2004:122).
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While it is true that the Internet can accommodate audio (and video) as well as text, 
within the context of the specific online technologies that the Republicans utilise the most, 
bulletin boards and email listservs, it is still, for them, primarily a textually based medium. 
This imbalance between writing and speaking online has produced some dilemmas for the 
overall Republican discursive identity as well as their identity as online Republicans.
I have already described Republican media culture as enacted both textually and 
orally; in text through its expansive book publishing and distribution, and through spoken 
word in the al-rukuns, zikrs and through the daily jalsas where Taha spoke on Republican 
ideology. Despite the different ways to deliver the message, the message was the same. In 
all the media, a uniform Republican ideology or opinion was repeated by members both 
textually and orally, and which was, ultimately, the result of constant verification with, 
clarification and refinement by Ustadh Taha. No book was written or speech delivered 
without Taha’s guidance on the finer or subtler details of Republican Thought and his final 
approval of the resulting text or speech. When a Republican spoke at a discussion corner or 
engaged in a public debate on a given day, in the evening jalsa they would report to Taha 
on what was said. Through Taha’s absence, the movement’s discursive touchstone is lost.
In exile the Republicans have moved this culture online and through the technological 
choices they’ve made (either due to the expense, convenience or the lack of adequate 
technology), preference has been given to written deliberations over spoken ones. As a 
result, Republicans have textualised their discursive culture.
To discuss what happens when speech is written online, at this point let us return to 
Sunden. She suggests that online, text-based conversations exist in the moment that they 
are written—as if they were spoken—and are not primarily written as a recording of the 
interaction. Online texts should be seen as performative in the present in which they are 
written (44). Consider the next statement with Sunden’s proposal in mind:
“Regarding the so called FITNA, I want to say AL-SALOON is the most 
important mechanism to kill it, regardless of who is now right or [who] is 
wrong, for instance, I think those who believe that [AL-QEYADEYEEN]24
24 Translates as “leaders” and written transliterally as al-qiadyyin. There are two transliteral alphabets to write 
Arabic with the English alphabet, but often Arabic speakers (at least when writing quickly online) will write 
Arabic phonetically using the English alphabet which results in several different spellings for words.
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are no longer the ones I knew, I think they are in a real trouble, and I 
have to talk to them, and the best way to do that is through AL-SALOON, 
on the other hand I believe some of my brothers will think I need to be 
helped by changing my mind regarding some of my belie[f]s, and they 
can’t find [a] better[way] than AL-SALOON. Actually, expressing our 
opinion by [wri]ting will help the others to read it many times and to think 
about it carefully, before deciding anything and by this way we ensure 
that the emotional reactions are eliminated or at least reduced” (Listserv 
posting, 26/01/1999).
Within this posting the author contends the opposite, that writing is not “as if spoken”, and it 
functions in an entirely different way. What this listserv author suggests is that the very 
nature of writing and of text, especially in the context of a listserv, lends itself to 
consideration and revision, and most importantly, will force the reader to think logically 
about the opinion expounded and not react emotionally. By referring to the disagreement as 
the "so-called fitna”, the author is showing his or her exception to the use of the word fitna 
(in English: sedition) 25 to describe those who disagree with the leadership over the self- 
imposed ban on political activities.
In my interview with Abdel about the differences between writing and speaking he 
placed the onus of writing directly on the author rather than on the reader:
“I’ve notice this ... when you talk to someone directly, face to face, he 
may use sometimes tough language but sometimes when people write, I 
don’t know what happens, they write things they would not say face to 
face” (Abdel 0., interview transcript, October 2004).
Abdel was speaking in regards to a particular Republican who managed to alienate 
(forsaken was the word used) many members through his writing style, which was described
25 Fitna can mean sedition or affliction. In the context of this listserv posting it means a serious disagreement or 
a splitting into opposing camps on the issue of whether or not to resume political activities. It seems however 
throughout this thread the use of the word fitna was highly contentious itself.
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by another study participant, Abdalla M., as “violent”. This Brother, Mahgoub I.26, explained 
Abdaila, presented his “spoken” self in a completely different manner, one of kindness and 
patience, and argued that this incongruity was direct evidence that there is something in the 
nature of writing, especially online, that produces a dissonance between the spoken and 
written selves. Abdalla, however, intuits this split; he cannot place a finger on precisely what 
it is but can only point to its effects:
“Even in the vocal forum that same Brother would remain very calm, very 
easy, very respectful of others but when he writes he is violent and I 
think I am right to use that word. It happens to all of us in some respect 
but he is well known for being a little bit aggressive” (Abdalla M., 
interview transcript, October 2004). .
According to the Republicans writing should enable the writer and the reader to think more 
critically, rationally and carefully yet at the same time can produce in the author a violent 
“written self, where text appears not to have the same consequences as speech does. In 
my analysis of the data one specific quality seems essential to the production of “violent” 
text: pointing fingers, or a text’s argument disintegrating into personal accusations and 
attacks. This quality is often described by Republicans as “emotional”, “subjective”, and “a 
failure to separate the issues from the person”. These descriptors are antithetical to how 
members perceive the Republican spoken behaviour as being one of detachment, 
objectivity and rationality (and even ethical). It is this perceived split that is most worrying to 
them. A Sudan-based Republican, Khalid S., described his personal encounter with “violent 
text” and explains what he thinks might be a reason why it seems prevalent in the online 
forum:
“I was forced to leave the closed bulletin as it failed to comply with [a] 
minimum-level ethics of the Republican Thought and one of the board
26 Before my interview with Abdalla, I had interviewed Mahgoub, who made no mention of the ongoing 
arguments on assaloon.org but did express dismay over the fact that 1 was researching the Republicans in the 
first place. He questioned and challenged the validity of my choice and suggested that there were many other 
groups online that serve as better examples for e-democracy.
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members, a Republican, entered into defaming me by leaking [a] 
message from my previous wife accusing me of adultery and many 
things. So, I calmly withdrew as the opposition to the main current inside 
the Republican group started immorally to deal with me and may be 
others. ... In jalsas before and after banning, all brothers and sisters 
[wejre existing physically in one place. The Ustadh, and senior brothers 
after him, keep the highest code of ethical beliefs ordained by Islam. No 
brother can assault another impolitely let alone defamations and 
personal backlashes. In the online discussion or activity, there is no 
close physical watch. Many brothers and sisters started for long time ago 
to forget much about these ethics and our highest brother after Al Ustadh 
was subject to defamation only for differences of opinion. I don’t say that 
this is only peculiar to the online practice due to the fact that even some 
brothers and sisters here in Sudan have deviated from this ethical code 
but under strong public opinion, they quickly withdraw from such 
activities but online, there is no feeling of embarrassment as there is no 
physical contact” (Khalid S., online interview, June 2004).
During her examination of anti-hate speech legislation in her book Excitable Speech, Judith 
Butler relocates the state’s power to do harm directly back onto its citizenry; the “private” 
citizens who are “figured as sovereigns whose speech now carries a power that operates 
like state power to deprive other ‘sovereigns’ of fundamental rights and liberties” including, 
sometimes, the right of an individual to continue living (1997a: 48). What she exposes in her 
book is how hate speech operates with its own agency, that is, the word itself is enough to 
enact violence (and a social death) on another. Let me give an example27: a young Jewish 
Viennese woman was riding a bus and when she arose from her seat to get off, she 
inadvertently but without an apology stepped on the toe of an older (non-Jewish) woman 
who was sitting with an equally older and non-Jewish female companion. As the young 
woman stepped down from the bus she overheard the injured (but perhaps really more
27 This story was told to me by a friend who had witnessed the exchange on a bus in Vienna, Austria.
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insulted) women say in a voice loud enough for her to hear, “That was one that the ovens 
missed”. In one simple but very deliberate speech act the old woman enacted the genocide 
of the Holocaust on this young woman. The spoken act performed bodily violence; it was not 
only a threat of violence but a violent act in of itself.
In a similar way to what Butler suggests with the performance of power through the 
use of hate speech, this accusation against Khalid operated not only to silence him (after all 
it was effective, Khalid left the board) but also functioned as an enforcement of a power that 
is greater than an individual Republican, the power of the state to impose a violent 
sentence. Aside from the obvious embarrassment and helplessness that certainly one must 
feel when a false accusation of marital impropriety is spread, within the social and political 
context of Sudan where Khalid lives, with the government’s imposition of hudud (for the 
offence of adultery an accused person, whether a man or a woman, can receive 
punishments that range in severity from 100 lashings if unmarried to death by stoning if 
married), the accusation itself becomes an act of violence (Mahmoud 2001:79-80; Mukhtar 
1996; Sidahmed 2001:188)28. What is so disconcerting for Khalid and other Republicans 
about such a violent statement made by a Brother or Sister is that this violence is anathema 
to Republican pacifism and discursive identity.
What Khalid suggests here is that Taha was the warden of what he calls 
“Republican ethical behaviour” and in Taha’s absence the Republicans have strayed away 
from it. Other study participants mentioned the phenomenon in similar terms; it is through 
the loss of the unifying presence of Taha’s leadership that is causing this behaviour. Khalid 
speculated that it is the lack of physical proximity to one another that may account for the 
reduction in Republican ethical behaviour, and that while it is not solely occurring online it 
may be exasperated there. While previous social science research in online flaming 
suggests that this behaviour is social-contextually dependent, that is violent textual 
behaviour is less prevalent among online groups that have well established social bonds 
either on or offline, it is unclear exactly what is precipitating this behaviour among 
Republicans online given that the forum is conducted among strongly connected people with 
a long-established discursive identity (Kayany 1998:1137,1141).
28 Sidahmed also shows, however, that there is a violent penalty for the perpetrator of a false accusation of 
adultery. If the slanderer is found guilty, the offender can receive up to 80 lashings for the offence (188).
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I do not want make the reductive suggestion that by virtue of being online 
Republicans are losing their discursive identity but rather I would suggest that their online 
presence deepens the ambivalence that the Republicans already feel as a group because, 
for them, the lack of physical contact reinforces the sense of alienation. By losing Taha, their 
one unifying source, this alienation has been compounded and exasperated, especially in 
exile, and is re-enacted online in the assaloon.org al-kitabi forum.
It is this “weighing down of speech” and performing text violently which is so 
problematic about “being online” for Republicans, and they position themselves towards it 
paradoxically. In my interviews and analysis of forum postings most respondents maintained 
a fragile conundrum, where the act of writing should force the writer to be more self-reflexive 
and to develop more carefully considered arguments but, at the same time, the very act of 
writing is violent and produces a “written self that is hostile and incongruent with the “aural 
self. It is the “written self that flies in the face of the Republican discursive cultural identity 
of rational, civil and reasoned argumentation. Many Republicans at the same time esteem 
and reject written thought. According to Republicans the writer does not feel the same level 
of responsibility towards one another when she or he is speaking. This may be true in the 
closed forum, however, this position changes when Republicans are “speaking” on non- 
Republican forums, such as sudaneseonline.com, as I will discuss at length in the section 
on who has the authority to speak.
7.5.2 Silence on the audio and written forums
“The essence of what Ustadh said was never [to] think that there is a 
final word on anything. Interpretation is open, you have to reinterpret 
your ideas and be vigilant. You need to observe the reality and try to 
always to understand and to develop your discourse and adapt to the 
new things that are coming. So we have some people who are more 
open minded and others who are becoming fanatics and dogmatic with 
regard to our writings and literature. This has been going on until now.
For some time I stopped writing in the as-Saloon because for me it had 
become ... a bad place, because people were pointing fingers and
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reading the Qur’an and become Muslim fanatics in some ways. But I 
think it is a normal stage...and now things have become more quiet. The 
enthusiastic writers aren’t writing as much as they used to. I was one of 
them. Now I am using non-Republican websites like sudaneseonline to 
write. Because also every religious-based organization can very easily 
relapse into dogma and they can very easily relapse into being a cult.
And I some point I thought the rhetoric in as-Saloon is the rhetoric of a 
cult rather than the rhetoric of open-minded people. I intentionally went 
to sudaneseonline. If there is any one person who wants to debate me it 
is better that they debate me where other Sudanese people can access.
So when he says everything, he doesn’t think that he’s talking to this 
closed circle, to those who share views with you. You better expose 
those ideas with people who don’t share those views with you” (Ahmed
F., interview transcript, January 2005).
Ahmed F. describes his reasons for silence on the closed forum assaloon.org. His 
statement about the incentives for his silence is packed tightly because of the several 
dynamics taking place within the forum that he describes. The most significant issue he has 
is that some Republican members were closing down the dialogue by making Republican 
Thought dogmatic, absolute, even cultish, and antithetical to what Ahmed believes to be the 
core, discursive identity of Republicanism. He describes the main lesson passed on to 
Republicans by Taha: interpretation is open and it must be continuously interrogated and 
revised, especially when new information or new circumstances arise. He believes a trend 
exists among Republicans towards shutting down interpretative practices on assaloon.org 
and that due to this, some members had forgotten the lessons that Taha had given them. 
One way these members are truncating and silencing debate, says Ahmed, is by quoting 
the Qur’an, the final word in Islam—instead of analysing it—and by so doing, making their 
arguments the final word too. Another way that these members are invoking silence is, as 
they say, to point fingers, and by so doing they make their arguments personal attacks on 
the characters of those who oppose them. But he suggests that the best way to test the 
validity of your argument and to maintain vigilance over dogmatic thought is to move the
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debate to an open rather than a closed forum. This is why he consciously decided to move 
his Republican dialogues to sudaneseonline.com to engage with non-Republicans, and this 
is significant since it is the essence of Republican Thought as he says but is also validates 
what critics theorising democracy have also said is the ideal (radical democratic) 
deliberative situation (Benhabib 1996; Fraser 1997; Habermas 1989; Taylor 1995; Young 
1996). What Ahmed is also suggesting in this statement, which should be read in context of 
his earlier statement on how online discourse is producing an endogenous democratic 
culture.
7.5.3 Fluidity, contingency and gravity
While I have shown the contradictory positions held towards writing and speaking, another 
problem Republicans have with online “weighed-down” text is what Sunden calls the fluidity 
of online text (2004:46). Even though it may be a truism, as she notes, that you cannot 
unsay something said; for Republicans it is the written word, one that is distributed digitally, 
which takes on such gravity itself that it becomes a responsibility most members find too 
substantial to shoulder by themselves. Online texts are a recording of and the transmission 
of, quite often, a countervailing and dangerous political position that bears a serious 
responsibility for the writer of those texts. Furthermore as I have shown online writing for the 
Republicans is not performed as if they were spoken, online texts in the case of Republican 
online practice perform intertextually, where texts are “weighed-down” by the ongoing 
ideological struggles over the meaning of words and members, as a group, are loathe to 
implicate themselves in those struggles textually (Allen 2000:36).
I have already argued in Chapter Six that to believe and espouse a religious 
ideology that challenges the fundamentalist foundations of Islam held and enforced by the 
present regime—the al-Bashir government and its ideologue al-Turabi through the National 
Islamic Front—is political, and can be dangerous in Sudan. While on the one hand 
Republicans are emboldened and strengthened by Republican ideology, especially in the 
context of Sudanese politics, it is safer to hold such viewpoints and positions privately, and 
to discuss them only with trusted others, far away from government informants. It is quite 
another thing to re-enter the current online public sphere of Sudanese politics, to publicly 
commit and record them in a text forum, and thereby possibly influence others in the current
167
political environment. Any evidence of a point of view that challenges the present regime 
can be employed to do harm against the person that holds that view and others that are 
perceived to support that view. As Sunden claims, online texts are, at once, contingent and 
fixed (in the sense that they are typed), what she calls textual fluidity, where online texts are 
always open to clarification and argumentation, and have the ability to “move” (2004:47). 
From a Republican perspective, however, it is precisely because online words are both 
digitally printed (“fixed”) and mobile at the same time, with the ability to move from one 
computer screen to thousands instantaneously, thereby becoming “solid evidence” of a 
writer’s opinion. This distinctive characteristic of online text runs the risk of being used 
against someone and for Republicans it is this quality, specifically, which makes online texts 
dangerous. While the literature on web journalism and publishing debate whether the 
medium fits into a publishing or broadcast model29 (Boczkowski 1999), for Republicans 
writing online (at least in an open forum like sudaneseonline.com) is much like broadcasting 
your opinion on radio or television, which can have an unnecessary and dangerous 
influence on others. Things that can be said in the audio forum are never written in the text- 
based one precisely due to the (online) written word’s mobility. Printed text acts as a 
constant reminder of Taha’s death and for Republicans the politics of the printed word, 
regardless if they are printed in pixels or ink, become that much more powerful online.
7.6 Legitimacy of argumentation
Part of the way that an argument is bolstered and becomes legitimate, as Gilbert (1977:
116) has shown, is in the validity of its references to other sources. An argument is more 
persuasive and leads to a consensus on its truth if it includes reference to prior and 
authoritative knowledge. The Republicans reference their primary, legitimate source, Taha, 
for any argument or clarification made about Republican Thought as well as to justify their 
own opinion or position on an issue. Taha built his own arguments and ideology on the solid 
bedrock of the Qur’an and the Hadith. But as Ahmed described his reasons for leaving the
29 In the early years of the commercialisation of the Internet, newspapers resisted expansion online in part 
since it belied the established print model for the industry, for a good example of this dilemma in determining 
which model— either print or broadcast—that the news industry thinks the Internet should follow, see 
Boczkowski (1999).
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al-kitabi forum, due to a dogmatic reliance on Taha’s sayings and the failure to recall (and 
the enactment) of one of his main teachings: that there is no final word. Other members 
have also noticed the worrying trend, which compelled one member to post this reminder to 
the listserv:
“It is alright to use al-Ustadh in support of our arguments and positions 
but I think we need to give it a little more thought before we embark on 
that. We have to use al-Ustadh’s methods of analysis and modes of 
thought more than his literal words and deeds. Otherwise we will not 
grow up and will not realize our own potential. If we want to look for 
every single act within our lives [for] a precedent from al-Ustadh, we will 
end up like al-Hadith; whenever we’re met with a problem they did not 
[look] into the skies nor into themselves in search of wisdom, but into the 
books of al-Hadith and when they did not find exactly what they wanted, 
they used a remotely relevant one, and if even a remotely relevant one 
was not available, they made one. Frankly, I can see the beginnings of 
such a phenomenon growing steadily among ourselves. So let us be 
more careful about that” (Listserv posting 21/02/1998).
What is interesting about this member’s post is that he cites Taha’s “methods of analysis 
and modes of thought’ as what Republicans should be referring to and modelling their own 
argumentational style after, and abandoning or at least limiting the reliance of solely 
referring to Taha’s sayings and writings to validate an opinion or position. Taha’s religious 
methodology, as I explored in Chapter Six, is based in a scientific method of analysis, one 
rooted in a Cartesian rationality and one of independent thought and inquiry. It is through a 
rigorous and methodologically sound inquiry and analysis that the path to God is open. This 
member is reminding other Republicans to remember and use the most important lesson 
that Taha left for them, to critically think for themselves.
Another posting to the listserv compels members to remember the core of the 
political identity of the Republicans, tolerance of diversity, by quoting Taha and the Qur’an 
simultaneously:
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“I think, as we claim Democracy and one of our definition^] that ‘It's the 
right to listen to others’, that being that, we should not deny issues raised 
for discussion here and give it names like ‘Fitna’. Let us recall the 
example of the Prophet (Peace and Prayers be upon him) when he was 
listening to that mad woman. Of course she was talking nonsense but 
still [H]e was listening. So we should expect that not all issues in As- 
saloon are acceptable. And I think it is our responsibility to argue in an 
effort to correct the wrong thinking whenever [it] appear[s]. The 
contributor has every right to be listened to] by others, and the others 
depending on the standards should elaborate to convince him with the 
right thing... I think we should mind our feeling[s] towards our brothers 
who come with strange or wrong ideas (due to stress, frustration, 
depression, fear, etc.) through th[is] arena that is [like] the prayer r[u]g...”
(Listserv posting 29/01/1999).
This posting reminds members also of their shared intellectual, political and spiritual 
heritage by quoting Taha (“the right to listen to others”) and the Prophet. Further down in the 
post, the author unveils the implicit meaning in Taha’s quote that democracy is the right to 
be heard (“The contributor has every right to be listened to] by others”). The author also 
reminds members that all opinions and arguments are valid in a Republican forum as long 
as they are conducted as if they were in a sacred place, like on a prayer rug. Again, this 
posting’s author echoes the previous posting by making reference to a method of analysing 
discourse as opposed to saying that only certain discourses are acceptable.
This posting takes a slightly different position in regards to legitimate 
argumentational styles by using similar statements attributed to Taha:
“No doubt that everyone is free to say, write whatever he/she may think.
However we all have a duty to protect and regulate this freedom. As a 
community we have to endure, tolerate and respect the different 
attitudes and opinions “almujtama allathy la yadeego bi anmat alsulook 
almukhtalifa". This is our legacy. I would like to translate that quote from
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Al-Ustadh: "the society that [is] tolerant of various kinds of behaviour 
And as individuals, we have to remember "Alhadeeth fi aldeen sair fe 
alwady almugdus, twkhlau fihi alnalain wa twasulu fihi at-talbia". That 
translates: "Speaking in religion is walking in a sacred valley in which
shoes should be taken off and the "talbia" should be continued" This
is rather a lousy translation of al-Ustadh's quotations but I hope it will 
give you the feeling of the idea” (Listserv posting, 01/02/1999, my 
emphasis).
This author, while reminding the list members of the Republican legacy of tolerance by 
quoting Taha, she or he amends this legacy with his or her own opinion by saying that it is 
an individual member’s duty to protect and regulate the freedom of speech, in the sentence 
with my emphasis. By choosing another quote from Taha about the respectful behaviour an 
individual should display when speaking on religion to justify this personal opinion, the 
author still leaves it as a contingency (“this is a lousy translation”) and presumably it is open 
to some interpretation if another member can translate the quote more accurately.
7.7 Who has the authority to speak? Uncertainty without leadership
“[The external activities] seemed to have stopped, you know, when what 
happened happened (the execution). And that was the one (Taha) who 
had permission, there wasn’t much else for us ...you know he had the 
permission from all of us to talk and that stopped. Whatever he wanted 
to say he said it. As he said in the last time that we saw him he said,
‘Whatever you want to say, we've said it in our books’” (Hanan M., 
interview transcript, July 2004).
Taha’s death shattered those members left behind and symbolically killed the Brotherhood 
and literally halted all of the Brotherhoods external activities. What Hanan M., a Republican 
who is also the daughter of one of the founders of the movement and is currently living in
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exile in the United Kingdom, describes is that before he died, Taha confirmed the tacit 
agreement that he should speak for the movement solely, and that the development and 
expansion of Republican Thought died with him, by his statement “whatever you want to 
say, we’ve said it in our books”. His statement quite clearly gives the authority to speak to 
individual Republicans as long as what they say remains faithful to what has been already 
written by Taha himself. Republican Thought is final in this sense. But for the Republicans 
that Taha left behind, they lost not only their leader but their only legitimate, public voice 
despite that voice’s accessibility in the books for any Republican to speak on. It was Taha 
who was solely given permission to speak for the others and to determine the Republicans’ 
ideology, an authority bestowed upon him by the Brotherhood’s members. In this sense the. 
circularity of the authority to speak acts as an interpellative power,30 where Taha’s authority 
comes from the members, the Republican ideology’s authority comes from Taha and back 
again to his authority comes from the others (Althusser 1971:170-171). Taha’s authority to 
speak also came from his baraka (divine blessing) and as the founder and leader of the 
Republicans. Like the Sudanese Sufi orders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a 
leader of tariqa was made legitimate by his followers since he was perceived to have the 
mystical and blessed qualities of a holy man, a blessing that is bestowed by God upon but 
only a few saintly people. The claims of baraka by any brotherhood’s shaykh are circular; 
strengthened by his followers’ belief in and testimony to his baraka (Warburg 2003:6-11).31
In my interview with Shafie M., a Republican living in the United States, he 
reiterates the loss of the movement’s one legitimate voice and describes it as something 
particular to Republican culture:
30 Interpellation, originally coined by Louis Althusser (1971) in the chapter “Ideology and ideological state 
apparatus,” in Lenin and Philosophy, has been used by many theorists to describe how subjective power is 
‘hailed’ into being by ideology that is enacted by others, and how it drives particular outcomes (see for some 
examples, Verran [2001], Butler [1997], and Warner [1990], among others).
31 In two interviews, however, participants expressed to me a strong sense of frustration with the predominate 
position of other Republicans, that there is a lack of authority to speak. These participants explained that this 
was in direct contradiction to Taha’s legacy for the movement. One participant said to me that it was for this 
reason that she discontinued her participation on as-saloon.org, since Taha had taught the Republicans to 
think for themselves, and to expand on and grow the religious and political ideology that was developed while 
he was alive. Her opinion appears to reflect one of the two camps within the movement more generally as to 
how the movement should continue after Taha’s death, either as a politically engaged movement or as an 
insular, non-political one.
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“Yeah, you know I don’t respond [to postings on web bulletin boards] and 
that is also maybe one of the culture, the Republican culture. Some of us 
Republicans are very active in these forums but most of the Republicans 
don’t because it is an authority. I don’t feel that I have the [authority] and 
I don’t want to distort things and I hope I didn’t distort anything from what 
I said in this interview. So yeah, it is a big responsibility to talk. And even 
the Brothers and Sisters who write in these forums always indicate that 
this is their own point of view, it is not the Republican point of view, 
because they don’t have to, because they don’t know if it is the right 
thing to say or not. In the past when Ustadh was between us physically 
there [wa]s a reference and people go back, even the people who talk in 
universities or write things, go through validation, either through Ustadh 
or a group that Ustadh asked to do things. I remember that Khatim would 
go to Khartoum University and he would speak in the university and he 
[would] come back or Faisal would talk someplace and she would come 
back and report on what she said. She w[ould] be given guidance on ‘ok 
that is ok’ and ‘that needs to be more verified’. But this is not available 
right now for somebody to go outside to speak” (Shafie M., interview 
transcript, February 2005, my emphasis).
What Shafie is explaining and as I have also described is that the movement lost its 
ideological author and touchstone. This loss and the responsibility around “talk” are 
compounded when “talk” happens online. Consider the following sentiments from another 
Brother. During an interview with a member living in exile in the United Kingdom, Saeed M., 
described to me his reasons for his steadfast refusal to ever commit his opinions textually 
online since when one is online:
“ ... [Y]ou in fact present yourself in a bigger image than what you 
actually are. Because the Internet is the louder voice than any other 
means of communicating your ideas. ...I feel that I am not actually as big 
as that. I think that speaking and talking to people in private about what
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we think is more comfortable because of this. Not because you are 
hiding or you have something to tell people. ...The idea of talking to 
people is basically you are used for your place [your status as a 
speaker], a place that is very difficult to earn and you better earn it rather 
than to claim it without an agreement. It is not only what you have got an 
idea it is in what condition [do you hold that idea], ... [On the Internet] 
you simply put yourself into the position of a leader when you are not a 
leader” (Saeed M., interview transcript, July 2004).
Saeed’s position towards online deliberation functions in two ways. He views the Internet 
primarily as a broadcast medium, and during our interview he made the analogy between 
online and broadcast has having similar responsibilities, the onus for online “speakers” is 
similar for those who chose to broadcast their opinions on radio or television. As such, 
broadcast technologies and their usage is the reserve of leaders, people who have earned 
the right to speak, since he believes that he has not earned or been endowed with that 
power, he refuses to utilise this medium to express his points of view. But these broadcast 
media enact power dually; either the person who uses broadcast already has the power to 
speak or presumes to possess that power. What Saeed does not trust about the Internet as 
compared with radio or television, is the Internet’s wide accessibility for production, that is 
not only is what you say widely accessible, but so too, the very fact that you can get front of 
the metaphoric microphone (or a computer screen) to speak is so easy. The Internet is an 
exasperating medium for Saeed. Unlike the more utopian opinions which argue that online 
technologies empower and give voice to “ordinary” people, Saeed views that the 
responsibility of the productive power of the Internet is too great (see for example Howard 
2003). Anyone without the genuine power to speak, but who presumes to have the power to 
speak, can broadcast across geographical and political borders to reach untold thousands, 
all without the authority to do so. Saeed explained that in regards to a topic as serious as 
religious or Republican ideology he did not believe he has the right to speak online because 
he refuses to presume that power. For Saeed the Internet is not a medium that lends itself 
easily to democratic culture and practice, and if the power of the Internet, which in his
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definition is the ability to broadcast your opinion without authority, falls in the wrong hands, it 
can be detrimental.
7.8 Conclusions
In this chapter I have described Republican online engagement through an examination of 
their websites alfikra.org and assaloon.org, their audio and written forums as-saloon al-sawti 
(the online jalsas) and al-kitabi, their listserv as well as their participation in other non- 
Republican Sudanese forums, namely sudaneseonline.com. In exile and under an official 
ban, the Republicans are continuing the movement’s multimedia efforts to engage 
Sudanese people in a public dialogue about Republican Thought, and the social and 
political change they believe is necessary in Sudan. Through the meticulous archiving of 
Republican materials, both printed and recorded media through digitisation, the Republicans 
are able to continuously refer back through their intellectual and political lineage directly to 
Taha, despite the fact that his unifying presence is gone. This seems to have impacted on 
two areas of Republican practice: how they make opinions legitimate by referencing Taha 
digitally and proselytising Republican Thought through reprinted digital media.
While the Republicans make the unequivocal public claim that all political activities 
have ceased since Taha’s execution, Republican online activities complicate this claim. I 
have shown that through a strategic ambivalence towards external activities employed by 
the movement, both explicitly and implicitly, the movement is able to maintain a certain level 
of safety and continue the movement as a single entity, all the while claiming not to be a 
movement.
The Republicans contravene the Sudanese government’s and their own ban on 
political activities by promoting Republican Thought through the alfikra.org website and 
through participating in non-Republican forums such as sudaneseonline.com, Republicans 
are able to engage politically as individuals without (too much) risk to the movement. They 
enact a strategic ambivalence implicitly by remaining silent in the closed forums and thereby 
deciding to act by not acting. While this has caused fractions to develop in the movement, 
the survival of the movement is secured.
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One of the most intriguing issues to arise from the data is evidence of the 
Republicans’ anxiety over a perceived split between the audio and written forums. This 
anxiety is perceived as an evacuation of the Republican discursive identity of rational, 
critical and self-interrogative engagement and further complicates the ambivalence that 
some Republicans feel towards online deliberations with other Republicans. The anxiety 
over this split may have larger implications for social research into online normative 
behaviour of intimate groups (Watt, Lea, and Spears 2002).
A most striking result to emerge from the data is the suggestion that a new, 
endogenous model of democracy is developing online at least among Sudanese exiles. In 
the context of online Sudanese forums, the pre-existing, liberal and Western (i.e. secular) 
models of democracy cannot be superimposed online and counterpublic (Warner 2002) 
models of democratic culture are emerging from a volatile and chaotic written deliberative 
atmosphere where online forums must go through iterations of extreme and violent 
deliberations to swing back and settle on a moderate position that is accommodating to all 
political opinions. The experience of Sudanese deliberative democratic culture on 
discussion forums like sudaneseonline.com also seem to indicate towards radical 
democratic theory’s contention that difference—in terms of conflicts of interest, political 
affiliation, religious practice, regional, ethnic and linguistic identities—is not bracketed online 
and is essential to the robustness of the debate.
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8 An Alternative Voice in the Wilderness: 
Democracy Now!
“[C]ontrary to the illusion that media only 
‘mediate’ what goes on in the rest of society, 
the media’s representational power is one of 
society’s main forces in its own right. From this 
perspective, media power (direct control over 
the means of media production) is an 
increasingly central dimension of power in 
contemporary societies. It follows that, as with 
most forms of power, media power is not 
generally made explicit by those who benefit 
from it: the media. No wonder it is rarely the 
direct subject of public debate”.
—Nick Couldry and James Curran, The 
Paradox of Media Power (2003:4)
It is 7:43 on a typical New York City morning in January: the jagged teeth of skyscrapers 
smile on a cloudless cobalt sky, pedestrians dart to the clear spaces in the street between 
black, sloshy puddles and veering cars, and the combined acrid smell of exhaust fumes, 
roasted nuts and garbage fill the chilly air. From the crowded Chinatown corner of Lafayette 
and Canal, looking down the street you can just make out the red doors of the old firehouse 
where the Democracy Now! studio is housed. It is little more than 15 minutes to air time and 
at 8 am another day’s almost simultaneous television, radio and Web broadcast will cover 
any number of issues forgotten by America’s mainstream media. Today’s topic is the latest 
media scandal—government propaganda in prepackaged video releases aired as news by
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several commercial outlets32. Walking through the station house’s red door, the front 
office—after 9 am will be full of Democracy Now! employees and even more volunteers—is 
now abandoned except for the voices drifting in from the chaos of the studio upstairs. The 
office’s walls are plastered with woodblock and stencilled images printed on large sheets of 
newsprint, political posters announcing rallies or underground music happenings, with an 
aesthetic made popular by those who inhabit the “alternative” youth subcultures in virtually 
any large city, from London to Chicago to Tokyo. The desks and tables are piled with 
papers, boxes, t-shirts emblazoned the Democracy Now! logo—the Statue of Liberty holding 
a microphone—and several coffee mugs filled with pens or yesterday’s half-finished coffee.
Up the short set of stairs leading to the show’s production space, at only five 
minutes to airtime, the already cramped studio appears smaller with seven people buzzing 
around each other, the video equipment, and the half-dozen monitors and laptops. One 
producer yells at another, “Where the fuck is my tape?” which prompts her to frantically sift 
through a small pile of digital video cassettes until she finds the right one and hands it over 
to her colleague. Any tension between the producers quickly dissipates; it is understood that 
this is part of what it takes to make a broadcast on time and well produced, and it’s nothing 
personal. A debate ensues with only two minutes before broadcast whether or not to change 
the order of the tapes, it’s decided that yes the change will be made and a producer quickly 
re-edits the sequence of images with a few seconds to spare before they are broadcast. 
While the producers are busy in front of the video monitors, today’s guest, a senior analyst 
from the media reform organisation Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), lets himself 
into the recording studio and shakes hands with the cameraman.
Behind the glass that looks onto the relative calm of the recording studio, Amy 
Goodman, the programme’s founder, host and executive producer, sits at a round, polished 
table going through the day’s headlines and stories. With the camera and microphone in
32 Air and webpost date 11 January 2005. Democracy Now! shows typically spend the first ten minutes 
covering the headline news, with the remaining 50 minutes dedicated to three topics. This day’s show placed a 
spotlight on commercial media and featured four stories including coverage of the recent firings of four 
journalists at CBS’s 60 Minutes for their story on President Bush’s military record; a story on the Bush 
Administration’s distribution of prepackaged video releases sent to the news media as news; a conservative 
journalist’s move from CNN to MSNBC; and the release of the four British detainees from the Guantanamo Bay 
US military prison. The show can be downloaded as an MP3 or the transcript read at: www.democracynow.org 
by searching the archive for January 11,2005.
178
place, the guest now comfortably seated opposite her, the show’s theme music is cued,
Amy looks up to the camera and says “From Pacifica Radio, this is Democracy Now!”.
In this chapter on the second group under study, I introduce the short history of 
Democracy Now!, the New York City-based independent33, multimedia news programme 
and how the programme fits into a larger movement of media reform and activism in the 
United States precipitated by both the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the 1999 “Battle 
for Seattle” antiglobalisation protests against the World Trade Organization that spawned a 
new movement of web-based, do-it-yourself (DIY) journalism. The purpose of this chapter is 
to demonstrate and analyse Democracy Nowl’s ideological framing of journalism’s role in 
American democracy in the discourse of Amy Goodman and other Democracy Now! 
producers, and the online and offline strategies that the programme utilises to do this. 
Democracy Now! has taken a strategic position in regards to online journalism and e- 
democracy, where they are building alliances with online activist groups and bloggers to 
create their own iteration of online news while still maintaining broadcast as their core 
medium.
I cannot exhaustively explain the current, complex and very fraught media 
environment in the United States, but I will attempt to present in brief the commercialisation 
of American media, which has spurred the recent and rapid trend of media conglomeration 
of the past 10 years in order to provide a better understanding of the current media reform 
movement that Democracy Now! is a part of. Within this brief description, I focus 
consciously on the commercialisation of broadcast media for two reasons: Democracy Now! 
is primarily a radio and television programme and, as I will show, they are ambivalent about 
their online presence and because Goodman’s own critique of corporate media is centred 
primarily on broadcast. In the second half of the chapter, through an analysis of its website,
33 The term “independent media” is problematic and cannot be assumed. Although I do not have the room to go 
into all of the debates over the meaning of the word, I can provide a bit of context for it within the American 
media system and how it is used by Amy Goodman and others at Democracy Now!. Generally independent 
media means that a given media organisation or programme is non-commercial, does not generate its 
revenues from advertising, and is not part of a larger media conglomerate or group. Within the US context, and 
especially how it is used by Goodman, it is believed that such types of non-commercial media are more 
concerned with producing media that serves a public interest rather than following a corporate agenda because 
they are not beholden to shareholders or advertisers. It does not necessarily mean that the productions of 
independent media are, therefore, unbiased or independent of a particular viewpoint. As I will show later in this 
chapter, however, Goodman endows the term to mean both non-commercial and “independent” of bias towards 
the government and corporate America, and she conflates her own Left ideology with independence from bias.
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www.democracynow.org, its employment of online distribution technologies, as well as 
interviews with Amy Goodman and her recent, best selling book that critiques American 
commercial media, I aim to demonstrate how Democracy Now! maintains a liberal 
democratic model for news journalism rather than the more radical model that they espouse. 
I also hope to show some of the issues that arise for the news programme that is rooted in a 
broadcast model when it becomes a multimedia organisation, especially online. Finally I aim 
to connect the ideology for journalism that Democracy Now! holds, primarily the idea that 
media should be a space for a diversity of voices and political positions, and how this relates 
to its struggle to identify itself online.
8.1 Independent media in the age of conglomeration
8.1.1 Beginnings
It is often in the crucible of a catastrophic event, such as a war, or a significant political 
situation, like an historic election, that a news organisation can make its mark. The US- 
based Cable News Network (CNN), for instance, was in business for almost 10 years before 
it gained considerable credibility (and revenues) with its coverage of Tiananmen Square in 
1989, and most significantly for its round-the-clock coverage over two months from Baghdad 
during the First Gulf War in 1991—unprecedented at the time—which pushed the news 
organisation into a central position as a news source of record (Flournoy and Stewart 1997: 
1-7; Vincent 1992:181). The Independent Media Centers (IMC)34 and the website 
Indymedia (www.indymedia.org), a grouping of autonomous, decentralised, volunteer media 
outlets, got their start in November 1999 when antiglobalisation activists, frustrated with 
previous media coverage of their movement, developed the website to provide alternative 
coverage of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) meetings held in Seattle. Since its 
founding, Indymedia has mushroomed in the (global) antiglobalisation foment to cover 
similar events, particularly from dissenting, anarchist and grassroots points of view.
34 While IMC and Indymedia were referred to interchangeably during interviews, for simplicity’s sake in this 
chapter I will refer to the organisation as Indymedia.
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Indymedia35 is now considered on the vanguard of the media reform and media DIY 
movements, at least in the United States (Downing 2003:243,246).
In many respects the American independent news organisation Democracy Now! 
has had a similar naissance. Founded to cover the run-up to the 1996 American Presidential 
elections (during which Bill Clinton won his second term) by veteran independent radio and 
print journalists Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez36, Democracy Now! began its life on 
independent Pacifica Radio’s New York City affiliate WBAI. From its beginnings as the only 
daily election show in the United States, the programme has touted itself as an independent, 
progressive and advocacy news programme. Democracy Now! says it covers stories that 
the corporate and mainstream media will not cover from a perspective rarely encountered in 
mainstream media by using “ordinary” people and unofficial or Left-leaning experts who are 
rarely or never heard in most broadcast media (Goodman and Goodman 2004:6-7).
The morning of 11 September 2001 became one of the defining moments for the 
small programme. The firehouse studios are close to the Twin Towers site in Lower 
Manhattan and just after a few minutes into the show’s broadcast at eight that morning the 
news broke in the station that one of the towers had been hit by a commercial airliner. 
Goodman interrupted the regular programming to cover the breaking news. When the 
second tower was hit, she remained on air for eight hours that day, expanding coverage 
from the programme’s regular one hour show (Ratner 2005:27). After the collapse of the 
towers, the police cordoned off the lower region of Manhattan, which forced Goodman and 
the small crew to sleep in the studio for three days to cover events. Democracy Now! 
became one of the only regularly broadcast shows within the quarantined area surrounding 
the disaster and its feeds were picked up by other Pacifica stations across the US, which 
instantly expanded their listenership. Within that same week, on 14 September, Democracy 
Now! technicians positioned a television camera focused on Goodman’s broadcasting desk 
and debuted its transition to a multimedia news organisation. Throughout its coverage of the 
11 September disaster and its aftermath, the show interviewed survivors, family members of
35 Within the context of this thesis I do not have the room to critically analyse Indymedia, its production model, 
the ideological framing of its stories or the dynamics that influence which Indymedia stories take precedence on 
its umbrella website. These issues most certainly need to be addressed and some scholars who are examining 
Indymedia more critically are Jenny Pickerill (2004), Vinita Agarwal (2005), and Ted Coopman (2005).
36 All the names of Democracy Now! employees have been changed except for those journalists that report on 
the show (and thus their names are publicly accessible), such as Amy Goodman and Juan Gonzalez.
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the deceased, and rescue and military personnel who were opposed to the calls for military 
retaliation in Afghanistan. These voices of dissent were not covered in the mainstream 
media during the hysteria immediately following the attack (Goodman and Goodman 2004: 
16; Ratner 2005:27).
In the nine years since its beginnings, the radio programme has grown from a four- 
person operation broadcasting from a small studio to 25 Pacifica affiliates, to a media 
organisation that employs 27 full- and part-time producers, outreach and volunteer 
coordinators, an archivist, an accountant and a fundraiser, and broadcasts on television, 
radio and the Web to over 420 affiliates in the United States, Canada and Europe. Its 
website, www.democracynow.org, contains a searchable and free archive of the show’s 
broadcasts (television and radio) that date back to January 2002, as well as show 
transcripts, and as of August 2005, logged 50,000 hits per day and was ranked among the 
top 20 podcasts on iTunes (Ratner 2005:27, itunes.com). A new blog, counterrecruiter.org, 
from the New York chapter of Indymedia on the emerging anti-recruitment movement was 
developed by one of the producers, Steve R. in May 2005 and is linked from the Democracy 
Now! homepage.371 will discuss the blog in detail later in this chapter. Also featured on the 
home page are Democracy Now! exclusive interviews with big names in the Left academic 
and media world including Noam Chomsky and Robert Fisk.
The website (figure 8.1) contains an online store and an online donation facility and 
serves as a significant fundraising vehicle for the programme. Democracy Now! says one of 
the ways it maintains its independence is by refusing any corporate or government 
sponsorship, declining advertising of any kind and solely relying on donations from its 
audience, or by receiving foundation grants to meet its $1.8 million annual operating budget. 
In addition to raising operational funds, Amy Goodman and the programme help to raise 
another $2 million annually that goes to support the Pacifica network through quarterly 
fundraising drives and through tours to promote her book Exception to the Rulers (Ratner 
2005:30). One of the programme’s most successful audience-supported funding drives was 
the 2004 Christmas campaign which was spurred primarily by the November 2004 
Presidential election results that gave President Bush his second term and motivated
37 As of October 2005 the blog was removed from the Democracy Now! homepage but the blog is still in 
operation.
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Democracy Now! supporters to help fund independent Left media. One Democracy Now! 
employee told me that for days after the election, some distraught viewers phoned in and 
through tears asked Democracy Now! staff what viewers can do to change things. Others 
emboldened by the election results phoned in an unprecedented level of donations to the 
programme.
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Figure 8.1 Entry page, www.democracynow.org, 2005
8.1.2 The Federal Communications Commission and media monopolies 
During the decade that Democracy Now! has grown, the American media and political 
landscape has changed dramatically. In the same year that Democracy Now! got its start in 
radio, the 1996 Telecommunications Act was passed that superseded the Communications 
Act of 1934, which had regulated media ownership and enforced rules for some public
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service provision by commercial media that use the publicly owned broadcast spectrum.
Due to the Act, coupled with the corporate-friendly Clinton and Bush Administrations’ media 
deregulation policies, mainstream corporate media has significantly tightened its grip on 
markets across the United States (and overseas markets, as corporate media 
conglomerates are globalised) and have commodified news media to such a degree that 
audiences and media reform activists describe the media system being in a crisis.
Media analyst Robert McChesney contends that this crisis has been fuelled by the 
pro-corporate media Federal Communications Commission (FCC)’s easing of the anti- 
monopoly legislation under the 1996 Act which has led to a rapid, corporate consolidation of 
mainstream media (McChesney 1999:74 - 77). The scarce and narrow broadcast spectrum 
is a public commodity, regulated by the US government through the FCC. Under the 1934 
Act the FCC was originally established. All users of the spectrum access it free of charge 
and in exchange for its free use, users are required to dedicate a certain length of air time to 
public service programming as well as being regulated in terms of ownership, such as how 
many stations one network can own or limits on cross-media ownership.
In his exhaustive examination of the history of corporate control of the American 
media system, of which he is specifically concerned with the broadcast media, McChesney 
(1999) shows that during most of the twentieth century the present shape of US media has 
resulted from a complex of corporate interests influencing government policy through its 
control of the government’s media regulatory bodies. He argues that this has led to a media 
system controlled by monopolies and corporate conglomerates that are able to maintain 
their power, due to a mutual collusion with government at the expense of any democratic 
public engagement with how communications resources, namely the publicly owned 
broadcast spectrum, should be regulated. Politicians know that their control of news 
through a compliant media that is susceptible to its spin, through which they gain access to 
(and influence on) public opinion, is far more influential than the money that media 
corporations splash out to politicians (65). This is hardly the fourth estate watchdog model 
American mainstream media purports itself to be. It is also through the intensely 
commercial media that the American media model differs from, say, the British media model 
of public service. While the British public service model has significantly changed with its 
own deregulation and commercialisation, there is still apparent a semblance of serving the
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public interest in the quality of programming content. A good example of a key difference 
between the commercial and the public service models can be seen in how media 
regulation is discussed in the media in both countries. In the US commercial model there is 
virtually no discussion about media regulation in the media outlets that are most affected by 
government regulation (or really deregulation), yet in the British public service model, 
debates about the license fee, the BBC Charter and other media regulations continue to be 
visible issues that are covered by the British news media, including the BBC itself. Often in 
the American mainstream media, media critics such as McChesney note, content is solely 
determined by the market and bottom line pressures, and not by a higher philosophical 
purpose of democratic civic engagement or education. The role of the media in American 
society or how it should be regulated is rarely ever discussed by the American mainstream 
news media. Through his description of the history of the Communications Act of 1934 and 
the wrangles over the deployment of early radio between American educators and corporate 
broadcasters, McChesney shows that the model of advertising-led media won out to the 
public service model (see Chapter 4: “Educators and the battle for control of US 
broadcasting, 1928-35” in McChesney 1999). Any early democratic potential of radio or 
television was squandered long ago in 1934, when educators lost their battle with the 
commercialisation of radio under the 1934 Act (17).
Over the past decade there has been a rapid concentration of media ownership into 
a few corporations that through the grace of deregulation, have bought up properties across 
media in most markets. Media deregulation has relaxed ownership rules and eliminated the 
mandate that broadcasters devote 5 percent of their programming time to news and public 
service (Hallin 1996:249). The relaxation of ownership rules has driven the rapid growth of 
media conglomerates since 1996, as corporations that are always looking to improve 
returns for shareholders see corporate conglomerations as a way to ameliorate risk by 
absorbing the competition, to save large amounts of revenue by streamlining and 
downsizing operations, and to maximise returns on investment by cross-branding in the 
production of content. McChesney notes that due to the 1996 media deregulations, six firms 
now own 80 percent of the cable networks and seven companies control 75 percent of the 
individual channels and programming (18). In radio the change was even more dramatic 
after the 1996 Act, where in each of the top 30 radio markets a single firm owned 40 percent
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of radio revenues (75). Ben Bagdikian, in The New Media Monopoly, an almost completely 
revamped 2004 version of his classic The Media Monopoly (1984) shows that after 1996 the 
five media behemoths operating in the United States are now ranked among the world’s 500 
largest corporations (2004:10). McChesney contends (as do many other media critics, see 
for a few of many examples: McNair (2000), Bagdikian (1996,2004), Schiller (1996), 
Blumlerand Gurevitch (1995), and Curran and Seaton (1985)) that conglomerate media 
control makes competition, media diversity, and any public service element to media, or 
even the prospect of public debate, impossible.
During the last few years, this trend of conglomeration and market control has 
accelerated under the FCC leadership of Michael K. Powell, son of former US Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, and who subsequently resigned in March 2005 after failing to pass hotly 
contested FCC legislation. If it had been successful, his proposed controversial legislation 
would have been the most favourable to corporate media in the history of the FCC, but it 
was ultimately struck down in January 2005. The draft legislation allowed a single 
broadcasting network to own stations that reached 45 percent of American households, and 
would have changed ownership rules to allow a single media company to own a newspaper, 
up to three television and up to eight radio stations, and a cable system within a single 
market (McChesney and Nichols 2003:11; McChesney and Nichols 2004:370). Since the 
early days of broadcasting in the United States, lobbyists working for the corporate 
broadcasters have exerted their influence and control over public debates concerning 
broadcast and media policy (regulated by the FCC) to such an extent that until recently 
there has been virtually no public deliberations on the issues at all; debates on policy 
occurred within Congress and were rarely covered in the mainstream media. One exception 
to this may be a series of “unofficial” FCC public hearings in 2003, organised by two 
dissenting FCC commissioners, Jonathan Adelstein and Michael Copps, with the help of 
grassroots media activists around the country who provided venues and publicity for the 
events. The three hearings were held New York, Phoenix and Atlanta in the run-up to the 
FCC vote on the new rules and allowed members of the public the rare chance to testify 
against the proposed changes. As a result of the hearings (and their coverage by alternative 
media) Congress members and the FCC received over 3 million phone calls, letters and 
emails against the proposals. Despite the overwhelming public response against further
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media deregulation, the remaining three FCC commissioners voted in the changes in June 
2003, only for some of the changes to be overruled by Congress that July, and a Supreme 
Court stay put against their implementation in September (Goodman and Goodman 2004: 
304-309). During most of 2004 the issue was debated in Congress and appeals to have the 
stay lifted were eventually withdrawn by FCC in late January 2005 (Ahrens 2005).
This monopoly of the airwaves (and virtually all other media) has had a detrimental 
effect on the quality of media content and knock-on effects on the state of democracy in the 
United States, according to media reform advocates such as McChesney and Democracy 
Nowl’s Amy Goodman. Media sociologist Brian McNair while describing the crisis of 
commercialised media in Britain could have easily been describing the well-established 
American media crisis where intense commercial pressures have caused journalists to 
compromise information for entertainment (“infotainment”) in the ever-demanding drive to 
capture ratings (McNair 2000:2-8). The force behind this ratings drive is the reliance on 
advertising revenues for media companies to make profits and has compromised content so 
that it is light, inoffensive, uncontroversial fare with a mass appeal. Indeed he even 
summons the pejorative adjective “Americanised” to describe the current political news 
content in Britain. Back in the United States, the pressures to produce high returns for 
shareholders means that mainstream media corporations are loathe to produce diverse and 
controversial content for multiple (as opposed to “mass”) audiences because this would 
splinter the large marketing bases sold to advertisers (Bagdikian 2004:260).
This crisis around anaemic or blatantly biased news content has led to a distrust of 
mainstream media among some American audiences, and they are turning to online 
alternative or foreign media for news information since it is perceived to be less biased (or in 
the case of alternative media, biased in the direction of the audience), more accurate and 
fairer to all sides. Alternative media within the context of the American media system are 
generally considered to be media that is non-commercial, “oppositional (counter-hegemonic) 
in intent, having social change at their heart”, and are increasingly dominated by blogs that 
have come to be sources of reference (Atton 2002:19). Many scholarly examinations of 
alternative media have struggled to develop an accurate and adequate definition of 
“alternative media”. For describing Democracy Now! and other Left American media, I will 
use John Downing’s definition where alternative media should be considered as “politically
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dissident media that offer radical alternatives to mainstream media” (1995:240; quoted in 
Meikle 2002:60). While foreign media are not necessarily “alternative” strictly according to 
Downing’s definition, when considered within the context of American media, they are an 
alternative to a media system that is considered increasingly to be biased towards the 
American government and corporations. The Guardian's website The Guardian Unlimited 
(guardian.co.uk), for example, clocked its most unique visitors, at 1.3 million, ever in its 
history during January 2003, in the lead up to the American and British invasion of Iraq, 
with close to half of the hits, or 49 percent, originating from the United States (Kahney 
2003). A poll taken after the 2004 Presidential elections cited that reforming the media was 
the second most important issue for progressives to address in 2005, after reforming the 
electoral system and before pulling troops out of Iraq (McChesney, Nichols, and Scott 
2005). Another recent poll report on American attitudes on the state of the media conducted 
by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press showed that trust in American 
media is at an all time low since the mid-1980s. The poll reported that more than 70 percent 
of respondents say that the media favour one side over another and do not treat all sides 
fairly, and 60 percent of respondents said the media are politically biased (Pew Research 
Center for the People & the Press 2005). Among American heavy broadband users, 
furthermore, 71 percent go online to gather news information on a daily basis, and 18 
percent of those users visit the websites of non-traditional, online news sources every day 
(Horrigan 2006:9-13).
The widespread mistrust and frustration with mainstream media has not only 
coincided with the corporate media tightening of news content but also has been shaped 
and accelerated in large part by a dearth of news coverage that depicts dissenting 
perspectives on the wars on terror and in Iraq, and the abysmal mainstream coverage of the 
Presidential elections of 2000 and 2004. Both elections were considered (and shown) to be 
permeated with widespread corruption resulting in mass disenfranchisement of voters in key 
states and the mainstream media have been criticised, especially in the 2004 elections, for 
not investigating the claims of fraud (Conyers 2005; Miller 2005). Since Democracy Nowl’s 
broadcast programmes and website are often framed by the larger American discourse on 
the wars, in the following I will focus on war reporting of the Iraq War and the occupation of 
Iraq by American and British forces.
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While the plagiarism and falsified news reports scandals have rocked reputable 
media outlets such as the New York Times and The New Republic to the core of their 
journalistic practice, the most damaging scandal to their reputations has been their 
coverage of the Iraq War. In 2004 both publications printed apologies to their readers for 
what they described as their uncritical and unbalanced war coverage, and admitted that they 
had relied solely on official White House and military sources as well as US military troop- 
embedded media dispatches to report stories on the war. A critical and public self-reflection 
on the failures of their journalistic practices, especially in their coverage of the events 
leading up to the Iraq War, and the acknowledgement that the work published by them was 
little more than “access journalism” was unprecedented. In fact both publications admitted 
they had been “duped” by the White House’s spinning of the issue of weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq and that their failure to recognise how they were manipulated came down 
to wanting to continue their access to official sources. These apologies followed earlier ones 
made by the Washington Post and CNN in October 2003 (Kurtz 2004). The Iraq War has 
been such a unifying issue for media critics and disaffected audiences alike that Ben 
Bagdikian wrote a new chapter dedicated to US media coverage of the Iraq War in the 2004 
revised edition of the Media Monopoly (see Chapter Four: “(Not) All the News That’s Fit to 
Print”) and Todd Gitlin discusses the media coverage of the Iraq War in the rewritten 
preface of the 2003 edition of his classic research on mass media and the American New 
Left, The Whole World is Watching (2003).
Members of the public who have grown increasingly frustrated by mainstream 
media and who are not necessarily trained journalists themselves have turned to DIY media, 
especially online, which has been made easier and more possible in the past few years with 
Web technologies such as blogging software (Moveable Type, Slash) or free sites 
(blogger.com, livejournal.com). There are strong alliances being built between media reform 
activists, antiglobalisation and antiwar activists such as Indymedia, the women’s peace 
movement Code Pink and Moveon.org that are all converging through the space opened by 
alternative media outlets. At the same time this sense of frustration has also enabled 
independent media organisations, such as Democracy Now!, to gain more strength and 
momentum because those who are not producing their own media are turning to alternative 
media to either supplement or replace news information from the mainstream media.
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Democracy Now! is also taking part, through key alliances with media activists, grassroots 
media groups and the antiwar movement, in a larger trend of dissention which is, as one 
Democracy Now! employee described to me helping to build a “parallel media system” (Phil 
H., interview transcript, March 2005). In 2003, for example, Democracy Now! hired an 
organiser who worked for local community organisations to lobby National Public Radio and 
local community radio and television stations to pick up the programme, this activist strategy 
has worked, having picked up 200 additional stations since being hired (Ratner 2005:30). 
Democracy Nowl’s accelerated success in recruiting new stations has been possible in 
large part by adopting an activist model of collaboration. It is through the activist model too 
that Democracy Now! produces news media with one of the programme’s most important 
allies, Indymedia.
8.1.3 “The biggest independent media collaboration”
While there has long existed an independent media in the United States on radio, in video 
and in print, it has been primarily underground due to limited resources and has remained 
largely “ghettoised” with small audiences and readership (Downing 1984). Through the rise 
of online DIY media groups, the blogosphere and Open Source Internet technology, 
however, alternative media now has unprecedented reach and is beginning to influence 
public opinion. The most obvious influence on public opinion has been the growing criticism 
of mainstream media which was started by groups like Indymedia and has forced (some) 
commercial media to re-examine its own values. In its May 2004 apology to its readers, the 
New York Times listed a blow-by-blow account of all of the stories where it “got it wrong” 
and the apology was seen as a direct response to the criticisms of its coverage in alternative 
media.
Online alternative media, greatly strengthened by its growing acceptance and 
legitimisation by web users, are also positioned to scrutinise mainstream media and are 
breaking stories on the media industry itself (Wall 2005). Bloggers on both the Left and the 
Right have broken many stories on media corruption in the last few years. Left-leaning 
bloggers, for instance, broke the story of the White House reporter, Jeff Gannon (his real 
name is James Guckert), whose journalism credentials were falsified, whose pay cheque 
came from the Republican Party and, who, as a Republican plant at the White House press
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briefings, asked the Bush Administration soft-ball questions on the Iraq War. Conservative 
bloggers scrutinised mainstream news reports by CBS’ Dan Rather on his unsubstantiated 
story of Bush’s unfulfilled National Guard service and CNN’s Eason Jordan’s unverified 
report on American troops targeting journalists in Iraq. The exposures by Right-wing 
bloggers forced both Rather and Jordan to resign their posts (Harris 2005).
What is most significant about this online trend of DIY journalism and its alliance 
with other alternative media is that it is challenging the mainstream media’s claims to 
professionalism and propriety over the production of news information. Democracy Now! is 
breaking news stories that are being picked up by mainstream media news outlets. One 
producer explained that Democracy Now! was the first programme to expose a link between 
White House officials and the outing of CIA operative Valerie Plame when they broadcast a 
speech by her husband, ex-US Ambassador to Iraq Joseph Wilson, alleging that Vice- 
President Dick Cheney and Karl Rove had leaked his wife’s name to reporters.38 This story 
was picked up by mainstream journalists on the same day that Democracy Now! aired it.
One of the most significant examples of Democracy Now! breaking a story that becomes 
national news happened in March 2004, with the ousting of the Haitian President Jean- 
Bertrand Aristide during the coup supported by the US Marines and his alleged kidnap 
(along with his wife Mildred and his brother-in-law) by US forces to the Central African 
Republic39.
Through its collaborations with other independent media organisations, and its 
alliances with progressive and dissenting political movements, such as the antiwar and 
antiglobalisation movements, Democracy Now! claims to be the largest independent media 
collaboration presently working in the United States. It describes its collaborations in terms 
of cooperatively providing content, cross-linking or coproductions with public access cable 
television activists Free Speech TV and Deep Dish TV, and Pacifica Radio. Online the 
collaborations are not as apparent as they are through broadcast since coordination
38 The broadcast, aired 16 September 2003, can be downloaded from the Democracy Now! archive at 
www.democracynow.org/index.p!?issue=20030916. At a White House press briefing the same day of the 
Democracy Now! broadcast, a reporter asked spokesman Scott McClellan about the connection, which he flatly 
denied. This can be viewed in the Democracy Now! archive for 17 September 2003, at 
http://www.democracynow.org/index.pl?issue=20030917.
39 As of August 2005, a record of Democracy Nowl’s reporting of this story can be found in a link on the front 
page of democracynow.org or by searching the site’s archives.
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between groups tends to be through the utilisation of Open Source software or archiving 
technologies. The cooperative relationships, for instance, with Real Networks (makers of 
Real Audio), archive.org, and BitTorrent40 have fundamentally helped the online distribution 
capabilities of democracynow.org.
The programme’s most significant collaboration with an online media group is with 
Indymedia. The relationship between the two groups started at the beginning of Indymedia, 
in Seattle during the WTO protests, when Democracy Now! broadcast live from the scene 
and produced coverage for its website. Of the seven producers that have been hired in the 
past few years, four come from Indymedia. In her book Exception to the Rulers Goodman 
dedicates close to an entire chapter (“Conclusion: Free the Media”) to the collaboration 
between Indymedia and Democracy Now!, indicating that this alliance has been most 
productive for Democracy Now! and represents a crossover for the programme from 
“advocacy” to “grassroots” journalism through the relationship. In fact Goodman claims that 
true advocacy journalism can only be possible with the DIY journalism model perfected by 
Indymedia (Goodman and Goodman 2004:314). It is also through these strategic alliances 
with media activists, and especially with Indymedia, that Democracy Now! is able to have a 
more definitive online presence because they are able to exploit the collective resources of 
the entire movement to have a much broader reach than through their programme, either on 
radio, television or the website, alone.
Phil H„ a Web and network administrator for Democracy Now! came to the 
programme from Indymedia, where he still volunteers his technical labour. He explained the 
organisational differences between the two groups:
“I guess the fundamental difference is that Democracy Now! is a nonprofit 
with a head and employees and it pays my rent and in exchange for that I 
work for them. Whereas Indymedia no one makes me do anything if I’m 
not interested. I have a lot more freedom to poke my nose into the editorial 
side of the organisation if I feel like it. But it’s a no-budget operation 
basically. But on the other hand what Indymedia’s been able to create with
40 BitTorrent is available for download at: www.bittorrent.com. On the website’s ‘Introduction’ page, the authors 
explain that BitTorrent 'is a free speech tool’.
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no budget is really quite amazing. We’re almost building parallel systems 
of media. So even if the New York Times never notices, I think large 
numbers of people are noticing. Which is what we want, we don’t want to 
be the Times” (Phil H., interview transcript March 2005).
While both organisations are independent, Democracy Now! benefits from the collaborative 
relationship with Indymedia (especially the New York City group) not only by its broadened 
resources but also by its radicalism. Democracy Now! editorial decisions are made only by 
the programme’s producers and while audience input may influence some of those 
decisions, audience members themselves cannot produce or edit Democracy Now! 
programmes or website content. This is in contrast with grassroots groups such as 
Indymedia where audience members can and do produce their own stories. Through 
collaborations with more radical media groups, however, Democracy Now! can stake a 
claim in that radicalism while actually engaging in more traditional media practices for their 
own programme. Through this collaborative effort both groups form two sides of one coin. 
This is for practical reasons, in order to produce the quality of work and to maintain stability, 
Democracy Now! must adopt a less radical model of organisation. But it does flow both 
ways, through productive relationships with less radical media, Indymedia is also able to 
reach more traditional audiences and break out of its own “alternative ghetto” (Atton 2002: 
33-35).
These very recent trends of the past five years in alternative media is reshaping the 
American media environment into polarised, splintered and partisan media spheres which 
are giving rise and legitimacy to “advocacy journalism”. Democracy Now! claims to be a 
pioneer of this new journalism trend but as I will show in the following section the 
programme’s website, this claim only extends to its broadcast productions.
8.2 Broadcast media online: Democracy Now!’s website
So what does all of this have to do with online journalism and e-democracy? In the following 
sections I aim to show that within the context of alternative media in a commercialised 
environment, Democracy Now! maintains a liberal democratic model for journalism in
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broadcast but is able to radicalise its model online through strategic alliances with online 
media activists and through online distribution methods. By building online networks 
Democracy Now! is able to engage in grassroots journalism and this is achieved not through 
its website but through productive relationships with more radical media groups such as 
Indymedia, its collaborations with the open source communities, and by using bloggers and 
activists as sources for perspectives on news stories.
8.2.1 Deciding whether to be a news site or a site about a television show
The first iteration of the Democracy Now! website went live in September 1999 as a spin-out
site independent of the Pacifica Radio (pacifica.org) website, though it was linked from the
Pacifica homepage. Before the launch the programme had its own web channel on
pacifica.org.
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Figure 8.2 Entry page, www.democracynow.org, 2000 (Source: archive.org)
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Through the years democracynow.org (figure 8.2) has grown along with the programme 
itself, and as more financial and labour resources have become available, more features 
have been added and the site’s software backbone has been made more robust 
incrementally. Through all of these iterations, too, the programme has also changed the way 
in which it frames itself ideologically online. These changes occurred quite abruptly and 
coincided with the addition of television broadcasts.
In this way, Democracy Now! played down its own biases as the programme gained 
a much larger audience base through its television broadcasts and its increased listenership 
after September 2001, and as the programme’s credibility increased as a daily news source. 
The website itself has had to reflect this legitimacy and to take the programme out of its own 
“alternative ghetto” (Atton 2002).
Until September 2001, for instance, the programme’s website carried Photoshopped 
images of Bush, Cheney and Gore sporting crowns that were linked to special reports on 
the politicians’ intimate ties with oil wealth (figure 8.3). Soon after September 2001, these 
types of images were removed from the website and a less ideologically framed visual 
design was created for the site. These changes coincide with the programme’s move to 
include television broadcasting in the same month.
Figure 8.3 Detail from entry page, 2001. .gif image linked to in-depth story 
on politicians’ personal financial links to oil corporations. (Source: archive.org)
Steve R., a Democracy Now! producer and an Indymedia media activist was surprised to 
learn how the Democracy Now! website has changed its framing since 2001 and said:
“For me I just think that we should let the journalism and the stories speak 
for themselves. I feel you don’t need to make fun of the President in that 
way and there are far more effective ways of offering critiques of his 
policies. I think for the website [as] I think with the show as a whole, we
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don’t want to turn off listeners before they have a chance to listen to us. So 
I think we do...I mean the show is structured in a way that a listener of 
NPR [National Public Radio] would feel somewhat familiar with our format, 
with the headlines at the top of the show and broken into segments. So I 
think we do run a creative model that brings in new listeners that might not 
traditionally, that might not go to Indymedia site or not pick up the 
Indypendent” (Steve R., interview transcript, August 2005).
Democracynow.org is not, however, a separate media venture into online journalism for the 
programme and functions primarily as a digital archive and as an outreach tool for the 
organisation. The website’s lack of interaction on all levels—there are no bulletin boards for 
viewer or listener comments, no visible interaction between producers and audience 
members or between audience members themselves—is said by most Democracy Now! 
producers to be due to a lack of labour resources. Meeting the demands of maintaining and 
monitoring a fully interactive news site is beyond the scope of their primary productive work 
in broadcast. Steve R., however, explained that there are other reasons why 
democracynow.org lacks audience interaction:
“I think when people go to the Democracy Now! website their main goal is 
to just get the programme. ... Well we don’t use the website to 
communicate back and forth with listeners. But we do have on the website 
areas where listeners can give a story idea or volunteer or email us about 
the show, I mean I check the listener email several times a day. So I’ll 
communicate with listeners that way but we’ve never had a public forum on 
the site, a bulletin board or a way that listeners could ...I don’t think it really 
fits into the ...I don’t think it’s appropriate for Democracy Now!” (Steve R., 
interview transcript, August 2005).
The lack of this level of interactivity on democracynow.org reaffirms the editorial productive 
model that Democracy Now! follows which are the same practices of traditional, mainstream 
media, where media acts a “representative” or mediator, and do not employ the grassroots
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or radical online production models of other alternative media. Furthermore, their use of 
Internet technologies is closely linked to the broadcast model, a model that reflects a one-to- 
many, one-way distribution system. They disrupt this model in a less visible way, however, 
by using online, Open Source distribution technologies, such as BitTorrent, to widely 
distribute their programming and to encourage other independent stations to download and 
broadcast their programme at no charge to those who reuse the programmes.
The programme producers have realised very keenly the importance and relevance 
of their online presence and it is becoming more central to reaching audiences beyond what 
even broadcast media can reach and their website is seen to be tied to the programme’s 
growth. Democracy Now! has hired a part-time consultant with a strong background in site 
development for media organisations and while work on changes have been slow, some 
new features have been added to keep up with newer technologies that other outlets in the 
mainstream are using, such as blogs, podcasting and as well as making some stories (the 
headline stories) available in Spanish, the second language spoken in the United States.
8.2.2 Blogging
Democracy Now! has worked around some of this lack in interactivity by linking to blogs that 
provide interaction and feedback, and are independent pet projects of individual Democracy 
Now! producers. One in particular which is linked on the entry page of democracy.org is 
counterrecruiter.net, a blog developed and maintained by Steve R., who is also an 
Indymedia activist. Steve and Francesca E., another Democracy Now! producer, both came 
to Democracy Now! from Indymedia and in their free time continue to work with the media 
activist organisation by publishing a newspaper, The Indypendent, that is distributed 
throughout New York City (and available online), and by continuing to work in online 
production. The blog itself is an Indymedia (New York City) project, started in May 2005 and 
was founded to document the burgeoning anti-military recruitment movement in the United 
States that forms part of the larger antiwar movement. The highlighting of this blog on the 
front page helps to further contextualise democracynow.org within the politics of the Iraq 
War as well as to link with American grassroots movements.
The reliance on bloggers as a central news source is another way that Democracy 
Now! gives voice to unconventional news sources and contrasts sharply against mainstream
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media’s reliance on “official” sources. Its almost daily use of bloggers, especially bloggers 
who have gained legitimacy among the online political Left, as sources for stories or who 
provide commentary and background on issues differs from the mainstream media’s 
dependence on established news sources. In an August 2005 broadcast on the death of 
Saudi King Fahd, for instance, As'ad Abu Khalil, a political science professor and the 
blogger of Angry Arab Media Service (angryarab.blogspot.com) featured as the only source 
to comment on King Fahd’s death and its impact on Saudi politics. In another story, this one 
on the controversial appointment of John Bolton as the US’ Ambassador to the United 
Nations, Democracy Now! featured Steven Clemons a journalist and blogger who runs 
thewashingtonnote.com, to comment on Bolton’s career. In addition to independent 
bloggers, other alternative or Left news websites, such as Raw Story (rawstory.com) and 
Salon (salon.com) are frequently quoted along with more traditionally mainstream media 
outlets, both national and international, such as the Wall Street Journal, the New Yorker 
magazine, Israel’s Ha’aretz, the UK’s The Guardian and The Independent
8.2.3 Special reports and context
One of the ways that democracynow.org is able to provide deeper context to the stories that 
they report in broadcast is through the special online features and interviews linked on the 
website’s entry page. These stories also reaffirm the advocacy journalism that Amy 
Goodman and the programme practices. Interviews with Left academics and journalists 
such as Noam Chomsky and Robert Fisk are prominently featured on the home page and a 
30-minute interview with an Iraqi-American, Sami Rasouli, who returned to Iraq after the 
start of the present war, help to provide a forum for Left viewpoints on the American 
occupation of Iraq. It is through its extensive, rich and no-charge archive, however, that the 
website is able to provide context and broadcast historical documents of the programme 
and of the underreported perspectives that Democracy Now! features.
8.2.4 Online distribution and archiving
Another innovation started by bloggers that has been adopted by both mainstream and 
alternative media is podcasting. Podcasting’s young roots date back to November 2004 and 
democracynow.org started offering podcasts from its website in July 2005. In a possible
198
expansion of the online distribution of audio files between community radio stations enabled 
by Open Source online software development, like BitTorrent, which is utilised by groups 
such as the A-lnfos Radio Project (www.radio4all.net) described by Meikle (2002:74). 
Democracy Now! is expanding into new markets, including European ones, by providing 
free content over the Internet both directly to individual audience members through 
podcasting and to other progressive, alternative satellite stations and pirate radio.
Democracy Now! podcasts have been so popular that they have ranked in the top 
20 podcasts on the itunes.com for several weeks at the end of August 2005. Caution should 
be used when trying to interpret podcast rankings, which have been challenged as easily 
skewed and manipulated41, and the rankings could be simply evidence that Democracy 
Now! audiences already form a demographic that adopts newer online technologies more 
quickly than audience members of more mainstream media. I think it is a fact worth noting, 
however, since one of the Democracy Now! producers pointed it out to me and he said that 
he keeps a daily tally of the programme’s progress up the podcast charts. This is one of the 
informal ways that Democracy Now! uses an online technology as a barometer of audience 
support.
The divergent distribution model is one of the most significant differences between 
commercial media and independent, advocacy media like Democracy Now!. Whereas 
commercial media charges for distribution rights and archives, Democracy Now!, through its 
online distribution, seek to have their productions circulated as widely as possible. From the 
earliest beginnings of the programme, Democracy Now! has supported (by building 
alliances) the radical idea that communities of media workers and computer programmers 
should collaborate in the development of free online distribution software. They want other 
media providers, such as pirate radio stations, to freely use Democracy Now! broadcasts for 
programming content. The most direct way of doing this is by making content available for 
free to both consumers and to affiliates, and to employ distribution technologies that are 
relatively inexpensive and that retain the broadcast quality of digital files. This enables 
affiliates with minimal or no budgets to rebroadcast shows on their own stations for virtually 
no cost. Democracy Now! has also utilised the online archiving software made available
41 See the archived debates (August 2005) about itunes.com podcast ranking system at: 
www.podcastingnews.com.
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through Open Source development communities to digitally archive programmes and to 
make files accessible for download for no cost to the web user. Tim S., Democracy Nowl’s 
archivist believes that archiving the news coverage by independent media is vital to 
preserving a historical record of dissenting and alternative viewpoints:
“A lot of news media will archive their materials for their financial resource 
value so that they can attract more people to their newspaper websites or 
to their video collections. The networks do a lot of licensing among one 
another and make a lot of profit off of their materials. So the worry is that a 
lot of the independent media places that I’ve found haven’t had the 
resources or the abilities to hire an archivist although some are able to get 
some preservation grants once in a while. But I’m not sure about how 
much of a long-term ability they have to preserve their own work. 
Democracy Now started in 96 but the collection goes back to the late 80s, 
mostly following Amy Goodman’s career. But I would say because more 
funding is available to the major network media that it becomes more 
accessible to historians. So a historian will more likely be able to find a 
New York Times article from today in 90 years than they’ll find material 
from an Independent Media Center. And I think it is likely that a CNN 
programme will be found in 40 years than a Democracy Now! programme 
because CNN can afford to record onto Betacam tape and have really nice 
climate controlled storage and have a preservation and migration policy 
where as our collection is kept on metal evaporated DV tape and Minicam 
DVD which are not nearly as stable. We’re working on a project right now 
where we’re sending MP2s to Archive.org because Archive.org has a 
really nice preservation strategy through their digital media. So even 
though it’s a very compressed copy the information is there. Archive.org is 
a way of disseminating public domain material and material the copyholder 
doesn’t mind archive.org freely distributing the material” (Tim S., interview 
transcript, March 2005).
200
Large media conglomerates have the capital necessary to maintain state-of-the-art archives 
and can be guaranteed a significant revenue stream well into the future solely on the basis 
of their archives (Bagdikian 1996:10). Independent media on the other hand have been 
slow to archive, mostly due to the intensive capital needed to properly archive media, and 
since most independent media subsist on shoestring budgets, priority is given to covering 
the news and not necessarily to archiving it. Democracy Nowl’s online alliances with 
archive.org and Real Networks help the programme strategically to document, preserve and 
distribute their point of view.
8.3 “Going to where the silence is”: Amy Goodman’s and Democracy Nowl’s 
democratic theory of media
8.3.1 Advocacy journalism
“...I do expect the news media to examine thoroughly the most important 
issues of the day. Instead, most of the journalists who reach thousands— 
and in some cases millions—of readers and viewers do nothing but parrot 
the government line. These are the same people who like to accuse me of 
being an advocacy journalist. I answer by saying that they are my model”
(Amy Goodman in Goodman and Goodman 2004 p. 283).42
One of the sharpest criticisms levelled against Democracy Now! by mainstream journalists 
is that it practices “advocacy journalism”, the sting of the accusation is in that by advocating 
a certain perspective, a journalist cannot be objective. In this section I will explore the notion 
of journalistic objectivity, and how it is constructed by Democracy Now!. First I would like to 
address the issue of advocacy journalism and how it is a response to the mainstream 
media’s practice of “objectivity”.
In his book Alternative Media, Chris Atton (2002) makes a careful distinction 
between what he calls “advocacy journalism” and “grassroots journalism”. Relying heavily 
on definitions originally developed by Traber (1985) Atton explains that while both models
42 In all direct quotes to print resources I use American spelling. When quoting from interviews I use the British 
spelling.
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develop “very different news values from mass media”, such as reporting on stories that are 
important to those people that are regularly marginalised by mainstream media, advocacy 
journalism maintains editorial control over content and applies the “grassroots” perspective 
and sources to produce news content. Grassroots journalism, on the other hand, is solely 
produced by community members themselves, who are often not professionally trained 
journalists and who report on local or community issues (2002:16). In his comparison 
between the British publications The Big Issue and Squall, Atton shows that while both claim 
to practice grassroots journalism, the former was written by journalists and the latter was 
written by homeless and squatter activists. In a similar way to the advocacy journalism 
practiced by The Big Issue, Democracy Nowl’s content is not produced by community 
activists on any given issue but coverage is often framed from an advocacy perspective.
This is achieved by the producers’ choices of sources for shows and by allowing sources to 
speak at length on issues. Since Democracy Now! produces broadcast media, sources 
speak largely uninterrupted (but still framed and filtered) by a journalist’s narrative and 
represents a significant difference when compared with shorter news programmes or with 
print where sources are quoted in small bits of text or in sound bites (33). Given, however, 
that Amy Goodman as well as most producers at Democracy Now! are activists in the 
antiwar movement, when producing stories that address the Iraq War especially, it could be 
said in these instances they are producing “grassroots” journalism. The cross-production 
and collaborative work with Indymedia is another way that Democracy Now! ensures that 
the content they produce fulfils both Atton’s definitions for advocacy and grassroots 
journalism. It is through a continued and sustained collaboration with Indymedia that 
Democracy Now! can make the claim that they are grassroots, with them, they are media 
activists who are reporting on issues that are affecting their communities, in this case, 
communities of dissent, without them they are simply advocacy journalists.
A key feature of advocacy journalism should be added to Atton’s definition. While 
advocacy media share similar journalistic practices and values with mainstream journalism, 
such as aiming to provide balance in news reports by including two or more sources an 
issue, they still reproduce ideology through the application of news frames. Alternative and 
advocacy media distinguishes itself in its transparency around this fact. In other words, 
journalists working in alternative media make no bones about their own ideology seeping
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into the media they produce or their partisanship on certain issues. It is this qualitative 
difference that helps to make them more legitimate and trusted by their audiences and 
readers in contrast to mainstream media.
In a story posted to the web on 1 November 2005 by Democracy Now! (figure 8.4), 
for example, the title of the story, “Cheney Taps Torture Memo Author to Replace Scooter 
Libby” gives away Democracy Nowl’s antiwar position and reframes the story of a 
governmental appointment as a significant manoeuvre by the White House increasingly 
under pressure due to its ongoing political crisis around the Iraq War. The lead into the 
broadcast of the story did not have the headline that appeared on the website. While the 
entire broadcast could be said to be ideologically framed by show identifiers such as “The 
War and Peace Report” , the addition of web headlines to stories helps to further 
ideologically frame Democracy Now! reports.
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The same story appeared a day later on the New York Times website (figure 8.5), not on the 
front page but within the Washington section, and was titled with a heading more difficult to 
neatly pin down into war politics. This does not mean that the New York Times story is 
unbiased but it is more carefully framed within the staid politics of Washington, and not of 
the Iraq War.
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While mainstream media steadfastly deny their own reproduction of ideology by pointing to 
the fact that they are “objective”, they are often silent on how they make journalistic choices, 
such as the editorial process employed to choose what stories are newsworthy, how stories 
are chosen to lead a broadcast or to appear above the fold, how words are chosen for 
framing and how they are covered. As I described in Chapter Three, John Fiske points out 
that utilisation of the word “objectivity” within media politics operates as “totalitarian rather 
than democratic. The result is the closing down of the plurality of truths that should be 
allowed expression under a democratic order” , and supports the ideology of the status quo
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(Fiske 1989:193). Raymond Williams, in his book What I came to say (1989), contends that 
until the early eighteenth century, novelists (a relatively new category itself as a reading 
public was still forming during the century) were also considered “newsmongers” and that as 
novelists became reporters later in that century and the next, this had effects on “news 
journalism” and its professional claim to objectivity by hiding behind the use of “facts” to tell 
a story:
“The fact that certain events have undoubtedly occurred—have happened 
to people, have been observed, have been reliably reported, have been 
tested from the evidence of participants and witnesses—has been used to 
conceal or override the equally evident fact that as they move from events 
to news they are being narrated, and that certain long-standing problems 
of narration—the identity of the narrator, his authority, his point of view, his 
assumed relationship with his readers or hearers, his possible wider 
purposes in selecting and narrating these events in this way—come 
inevitably into question” (1989:115).
The professional journalistic practice of “objectivity” in the United States arose in the 1920s 
in response to the sensationalist and jingoistic reportage during World War I, and reporting 
on events from a non-subjective point of view was originally espoused as being democratic 
by journalists, as well as democratic theorists such as Walter Lippmann and John Dewey 
(Johnson-Cartee 2005:112). What arose over the intervening years was a belief that if only 
the same methods that are employed in science could be applied to journalism that an 
objective reality would be revealed in news reporting. Gaye Tuchman in her classic Making 
News (1978) demonstrates the methods that journalists employ to construct “objectivity”, or 
what she calls “the web of facticity”:
“By stressing methods—gathering supplementary evidence, presenting 
conflicting truth-claims, imputing facts through familiarity with police 
procedures, and using quotation marks, to name some techniques ... — 
newsworkers produced a full-blown version of the web of facticity. ...
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Just as scientists discovered facts about nature by using normatively 
established objective methods, so, too, the news media and the news 
professionals would use their methods to reveal social reality to the news 
consumer” (Tuchman 1978:160-161).
The belief that objective reporting strengthens democracy was questioned in the 1970s by 
scholars such as Stuart Hall and Fiske, who found that the practice of objectivity functions 
as a mask for supporting hegemonic ideologies (Hall et al. 1978).
Democracy Now! does not make the same claim to objectivity that its mainstream 
media critics do. When asked how Democracy Nowl’s reporting practices are the same or 
different as compared with mainstream media’s practices, all of the producers named two 
qualities that are shared but practiced differently: fairness and balance. While these 
qualities form part of traditional journalistic practice too, Democracy Now! producers 
consider that their practice is distinguishable from practices of mainstream media:
“I think more of our goal is to be fair and accurate. I think that objectivity is 
sort of this trap that you set yourself up fo r.... That is not the way a lot of 
traditional journalism outfits view it. Where, I mean especially at the place 
that I used to work at (a local newspaper in Amherst, Massachusetts) there 
were definitely sources, there were corporate sources of information and 
then there is everyone else. So there were the city officials, there were the 
local experts; there were the pre-approved sources that generally advocate 
the status quo to some degree. Or there [are] the very well known critics; 
you end up having the same critics as sources all the time. There is a 
limited...it limits the debate and the public discourse tremendously. I think 
at Democracy Now! we try to expand that, to go beyond the traditional 
talking head. I mean we have them on as well but we also try to have 
people themselves speak. There is one time I remember well when it was 
my first year there ... we were looking at the whole issue of post-911 
detentions and we had a spokesperson from the Justice Department on 
and we also managed to have a detainee on call-in from jail. We were able
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to have a detainee gauge the Justice Department on air, on national 
broadcast. That’s a discussion you don’t often hear” (Steve R., interview 
transcript, August 2005).
Steve explains that part of this key difference is in Democracy Nowl’s openness in how they 
chose sources and stories. Democracy Nowl’s choice of non-traditional sources makes 
them advocates for their own ideology. For those news journalists, like Amy Goodman, 
working in alternative media, there is no contradiction in the advocacy label and maintaining 
balance. She often turns the accusation back onto her accusers by saying, “the 
establishment reporters are my model” since they too advocate for one side, the side of 
power. By agreeing to be embedded with American and British troops in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and by not being embedded with, say, Iraqi families or antiwar protesters, mainstream 
media have traded their principals of independence and objectivity fundamental to their 
practice so that they can maintain access to sources established as legitimate when 
reporting stories. Journalists cannot be credentialed to work in Iraq without being embedded 
with troops. Independent journalists who have dared to work without being embedded have 
been explicitly warned that they will not be “protected”, and in the case of the Hotel 
Palestine, they were attacked and killed by US forces. What is more, Goodman points out, 
for all of the combat stories that these embedded journalists report, not one has depicted 
non-combatants hit by weapons (Goodman and Goodman 2004:198). For Goodman and 
other advocacy journalists, one side is advocating for power and the other side is 
advocating for “‘the rest of us’, it is only when all sides are heard that we can approach the 
truth” (Amy Goodman, Independent media in a time of war [DVD], chapter “Unheard 
Voices”).
Francesca E. explained that the fact that more listeners and viewers on the political 
Right are turning to Democracy Now! is evidence of the quality of the journalism that they 
do, that it is fair and balanced:
“Obviously we have a large following on the Left because there isn’t much 
Left media in this country and we’re kind of held up as the beacon.
Everyone kind of relies on us to hear their own perspectives reiterated but
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a growing number of people on the Right are also listening and watching.
Just yesterday for an example I was talking to one of the Minutemen, who 
are the so-called vigilantes on the border making sure that Mexicans don’t 
cross over. They’re taking the law into their own hands. So we called them 
to have them on as part of a debate, you know we aim to have debates 
whenever possible so that all of the issues can get flushed out, and all the 
myths and all the accusations on either side can get flushed out. And 
people love to hear that, you don’t hear that on CNN. Most of the time you 
don’t hear that, it’s usually a military man and another military man 
debating which plane is better to fight with, not whether the war is right or 
wrong. So we like to have debates. So he called ... and he said: ‘I watch 
you guys all the time. I think you are a great show, all the Right-wing 
programmes have been calling me non-stop but I called you back first 
because I think it is so important that you guys have debates ail the time’” 
(Francesca E. interview transcript, March 2005).
Democracy Now! journalists told me that it is by giving equal time to multiple interpretations 
on a news story, and by not restricting how stories are told by featuring one “military man 
debating another military man”, ensures that balance is maintained while reporting as well 
as introduces diverse perspectives on an issue. This is something that, Francesca says, 
rarely occurs in mainstream media. It is here too that Democracy Now! journalists can claim 
that they are both fair and balanced reporters, as well as advocates for marginalised voices. 
While they do engage in sound journalistic practices, they also provide a space for “all 
voices to be heard”. By providing that space to those voices that are rarely, if ever, heard, 
such as antiwar voices, they can also advocate for those causes simply by letting those 
positions speak in a public forum. Furthermore Francesca says that the proof that 
Democracy Now! is balanced and fair is evidenced by those voices on the Right, such as 
the Minutemen representative that she spoke about, that are given equal time within the 
Democracy Now! forum and who tell Democracy Now! journalists that the work they are 
doing is important owing to its impartiality and providing a space for debate. Simply by 
providing a space where a balanced debate can occur and inviting those guests to speak
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who are not normally asked to act as sources for mainstream media, Democracy Now! says 
that they are advocates for perspectives that are consistently marginalised.
8.3.2 The unheard are heard
Amy Goodman brings up a little known statistic consistently in her book, speeches and 
interviews. The datum comes from the media watch-dog organisation Fairness and 
Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), a frequent guest on Democracy Now!, which reviewed the 
mainstream media’s coverage of the American government’s case for invasion in the 
months leading up to the beginning of the Iraq War. In the analysis of 400 interviews 
conducted in the mainstream news coverage on the lead-up to war, only three interviewees 
were either antiwar activists or peace advocates. By pointing to this underreported 
information, Amy Goodman is able to reveal the corporate media’s own ideological bias 
towards the government’s prowar position and its blatant subjective reporting practices. But 
by doing this, she does not deny her or Democracy Nowl’s own ideological reproduction. 
The entire programme, in fact, is ideologically positioned. In the opening sequence to every 
Democracy Now! show, for example, there is a montage of newspaper headlines that read 
“The War on Terror”, “Peace”, “Protest”, and finishing the sequence by ending with another 
newspaper headline that reads “Amy Goodman” as a camera shot enters into the red doors 
of the programme’s firehouse studios. Between each story Amy Goodman reminds viewers 
of the show’s website by saying: “democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report” and the 
website’s banner is also so titled. The website and broadcast was renamed the “War and 
Peace Report” on 21 September 2001 when the US was preparing to invade Afghanistan. 
By introducing each broadcast and story in this way, even though not all of the stories it 
reports have to do with the war or the antiwar movement, is to frame the entirety of the 
programme and its stories within the political context of the Iraq War and within the broader 
American counterpublic of dissention that is rarely represented by the US mainstream 
media.
In another instance, in the DVD “Independent Media in a Time of War”43, a 
coproduction of Democracy Now! and Indymedia (Hudson-Mohawk), Amy Goodman spends 
29 minutes analysing the American mainstream media’s coverage of the Iraq War and its
43 Available for purchase from democracynow.org or for free to volunteers.
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silences on the dissenting voices against the war. In one scene she is positioned in a chair 
with two other journalists (one of them the late actor and civil rights activist Ossie Davis) on 
the edge of a crowd at the antiwar march in New York City in an ironic format that is familiar 
to anyone who has watched the televised Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade (television 
journalists seated next to the crowd of the parade). From this vantage point as well as from 
the point of view of the video journalists “embedded” in the crowd, the viewer is given the 
perspective of the march from the protesters’ points of view, from the “subjective” inside. In 
between scenes of protesters’ anger and confusion over the New York City police’s splitting 
up the crowd, quick interviews are conducted with individual protesters on why they chose 
to come to the march. In this way the documentary depicts an overwhelming dissenting 
viewpoint that at that point had been severely underreported by the mainstream media (at 
least in the United States). This protest footage closes with a news report on the same 
protest from ABC News that shows the reporter, Chris Cuomo, in front of the night time 
lights of Times Square, well after all the protesters were forced to go home. He gives his 
summary of the protesters’ viewpoints that he had interviewed earlier in the day:
“Well they have these signs that say 'no blood for oil’ but when you ask 
them what that means they seem very confused. I don't think they know 
why they're out here” (Clip 11:20-11:36, “Independent media in a time of 
war” [DVD]).
The significant difference between the two ways that the protests were reported is that by 
denying the protesters to speak for themselves and to give to the viewing public, in their 
own words, why they were protesting, the mainstream news reporter relied on his news 
organisation’s power and legitimacy with its audience, and acted as an ideological 
interpreter of the events without acknowledging his role. As their views are filtered through 
his interpretation, he speaks for the protesters and makes up his mind on their opinions— 
without allowing the audience to make up their own minds on what the protesters think 
because he never presents the protesters’ opinions for the audience to actually hear. Amy 
Goodman’s coverage, on the other hand, lays bare her ideological interpretative role by 
reporting the protests within the context of the protest itself and not as an outside
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(objective?) observer. By simply allowing the protesters to speak for themselves is to 
ideologically position herself as a journalist, she moves from merely representing their 
viewpoints to providing a forum to protesters and frames the protesters’ discourse within a 
larger antiwar discussion. As Goodman says: “That is the role of journalism in a democratic 
society: to provide a forum fo r... discourse” (2004:282).This is how Democracy Now! 
advocates for the antiwar movement by giving a forum to the protesters and by doing so, by 
allowing for unconventional sources to be heard, she makes the claim that she is fulfilling 
the “true” purpose of journalism in a “democratic society”. The irony here is that by providing 
more than one perspective for a story, in this case, it is the bigger story of the Iraq War and 
American dissention against it, Democracy Now! is closer to achieving a less biased stance 
than the mainstream media’s coverage of the war. In other words, since Democracy Now! 
represents dissenting viewpoints which they also happen to sympathise with and that are 
continually marginalised by the mainstream media, they are able to achieve more balanced 
reporting on the antiwar movement simply because no one else is covering dissenting 
viewpoints. It is in this way that Democracy Now!'s reports are more balanced than the 
mainstream media's coverage; at least as far as the antiwar movement story is concerned.
8.3.3 How things look from down here: Democracy Now!’s take on democratic journalism
“Journalism is the only profession explicitly protected by the US 
Constitution, because journalists are supposed to be the check and 
balance on government” (Amy Goodman interview in Yes! Magazine 
2005).
“I see the media as a huge kitchen table that stretches across this country, 
that we all sit around and debate and discuss the most important issues of 
the day: life and death, war and peace... Anything less than that is a 
disservice to a democratic society” (Amy Goodman in Ratner 2005:31).
When Goodman speaks about the role of journalism in a democracy, she often frames her 
opinions in broad and unfulfilled ideals: “we (journalists) are supposed to be holding those in
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power accountable”. She also sees the media as a (domestic) space for discourse: “the 
media as a huge kitchen tab le ... that we all sit around and debate and discuss the most 
important issues of the day” (my emphasis). What is interesting about this last Goodman 
quote is how it functions to situate news media as both a public and private space for 
discourse between Americans, where all of us Americans can discuss our most significant 
issues that affect us all (life and death after all!), this purposeful blurring of the private and 
the public in the construction of “a public”, the public that the American media is supposed 
to serve. One of the ways she does this is by often employing the first person, or first person 
plural to emphasise who she is speaking for (the “us” of the dissenting public or the “us” of 
professional journalists) and underlines Warner’s (2002:76-77) point that in the construction 
of counterpublics, the addressee is both personal and plural at the same time:
“Journalism was a respectable profession. Journalists are supposed to 
expand our understanding, taking risks to provide an independent view of 
the world. We trust reporters to speak truth to power, to ask uncomfortable 
questions” (Goodman and Goodman 2004:174, my emphasis).
As Warner also theorises, counterpublics are constructed through discourse: “a public is a 
space of discourse organised by nothing other than discourse itself (67). It is through 
Goodman’s own discourse about her ideals for democratic media that she constructs a 
counterpublic of dissent, especially dissent against the Iraq War, and of media and 
democratic reformation. It is within her ideology of advocacy journalism that she emphasises 
the socially transformative power of democratic media:
“Media should not be the tool only of the powerful. The media can be a 
platform for the most important debates of our day: war and peace, 
freedom and tyranny. The debate must be wide-ranging—not just a narrow 
discussion between Democrats and Republicans embedded in the 
establishment. We need to break open the box, tear down the boundaries 
that currently define acceptable discussion. We need a democratic media.
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A democratic media gives us hope. It chronicles the movements and 
organizations that are making history today. When peopie hear their 
neighbors given a voice, see their struggles in what they watch and read, 
spirits are lifted. People feel like they can make a difference. Social change 
does not spring forth from the minds o f generals or presidents—in fact, 
change is often blocked by the powerful. Change starts with ordinary 
people working in their communities. And that’s where media should start 
as well. The role of the media isn’t to agree with any person or group—or 
with the government or the powerful. But the media does have a 
responsibility to include all voices in the discourse. Then let the people 
decide. This is a new kind of power politics. Instead of backroom deals, it’s 
open-air rallies, public, transparent, and full of lively debate. That’s what 
democracy looks like” (Goodman and Goodman 2004: 310-311, my 
emphasis).
Goodman not only describes the role of journalism in a democracy but how journalists too
can advocate for a democratic media and a media of dissention:
“Our mission is to make dissent commonplace in America so you’re not 
surprised when you're at work, someone walks over to the water cooler 
and makes a comment and someone isn't shocked and says, ‘what's that 
all about?’ but that it comes out of the finest tradition that built this country.
People engaged in dissent. We have parallel worlds in this country. For 
some it's the greatest democracy on earth. There is no question about that.
But for others, immigrants now in detention facilities, they have no rights, 
not even to a lawyer. And we have to be there and we have to watch and 
we have to listen. We have to tell their stories until they can tell their own.
... Dissent is what makes this country healthy. And the media has to fight 
for that and we have to fight for an independent media” (Clip 26:29-27:58,
Amy Goodman, Independent media in a time of war [DVD], my emphasis).
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Again she emphasises two models of independent journalism, advocacy (“we have to tell 
their stories”) and grassroots (“until they can tell their own”). Goodman’s statement reveals 
perhaps more than what was intended. By emphasising that Democracy Now! must tell the 
stories for those who cannot speak, the real journalism model Democracy Now! is following 
is not a radical democratic one but rather the one James Curran (1991:29-30) defined as 
the liberal democratic model, a representative one. Media should be in the hands of “the 
people” or at the very least, represent “the people”. In this way Goodman’s ideology (and 
that of Democracy Now! since she acts as the programme’s spokeswoman) is rooted deeply 
in the American liberal tradition and less so in the parallel tradition of American radicalism. 
This is the same liberal democratic model that mainstream media are also founded on. 
Journalism’s role in a democracy is Goodman's (and our goal as radical, independent 
journalists and/or a dissenting public committed to democracy) goal: social change through 
dissent. This dissent is constructed out of the dissemination of represented “alternative” 
viewpoints and the “truth”.
8.3.4 “Speaking truth to power”
As Stuart Hall et a l (1978) have shown the media construct social realities by organising 
“what is widespread and free floating” into the “truth” (cited in Curran and Seaton 1985:
281). In Hall et a/.’s case, a generalised anxiety around a perceived increase of violent 
crime but not, in fact, an actual rise in crime rates, led the press to hone in on that anxiety 
and create a moral panic around a phenomenon they called “mugging”. Thus a social 
phenomenon, “mugging”, was created by the media which led to the implementation of 
social policy legislating against “mugging”.
What Hall’s study was able to demonstrate is that the media organise disparate 
facts to tell stories and construct a version of truth, a truth which functions to influence policy 
making, encompassing almost all forms of policy from policing certain areas (and 
communities) to military recruitment. This construction, at its core, is ideological since, 
depending on where one stands in relation to the facts, those same facts can be used to 
construct multiple and contradictory versions of the truth by different storytellers. Democracy 
Now! also claims to be able to get at the “truer truth” and in the process constructs a truth 
that is very different from mainstream media’s “truth”:
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“We’re supposed to be holding those in power accountable. We’re not 
supposed to be their megaphone. That’s what the corporate media have 
become. When those in power both Democrats and Republicans 
continually alleged that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, Democracy 
Now! was reporting on all the voices that said there were no such 
weapons. When I’ve been on shows like Hardball and Scarborough 
Country, representatives of the corporate media have said to me, ‘How 
were we supposed to know those claims were false, since the 
administration officials said they were true?’ But it’s not journalism’s role to 
pass on opinions. It’s journalism’s role to get to the truth. Those in power 
are an increasingly small elite. That elite doesn’t represent the mainstream 
view of people in this country or the world. Even if all those in power are in 
agreement, reporters should ask, is this true what they’re saying?” (Amy 
Goodman, interview in Yes! Magazine 2005).
It is through trying to represent all sides of the story (“Democracy Now! was reporting on all 
the voices that said there were no such weapons”) and by the doggedly scrutinising of facts 
presented by the power elite (“reporters should ask, ‘is this true what they are saying?”’) that 
the truth is revealed and revealing the truth is journalism’s ultimate goal. Since the 
mainstream media are a part of the power elite (“representatives of corporate media”), 
according to Goodman, it is impossible for commercial media to ever report the truth. In 
many ways, Goodman’s model for journalism is the same model developed in the beginning 
of the twentieth century by the American muckraking journalists that reported on stories to 
bring down the dominance of the powerful corporations that were determining, to 
detrimental affect, the daily miseries of a large portion of Americans (Ewen 1996).
8.3.5 The Fifth Estate: The Watchdog’s watchdog
A final role for independent journalists working in advocacy journalism, according to 
Goodman, is to advocate for a democratic media by not only holding those in government 
power accountable, but so too, by holding those in media power accountable:
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“This has to be changed, this has to be challenged. We are not the only 
ones that are using the public airwaves, they are too. And they have to 
provide the diversity of opinion that fully expresses the debate and the 
anguish and the discussions that are going on all over this country. That is 
media serving a democratic society” (Clip 26:29-27:58, Amy Goodman, 
Independent media in a time of war [DVD]).
By reclaiming the public airwaves and by making those who use those airwaves more 
accountable to “the public”, says Goodman, the original function of journalism in democracy 
can be realised. Democracy Now! does hold mainstream media accountable not only in 
Goodman’s criticism of it in her book and speeches but also by inviting representatives from 
media watchdog groups, such as FAIR, on as regular guests to discuss media issues. 
Mainstream media journalists also speak at length on Democracy Now! shows about those 
news stories that have become controversial because of how mainstream media has 
reported them.
8.4 Conclusions
I have demonstrated through an examination of Democracy Nowl’s website, Democracy 
Nowl’s production model follows closely those of other mainstream media outlets, in which 
is there is an editorial hierarchy that acts a gatekeeper that controls broadcast and online 
content. As an independent media organisation, Democracy Now! can only make the claim 
of practicing advocacy and grassroots journalism through its key alliances with more radical 
media organisations such as Indymedia and media activists who have flattened editorial 
hierarchies. Without an alternative and parallel media system, one that is equally biased 
and ideological in its practice (but is also relatively transparent about this) as mainstream 
media, any evidence of a counterpublic would not exist due to the dominance of the 
commercial media’s representational power. If all of the voices heard in mainstream media 
are those of consensus and agreement, we as a viewing and reading public would not know 
that there are dissenting voices among us was it not for alternative media. Amy Goodman
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and Democracy Now! journalists constructed this as a failure to live up to the ideals of a 
democratic media by mainstream journalism. The counterpublic that Democracy Now! is 
constructing is explicitly described in the public discourses of Amy Goodman, when she 
illustrates how a democratic journalism should be and how American mainstream media 
consistently fall short of accomplishing all of the shoulds that make media democratic. By 
doing so she also positions herself and the work of American independent media in direct 
opposition to the mainstream and to the power elite. Within her discourse, however, there is 
little or no critical engagement with independent media’s own ideological reproduction. This 
counterpublic is further strengthened and publicised by using online technologies and 
building alliances with other online media activists.
Unlike previous media reform movements of the past, the emergent online media 
activism movements have a new breadth of influence since unlike print, the size of reach 
and the ability to coordinate action is unprecedented. Combine this with the explosion of the 
blogosphere, where media criticism has been profound in its ability to act as a watchdog of 
mainstream media, there are changes that are no doubt occurring to how the mainstream 
media interact with criticism and competition from non-commercial media, but it is hard to 
see that these responses indicate deeper changes to the configurations of the American 
media landscape. As long as the powerful influences of corporate sponsorship, political 
patronage and public opinion shape mainstream media’s practice, a sea-change to the 
media environment is unlikely in the near future.
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9 Democracy’s Contested Imaginaries
“I have come to believe that genuine democracy 
cannot exist without the freedom to imagine and 
the right to use imaginative works without any 
restrictions. To have a whole life, one must 
have the possibility of publicly expressing and 
shaping private worlds, dreams, thoughts and 
desires, of constantly having access to a 
dialogue between the public and the private 
worlds.”
—Azar Nafisi, Reading Lolita in Tehran (2004: 
339)
In this final chapter I summarise the core findings that resulted from the research conducted 
for this thesis. The chapter begins with an exploration of the ways in which the discursive 
practices of the Republican Brothers and Democracy Now! journalists are connected, 
namely through the democratic imaginaries of both groups (Taylor 2004). I follow this with a 
recapitulation of the research questions and I reconnect some of the literature reviewed in 
Chapters Two, Three and Four to the two groups studied to further demonstrate some of the 
conclusions drawn out in this thesis. I then explore the implications those results may have 
for the theories of liberal and radical democracy, as well as for e-democracy.
9.1 Unrealisable Utopias
“There will always be competing interpretations of the principles of liberty 
and equality, the type of social relations where they should apply, and 
their mode of institutionalisation. This is why a common good can never 
be actualised; it must remain as a kind of vanishing point to which we
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constantly refer, but which cannot have a real existence” (Mouffe 1996: 
24).
Through the findings of this thesis I have shown how the discourses of two groups, the 
Republican Brothers and Democracy Now!, construct horizons of democratic possibilities; 
horizons that discourse drives towards but which will always remain horizons and will never 
materialise as destinations. By positioning discourse relational^ to horizons of possibilities, 
we are afforded a vision of not only what is near to us but also that which is far away, and by 
being, in relation to both, both are synthesised (Gadamer 2004:301-306). It is in this way 
that the distant vision of democracy could be considered as a piece of imaginary work, a 
dream dreamt conspiratorially by how people talk about what a democratic society could be. 
The Republicans and Democracy Now! construct their democratic horizons as well as their 
present that fails to reach those horizons through their discursive strategies, as I have 
demonstrated through Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.
At the beginning of this thesis Homi Bhabha proposed to us that: “...we have no 
choice but to place, in full view of our buildings, the vision of the Unbuilt—“the foundation of 
possible things”, other foundations, other alternative worlds. Perhaps, then, we will not 
forget to measure Progress from the ground, from other perspectives, other possible 
foundations, even when we vainly believe that we are, ourselves, standing at the top of the 
tower” (2003:34). It is somewhere between the “actually existing” democratic social 
institutions and structures, including the injustices produced by those institutions, and the 
ideals of what should be, that groups which advocate for social change, which both the 
Republican Brothers and Democracy Now! do, forge foundations for their own Unbuilt 
realities (Fraser 1992). The reality of democracy happens in the grey, shadowy spaces 
between what we imagine democracy to be and its failure to live up to those ideals. Or what 
democratic theorist Charles Taylor might call “democratic imaginaries”. In Taylor’s definition 
of “social imaginaries”, he describes the concept as the “way people imagine their social 
existence” and “incorporates a sense of normal expectations that we have of one 
another...and it is a sense of how things usually go but this is interwoven with an idea about 
how they ought to go” (Taylor 2002:106). These democratic imaginaries are expressed,
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refined and explicated through discourses that are spoken, written, printed, broadcast and 
posted online.
Through the examinations of the several forms of discourse produced by the 
Republican Brothers and Democracy Now!, I set out to demonstrate how democracy lives a 
double life as an imaginary work, an idea collectively dreamt and conspiratorially conceived 
of, and how it exists in the present as “deidealised”. For both groups, part of its double life 
lies in the hope of its revitalisation found in the promise of new communication technologies 
or in more traditional uses of journalism, and its other life is lived and imagined in the 
everyday conditions of an imperfect democratic culture. These imaginaries often construct 
oppositions to the dominant consensus on what democracy is and who should be defining it. 
This is not a nihilistic position, however, it is, as Bhabha proposes, a necessary reality to 
help us realise through a constant reiteration and comparison of how things should be and 
that helps to bring us closer to an approximation of our visions. Without our Unbuilt 
democracies overshadowing our actually existing political and social realities, we would 
never be able to achieve social change and some semblance of justice, which both groups 
continue to strive for. While their versions of democracy may remain a dream for members 
of the Republican Brotherhood or for journalists at Democracy Now!, they nevertheless 
continue to build their democratic imaginaries and by doing so construct themselves as 
counterpublics.
The project of public deliberation for the Republicans, this attempt to talk the Unbuilt 
into existence, was started by members in the streets and markets of Khartoum, and 
continues online and in exile. In the Republican Brothers example, their Unbuilt is two-fold. 
The first one is characterised by the reclamation of the democratic values that they see 
embodied in Sufism as well as contained within Sudanese society’s traditions of tolerance 
and pluralism; traditions which have been co-opted by years of totalitarianism and 
fundamentalist doctrinaire visions. The second one is exemplified by members’ attempts to 
salvage what they see as the Brotherhood’s own democratic values. Here the Internet is 
placed in a central position, where new democratic values are incubated and nurtured in the 
online engagements with a digitised Sudanese public. In both repossessions the 
Republicans envision and construct their model of democracy through a revitalisation not 
only of Islam but also of what they see as the strengths of Sudan’s progressive and tolerant
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heritage. A reinvigoration of the past through its rhetorical reclamation is achieved through 
their discursive culture spoken and textual, often online, and provides the framework for the 
Republican version of democracy. Through the process of discursive repossession, there is 
an emergence of what could be called a “Sudanese model of democracy” through online 
public deliberations, where Sudanese publics are “experimenting with democratisation”, as 
Ahmed described it in Chapter Seven. With a publicly enacted and engaged discourse, 
Republicans are building an approximation of their vision for democratic culture, online 
together with other Sudanese people.
The Republican democratic imaginary, however, has been disrupted by the 
emergent behavioural norms contained in the online “written” deliberations on their closed 
bulletin board. This disruption has produced deep anxiety and ambivalence for many 
members, and the centrality of the Internet in revitalising their discursive identity is seriously 
jeopardised. In the listserv postings and interview data analysed, Republicans said such 
things as:
“by expressing our opinions by writing [it] will help others help the others 
to read it many times and to think about it carefully, before deciding 
anything and by this way we ensure that the emotional reactions are 
eliminated or at least reduced”
7 think, as we claim Democracy and one of our definitions] that ‘It's the 
right to listen to others’, that being that, we should not deny issues raised 
for discussion here. The contributor has every right to be listened to] by 
others, and the others depending on the standards should elaborate to 
convince him with the right thing...”
“As a community we have to endure, tolerate and respect the different 
attitudes and opinions”.
In the Republican descriptions of an idealised online deliberative democracy, they reference 
their own Republican discursive identity to describe the deliberative norms that they should
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be following, such as “eliminating emotions” and “encouraging tolerance”, and when online, 
somehow, they fail to implement them. These strategies help to remind Republicans both of 
how they should be enacting Republican democracy as well as pointing to the fact that, at 
least for the present, they are failing to live up to that imaginary. Yet these emergent online 
norms also could be indicative of the counterpublic the Republicans built through their offline 
“spoken” discursive culture. Because the online “written” norms contrast so sharply with how 
Republicans perceive themselves, the split between the two seems to underline the 
distinctiveness of the discursive identity of the movement. The online written norms 
contradict and obliterate the Republican discursive identity that developed over several 
decades. It is through the current discourses about this disruption that Republicans innovate 
on their democratic horizons. The Republican Unbuilt is constructed through a discursive 
reinscription of their identity.
The examples from the discourses of Democracy Now! journalists demonstrate that 
they primarily construct their Unbuilt democratic mode! with the raw material of critique of 
the American mainstream media system. By utilising this building material, Democracy Now! 
opens a discursive space within a larger mediated enclosure that tends to be overshadowed 
by a prior framing of what the rules of discursive engagement are on several contemporary 
and highly contested issues, such as the Iraq War and dissention against it in the United 
States. Not only do the Democracy Now! journalists construct the role of journalists in 
democracies in general through their discourse, they also position themselves using their 
identities as radical journalists, in direct opposition to the existing media system. Through 
these oppositions, their own identities are reinforced since they say that it is only through 
their own journalistic practices that Democracy Now! is fulfilling those ideal roles -  “exposing 
the truth, providing a forum for all voices, supporting an independent view of the world” -  
while the mainstream media, due to their practices, are not:
“We’re supposed to be holding those in power accountable. We’re not 
supposed to be their megaphone. That’s what the corporate media have 
become. It’s not journalism’s role to pass on opinions. It’s journalism’s role 
to get to the truth”
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“And [mainstream media] have to provide the diversity of opinion that fuily 
expresses the debate and the anguish and the discussions that are going 
on all over this country. That is media serving a democratic society”
“Media should not be the tool only of the powerful. ...W e need to break 
open the box, tear down the boundaries that currently define acceptable 
discussion. We need a democratic media”
“The role of the media isn’t to agree with any person or group—or with the 
government or the powerful. But the media does have a responsibility to 
include all voices in the discourse. Then let the people decide. This is a 
new kind of power politics. Instead of backroom deals, it’s open-air rallies, 
public, transparent, and full o f lively debate. That’s what democracy looks 
like.”
“Journalists are supposed to expand our understanding, taking risks to 
provide an independent view of the world.”
For Democracy Now!, as is similar with the Republicans, the Internet and its democratic 
promise is centrally featured in their democratic imaginary. Emphasis is continually placed 
on the possibilities that Internet tools could provide for a return to “democratic media”: 
through new collaborations with other radical media groups as well as enabling distribution 
models that were not possible before the emergence of the technology. Yet rhetoric about 
radical democratic politics online is only as good as radical democratic actions online 
(Pickerill 2006:6). While Democracy Now! journalists often emphasise that the key to 
making media democratic is the empowerment of “ordinary” people to speak publicly, 
Democracy Nowl’s online practices do not quite match their discourse about the shape of 
empowered media. Without providing more ways to allow their audience to engage and to 
interact online with the programme’s day-to-day production, Democracy Now’s journalism 
remains advocacy journalism as opposed to the grassroots journalism that they claim the 
programme to be. There exists no critical awareness within their discourses on democratic
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media of how their discursively constructed roles as “radical journalists who are empowering 
others” disrupts their own democratic imaginary because the very presumption is that 
through their productive process they speak for others; it is their power to speak that they 
give to the rest of us.
Both groups are also continually disappointed by the realities in which they live, 
including the realities they themselves build, since those realities rarely live up to their 
Unbuilt visions of what their societies should be. But by enacting their ideals through 
discourse, be it through the online al-rukun reconstructed on sudaneseonline.com or 
through producing media that directly confronts mainstream American media, both groups 
endeavour to realise their unfulfilled Utopias, incompletely and iteratively. That is, it is 
through re-enacting and reinscribing the practice of their Unbuilt visions for society through 
talking about it (in digital/printed text or through speaking), they are able to clarify their 
visions and reinforce their differences in contrast to what actually exists. What is also 
demonstrated by my research is that democratic models exist in parallel publics that abut 
one another but rarely overlap. While a radical democratic culture may be enacted online, 
say, such as on the bulletin boards ofsudaneseonline.com or through the advocacy 
journalism of Democracy Now!, that democratic model does not necessarily extend to other 
publics. So if Sudanese people are engaging in democratic discourse online, it does not 
necessarily mean that a democratic culture is being extended to the institutionalised and 
sectarian politics in Sudan that are controlling the conditions of life for Sudanese people. If 
Democracy Now! is reaching more people through using new online distribution channels 
and forming online networks with other radical media, they may be in small ways reclaiming 
the discourse around democracy, but the larger American media context remains for the 
most part unchanged, especially in terms of the politics over ownership and consolidation. 
Much like how Phil described the work of Democracy Now! in Chapter Eight, in several ways 
both groups are building “parallel media (or parallel deliberative democratic) systems”.
Both groups construct their discourses through the media they produce—in how 
they frame and contextualise their arguments in print (online and on paper), in broadcast, 
and at antiwar rally speeches—I was particularly interested in how their democratic 
ideologies are constituted through digital media. They use their discourses as a foil to 
contrast their imaginaries with those who they consider to be in opposition with. A surprising
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finding shows that the Republicans in exile and online are experiencing a disruption to their 
long established discursive culture, a cherished culture that defined them as a spiritual and 
interpretative community. Concerned by this disruption online, Republicans tried to lay down 
some ground rules for argumentation that would harmonise online written discourse with 
their discursive identity but these efforts have failed. What has happened online is the 
emergence of violent text setting the tone for online discourse and a subsequent withdrawal 
from online engagement. Rather than continue to engage in this way with other 
Republicans, many members have moved to open forums such as sudaneseonline.com to 
discuss Republicanism. Due to the openness of the forum and the possibility to engage with 
people who do not agree with Republican ideology, many members have found a 
reinforcement of their discursive identity in these open forums for the reason that their 
identity tends to be in opposition to the dominant Sudanese ideologies circulating on these 
forums.
While issues of an online disrupted imaginary in regards to Democracy Now! are not 
as poignant for journalists working there, evidence of a disruption none the less exists.
Steve R., a Democracy Now! producer summed up this disruption when he noted in Chapter 
Eight that an interactive, more “grassroots” model for their online production is not 
appropriate for the overall production model of the programme.
9.2 Research questions
The aim of this thesis was to provide a critical reflection on the existing sociological 
understanding of online democracy and how the insights gained from the qualitative 
explorations on the discursive practices of the Republican Brothers and Democracy Now! 
contribute to a much more complicated and nuanced story of e-democracy than what has 
been previously told.
My investigation into how people construct meanings of democracy was made 
through an examination into how they perceive the roles played by communication 
technologies and journalism within their own interpretative communities as well as in a 
broader social context. This led me to approach notions of e-democracy through a social 
constructivist framework which helped to expand on the existing sociological discussions
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about online technologies and deliberative practices, where previous work on e-democracy 
primarily has been concerned with establishment politics, communicative interaction 
between government and citizens, or the textual remnants of online discussions to 
extrapolate meanings without considering the larger social contexts that these discussions 
exist in.
When I started this research process three years ago I wanted to understand how 
people “do” democratic culture online and I approached the field with three questions in 
mind: “Is the Internet democratic? Can a communication technology support democracy? Is 
it possible for a technology to be the “killer app” for democracy?” In the past three and a half 
decades there has been much speculation on what kind of promise new communication 
technologies, especially the Internet with its rapid diffusion in the last decade and a half, can 
hold for democracy. The prevalent, normative claim made by academics and activists alike 
is that due to some inherent quality of the technology, the Internet would finally give 
“ordinary people" a voice, that information would finally be freely (and digitally) available to 
all people, especially in an age of commodified information, to enable them to make 
informed political choices, and that this, in turn, would make politics transparent which would 
no longer alienate people from the political process. The Internet could finally fulfil the 
promise of a full participatory democracy, and by so doing people would want to participate 
in democracy. What seems to be a much more productive account of online democracy 
based on the findings of this thesis may be one that demonstrates how what Nik Brown 
(2003:17) calls “communities of promise”, or groups who engage in collectively imagining 
the past, present and future promise of a technology, synthesise expectations with what 
actually is.
While I did consider three possible models for democracy: liberal, Islamic (mainly 
confined to Republican Thought) and radical, to frame my own thinking about e-democracy, 
a reliance on radical democracy, with its insistence that meanings are contingent and the 
interpretations of truth diverse and open, seemed the best way (for now) to describe what I 
found in my research with the Republican Brothers and Democracy Now!. I chose the 
Republican Brothers and Democracy Now! as two groups that could present to us different 
perspectives on how interpretative communities reconfigure and constitute the democratic 
expectations of communication technologies. The distinctive narratives that I have
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presented in the thesis provide us with alternative readings of online political culture that are 
different to the ones found in much of the e-democracy literature.
The thesis, for instance, demonstrates that the groups in my study are not using the 
Internet in the “liberating” ways that have been expected by previous sociological thinking 
on e-democracy. This finding shows that the meaning of communication technologies in 
democracies is socially specific and constructed by the groups or individuals that employ 
them—there is no inherent quality of the technology that makes it democratic nor are its 
expectations inherent. This is not to say, however, that the technology is neutral. The 
politics of the technology are constructed by the meanings that people give it, by how they 
conceptualise it and imagine it (Taylor 2004:23).
The Republicans and Democracy Now! are not seeking a further institutionalisation 
of democratic politics through their uses of the Internet, but rather they endeavour to 
deinstitutionalise democracy, to radicalise it through the construction of a democratic 
culture based on pluralistic, discursive engagements where they seek to insert their own 
discourse. These engagements do not necessarily have consensus as a goal (as 
consensus is the goal in liberal theory), but aim to develop fresher and deeper 
understandings of contending interpretations. These interpretations are contingent and 
change: democracy is a dynamic, lived process, not a fixed system.
9.3 Implications for e-democracy: Liberal publics and radical counterpublics
In the literature reviewed in the earlier chapters of this thesis, I demonstrated how 
information technologies and democratic models, and especially the values embedded in 
liberal democracy, have been conflated and mutually assumed since the emergence of print 
and the construction of a reading public (Habermas 1989; Warner 1990). Warner notes in 
his book Letters of the Republic (1990), through his example of the emergent reading public 
in the American colonies, for instance, that the development of print was “seen as having a 
logic internal to itself, a logic which then exerts causative force in human affairs. The 
invention of printing, for example, is said to have encouraged rationalization and 
democratization” (1990:5). He makes explicit how technological determinism organises 
theories about liberal democracy and information. Warner’s example of the early American
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print industry and republicanism can be used to show how successive technological 
transformations in communications have been similarly subjected to deterministic analyses 
where virtually all communication technologies are endowed with essentialist, politically 
liberating or empowering qualities for users (Abramson, Arterton, and Orren 1988; Coleman 
1999; Dahlberg 2001b). In the review of some of the literature on deliberative democracy, I 
focused on Jurgen Habermas’s theory of the bourgeois public sphere and its critics (1989). 
Habermas proposes that it was through the utilisation of printed media, such as 
newspapers, and the construction of a reading public, which helped private citizens to be 
educated on political issues, to discuss these issues in a disinterested way and to transform 
institutionalised politics. The aspect of his theory to come under intense scrutiny and critique 
is his argument that within the bourgeois public sphere participants often bracket their own 
special interests to discuss matters “rationally” and that this shifted the control of public 
discourse from the hands of the state to a negotiated power between the state and the 
public. It was through the employment of “public reason” and discourse that the public held 
state power accountable and that this utilisation of public reason represents the pinnacle of 
deliberative democracy. The second transformation of the public sphere, according to 
Habermas, occurred in the twentieth century with the rise of mass media that replaced 
horizontal communication between citizens with vertical (and one-way) communication 
between mass media and the public (Downey and Fenton 2003:186). It is this theoretical 
framework—that a democratic public sphere engages in rational-critical discourse to reach a 
consensus—that has dominated the theories of e-democracy for the last three decades and 
which underpins a liberal democratic model of information’s role in societies. Unfortunately, 
the e-democracy literature has rarely addressed the criticisms of the Habermasian public 
sphere.
Theorists of radical democracy on the other hand, critically reconceptualise the 
public sphere, and what happens within it discursively. These theorists propose a 
radicalisation of liberal democracy through the reunification of socialism and democratic 
principals. For scholars Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau all of social life is mediated and 
constructed through discourse, “every social practice is ... articulatory”, and the public 
sphere is a space where contending discourses of pluralistic publics struggle to make their 
interests and interpretations of social justice hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985,2001:
228
113; Nash 2000:244). Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of radical democracy focussed primarily 
on the political utilisation of discourse by social groups. In other words different groups— 
neoliberals, church leaders, gay, lesbian, bi, transgender (GLBT) rights groups, feminist and 
workers groups, environmentalists, gun owners, conservatives—recognise and emphasise 
their own subject positions through discourse. With competing interpretations of what they 
think is fair and just groups struggle publicly primarily through the media, to make their ideas 
the ones that become the popular definition of what is fair and just. It is only through 
agonistic (for Mouffe [2002:9] this means the struggle between adversaries, as opposed to 
the word “antagonism”, which she conceives of as a struggle between enemies), 
contentious struggle to make one’s interpretation the hegemonic interpretation of what is 
socially just can democracy remain pluralistic, fulfil its promise of equity and inclusion, and 
not tip over into totalitarianism. “A radical pluralist approach [to democratic politics], 
informed as it is by a nonessentialist view of politics [that is that social agents—people—are 
constructed from multiple subject positions], acknowledges the impossibility of a fully 
realised democracy, and of the total elimination of antagonisms” (Mouffe 1996b: 24). As 
modernity heralded the end of absolute certainty with the rise of liberal democracies, the 
radical democratic model pushes the liberal envelope further; there exists no objective, 
absolute truth, only the diverse interpretations of multiple truths (Nash 2000:245).
What then are the radical democratic implications for publics and counterpublics? If 
the goal of discourse in a liberal democratic model is to achieve consensus and a unified 
public opinion on what is just, in the radical democratic model the discourse is the goal. In 
radical democracy discourse maintains a contingent struggle over meanings and 
interpretations, a plurality of opinion and a fractured, agonisitic public sphere. The radical 
democratic public sphere is the discursive politics of “dissensus” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 
2001; Ziarek 2001:1). As Warner theorised, counterpublics are built through discourse just 
as publics are but they are publics of dissent, of resistance to hegemony (even though they 
too are hegemonic), of counters to the mainstream (Warner 2002). It is this theory of radical 
democracy, a reconceptualisation of the public sphere as a site of dissensus and 
counterpublics constructed through discourse that I relied on as a framework to understand 
the online discursive activities of both groups under study in this thesis.
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As I showed through my examination of the e-democracy literature the liberal 
democratic model was implicitly applied to the analysis of online democracy. With the 
possible exception of Curran’s proposal to employ a radical democratic model for analysis of 
online technologies, most researchers focus on establishment politics, rational-critical 
discourses and the goal of consensus in political discourse within their analyses of online 
democratic politics. A recurrent theme in many studies is to link the deliberative, 
Habermasian public sphere with the application of new communication technologies, such 
as the Internet, to reclaim the discursive public sphere that is said to have been lost through 
the rise of mass media during the twentieth century (Albrecht 2003; Albrecht 2006; Dahlberg 
2001a; Dahlberg 2001b). In those studies the focus is on institutionalised politics (and not 
on the politics of democratic culture), where researchers look for evidence of rational-critical 
argumentational styles, citizen participation and consensus building online (Coleman 1999; 
Hale, Musso, and Weare 1999,2002; Malina 1999; Wilhelm 1999). Due to the predominant 
liberal assumptions of the studies, when online discourse did not appear to be rational or 
critical or to lead to an agreement, it was assumed to be undemocratic (Buchstein 1997; 
Dean 2003). In several previous studies, such as Kevin Hill and John Hughes’s study of 
Usenet political groups, researchers coded online text with predetermined categories, such 
as “right”, “left”, “democrat” and “republican”, to determine whether or not a text could be 
considered "democratic” or not (Hill and Hughes 1998). No consideration was made about 
what other possible meanings or categorisations the authors of those online textual 
remnants might have given the text if they actually had the chance to tell their own stories to 
researchers. Imagine the story that could be told if the authors of those analysed online 
discursive texts were asked to explain how those texts function within their own definitions 
of online democracy. The aim of this thesis then was to let some of those stories be told.
My analysis departed from most of the sociological work on e-democracy 
significantly since I did not set out to analyse whether or not a piece of online text was 
“democratic” or “rational” or “biased”. I was concerned with what the two groups in the study 
think constitute democratic discourse and what makes online deliberations democratic, and I 
underlined throughout the thesis that it is not for me to determine it for them. I wanted them 
to tell me. By approaching online democratic phenomena in this way, I aimed to present 
some alternative accounts of online political discourse and media production.
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9.3.1 Emergence of discursive norms online: When deliberations are typed
Throughout the thesis I was interested in how online democracy is perceived by the 
respondents in my study and how or whether they think they enact democratic culture 
online. As I have already stated, many respondents expressed ambivalence towards e- 
democracy. Depending on the social context of the online engagement, they believe 
democracy online is possible, however, in other contexts it is not possible for democratic 
culture to thrive. Many people in my study developed strategies to manage their 
ambivalences.
With the Republicans that I interviewed and in the analysis of their listerv postings, 
they described an emergence of discursive norms within the written forums, especially the 
emergence of what they call “violent text”. When Republicans first engaged textually with 
each other online, they approached online written deliberations with their prior and well 
established discursive identity as well as with a conception of how the act of writing 
functions with thought: that writing enables the thinker to think better; whether the thinker is 
the writer or the reader of a text. Both their discursive identity and their conceptions about 
writing has been disrupted by the emergence of online norms that directly contradict these 
notions. In online Republican forums, these norms contradict and challenge the previously 
established Republican discursive identity and their expectations for written text. The 
development of these unexpected (and in many ways for most Republicans disappointing) 
norms have been handled with several strategies that are contingent and depend on the 
social context of the different online forums that they use.
Strategies: Silences
For the Republicans a strategy of silence is one response to this emergence of discursive 
norms that contradict their established discursive identity. Different members employ the 
strategy of silence in various ways, some choose to silently observe online deliberations and 
to never post responses, others choose to speak on other online forums and to not engage 
on assaloon.org. The use of silence is significant and explicit since the message that it 
sends to those who chose to make use of violent text is that making the choice not to 
engage with violent text underlines the disapproval of online behaviour that contravenes 
established “offline” norms. Behind the strategic employment of silence, also, is the constant
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reminder of Taha’s absence through death. The negative space created by this silence 
serves to emphasise what has been lost by the movement and by individual members—the 
right and authority to speak.
The evidence of online silences is a significant finding in the research with the 
Republicans because it contrasts so sharply with the theories that frame online deliberative 
democracy and the rhetoric of advocacy journalism employed by the other group studied in 
this thesis, Democracy Now!. The Internet is not necessarily giving a “voice to the 
voiceless”, in the case of the Republicans. Many members explicitly said that they do not 
want a voice online, despite knowing that if they wanted to speak they could. It is a choice 
not to speak especially online and by doing so, it relieves them of the responsibility for 
speaking. These silences on the Internet indicate, at least in the Republicans’ case, that not 
all people buy into those liberating and empowering qualities said to make the Internet 
uniquely suited to support democracy, such as having a voice and expressing an opinion in 
public. For some online Republicans the Internet is a technology of coercion and not one of 
liberation, a technology that unduly endows speakers with an unearned and illegitimate 
authority to speak as well as giving evidence of that speech—digital text—a weightiness that 
to them is too dangerous to risk losing control over it (Sunden 2003). As Warner (1990) 
shows, the logic of print is contingent in spite of multiple attempts to configure it as a 
technology of enlightenment and rationality. So too does the Republican ambivalence 
towards online discourse underline the contingent, contextual and unstable democratic logic 
of the Internet.
Moving to other forums and contextual democracy
In the interviews with Republican members many expressed a belief that online deliberative 
democracy is socially contextual: in one context the same discourse is not considered 
democratic, in another online forum it is. They did not immediately make the ontological 
connection between the technology and an essential democratic quality, but rather many 
suggested that it is how the technology is utilised and in what social context that makes it a 
democratic medium or not. The nature of the discourse and its role in constructing an online 
democratic culture is dependent on the structural social context of the online forum. Ahmed
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F. discussed the discursive norms that developed on the closed assaloon.org forum that he 
felt were un-Republican and undemocratic:
“And I some point I thought the rhetoric in as-Saloon is the rhetoric of a cult 
rather than the rhetoric of open-minded people. I intentionally went to 
sudaneseonline. If there is any one person who wants to debate me it is 
better that they debate me where other Sudanese people can access. So 
when he says everything, he doesn’t think that he’s talking to this closed 
circle, to those who share views with you. You better expose those ideas 
with people who don’t share those views with you” (pg. 165, Chapter 
Seven).
I have already discussed the early hope many Republicans had for online technologies 
uniquely supporting and reinforcing their discursive identity they felt was under threat of 
extinction in exile as well as holding higher expectations for written opinions over spoken 
ones, which they saw online technologies especially conducive for. Their experiences with 
what they call “violent text” have belied these hopes and have produced both a perceived 
rupture to this identity through a textual self that is often dogmatic and violent, and online 
silences, and have forced many to seek more open and diverse forums to engage in political 
discussions. So by changing the social context—in this case the online forum where 
discussions are being held—Republicans were able to find and reinforce the discursive 
identity. Ironically it was not reinforced by their own social context of assaloon.org but was 
found only when they left their closed forum and went to the non-Republican social context 
ofsudaneseonline.com. In the relatively diverse and public context ofsudaneseonline.com, 
where equally violent and hostile posts also occur, Republicans re-enact their discursive 
culture of the al-rukun despite, and in many regards because of, the presence of violent text.
My findings echo Papacharissi’s that hostile online discourse cannot easily be 
written off as undemocratic (Papacharissi 2004). Robust and even violent discourse can 
function democratically, where this type of deliberation can help adversaries on an issue 
solidify their arguments and observers of a debate decide their own positions. Chantal 
Mouffe’s analysis of radical democracy further underlines my findings that for Republicans
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when “speaking” publicly online with other Sudanese, prefer a debate that is contentious 
and antagonistic, and one that is not determined only by hegemonic interpretations of 
Republican Thought (Mouffe 2002:9). The experience and thoughts of Ahmed were most 
interesting since he seemed to articulate so clearly (online) radical democracy as Mouffe 
theorises it:
“It’s a new era and this kind of freedom, maybe people might abuse 
freedom, maybe it will look very extreme. But the cure for mishandling 
freedom is more freedom, not censorship or control. ... Now on 
sudaneseonline there are very rude people, they write really irresponsible 
kind of language. There is a public opinion that is growing to [counteract] 
these. ... Let people practice and then reflect on what they say and then 
create a public opinion that rejects bad things and accepts good things"
(pg. 155 in Chapter Seven).
His perception ofsudaneseonline.com, which was also expressed in similar terms by Fatima 
H. in the same chapter, mirrors Mouffe’s theorisation of radical democracy as an “agonistic 
struggle” of interpretations contending to become hegemonic which never reaches a 
consensus (2002).
The radicalism of Republican ideology and its proposal for Islamic democracy lies in 
the contingencies of interpretations, the openness of the interpretation itself, and the 
possibility that anyone has it within herself to interpret the texts fundamental to Muslim 
thought, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Recall Ahmed F.’s description of Republican discursive 
identity:
“The essence of what Ustadh said was never [to] think that there is a final 
word on anything. Interpretation is open, you have to reinterpret your ideas 
and be vigilant. You need to observe the reality and try to always to 
understand and to develop your discourse and adapt to the new things that 
are coming” (pg. 165 in Chapter Seven).
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Laclau and Mouffe (1985,2001) propose, on the one hand, the radicalism of discursive 
strategies is in their resistance to domination and on the other, these strategies seek to 
make their own interpretations hegemonic. In a similar way the Republicans employ 
discursive strategies to resist and dominate at the same time. Both in the al-rukun and in 
online forums, Republicans seek to upturn the hegemonic power of the established 
discourses of the government and of the Muslim Brotherhood, and to convince others that 
their interpretations of Islam, the Second Message and more broadly Sudanese politics are 
the true interpretations. At the same time, Republicans also say that their interpretations 
are contingent and this contingency is reinforced only by a discourse that is publicly 
engaged. For them if discourse remains insular and closed it will calcify, become brittle, and 
be drained of its vitality.
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) also noted that all identity is relational and for Republican 
discursive identity this is demonstrated in how it is constructed through discursive 
engagements with non-Republicans. In other words their identity is construed from how their 
discursive engagements are different from non-Republican ones, as explained by Fatima H. 
in Chapter Seven when she described how Republicans maintain a non-emotional 
discursive position in the face of violent text from other Sudanese people in online forums.
At the same time my findings are also similar to other studies (Cronauer 2004) that 
show online hostility on some forums populated by people who are familiar with one another 
can have a silencing effect and can alienate participants, that the experience of online 
silence is not necessarily unique to the Republicans but nevertheless it reinforces and 
underscores for them the alienation and trauma of exile. This has been a surprise to them 
since they believed that online technologies would help them bridge the geographical 
distances between them and recreate and reinforce their sense of being a community. This 
has not necessarily been the case for many Republicans.
Strategic ambivalence
As there is no clear and definable line between the online and offline, so too there is no 
bright line separating the public and the private (Pateman 1989; Warner 2002; Woolgar 
2002). The Republicans employ a strategic ambivalence towards their own definitions as to 
what constitutes public (political) activities and which activities should remain internal
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(spiritual) and private, which blurs the distinctions often made between the public and the 
private. By being ambivalent they are able to suspend not only a final decision on political 
activity indefinitely but also they deny the Sudanese government any opportunity to 
persecute them for the political activities that they still conduct, both online and offline. This 
ambivalence complicates too the claims made so often in the sociological work on e- 
democracy that the political happens in the “public sphere”.
9.3.2 Authority to speak
In the two studies of the Republicans and of Democracy Now!, the issue of the authority to 
speak arose and is in many ways intertwined with the notion of silence. In the Republicans’ 
case, many members said that they did not have the authority to speak for the Republicans 
as a group or to speak on serious issues such as religion and Republican Thought. The 
right to speak departed with Taha’s death, and the refusal to speak serves to constantly 
underline his absence. This question of the right to speak has been compounded online and 
complicates the optimistic claim that the Internet endows a voice to the voiceless; in some 
cases people simply do not want an online voice.
At the same time that the Republicans chafe at the prospect of that authority, 
Democracy Now! assume this authority to speak for others: “we have to tell their stories until 
they can tell their own”. This presumption to speak on the behalf of others is directly related 
to the American media context where only a small elite of voices are given a forum through 
the media’s reliance on official sources from government, the military, corporations (leaders, 
rarely ever lower level workers) and academics. Democracy Now! presumes to speak for 
those whom they call the “silenced majority”—the rest of us—and while the Democracy 
Now! journalists say they provide a forum on the show to let these voices be heard, they do 
not provide a similar forum on their website. While they point to time and budget factors that 
impact on their decision not to have a bulletin board or forum on the website, it may be 
because an online forum would be disruptive to their hierarchical production model where 
Democracy Now! journalists represent these voices and speak for them rather than letting 
them speak for themselves. With Democracy Now! there appeared to be no questioning 
about who has the authority to speak; journalists do—on behalf of those who cannot, their 
audience. There seems to be no self-interrogation by producers on how journalists endow
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themselves with this authority in terms of Democracy Nowl’s production model. The 
authority was taken as an implicit given. Producers have this authority reaffirmed, however, 
in the emails, letters and phone calls that they receive from their audience members who 
thank them for the work that they do.
Similarly, I explored how information and journalism organise discourse in 
democratic societies in Chapter Three and showed that American news media are deeply 
entrenched in a liberal democratic model where it acts a fourth estate to state power, 
representing the interests of the “people” in opposition to the state, and mediating 
information between the state and the ruled. Liberal democratic journalism is practiced by 
professional journalists, in a similar way to how politics are practiced by professional 
politicians. Radical journalism, on the other hand, is not practiced by professionals. The 
tools for news production are in the hands of “ordinary” people who live and work in the 
communities on which they report. James Curran’s (1991) analysis of the fourth estate 
model for journalism exposes it as an oversimplification of how power operates in societies. 
It is not just simply a dichotomous relationship between the state and everyone else but 
rather that power is enacted through different subject positions, including those of the 
journalists themselves, and diffuse power relationships are reproduced through the media.
A visibly public engagement with Democracy Now! listeners and viewers is not 
apparent on democracynow.org, even though producers do interact with their audiences 
through email. This production model in many ways contradicts the rhetoric Democracy 
Now! employs to promote itself as the media that gives a “voice to the voiceless”. The 
programme producers and Amy Goodman assert that the purpose of its journalistic practice 
is to expose silences and give a voice to those who cannot access the megaphone of 
mainstream media through the practice of what they call grassroots or advocacy journalism. 
Yet the programme follows a traditional liberal democratic model for media production, 
editorial control remains with the producers of the programme and is not turned over to the 
community even when this is made easier with online media. Democracy Now! does not 
exploit the full interactive potential of the Internet and it configures its website as a 
broadcast medium. As a result Democracy Now! is unable to overturn the traditionally liberal 
model of democratic media, the vertical communication framework as opposed to the 
horizontal one that is said to be possible online. However, it is through the use of non-
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traditional sources for news stories and reporting on stories that commercial media are often 
late on coming to (such as the antiwar movement), that Democracy Now! radicalises its 
practice. They are able to be closer to the grassroots in their media distribution model and 
utilise Internet technologies in ways that are closer to their own idea of radical media. It is 
through building production and distribution networks with other media groups and activists, 
both online and through the airwaves, that Democracy Now! is able to radicalise its media 
production and in some ways synthesises its democratic imaginaries with its actual practice.
What the data in this thesis show and what I have already argued is that the 
democratic logic of the Internet is not inevitable. While many Republicans have an idea of 
what is supposed to happen online, their experience of actually being online contradicts this. 
Because of this split many Republicans expressed a deep sense of disappointment with the 
democratic potentials the Internet is said to have. Democracy Now! journalists point to all of 
the democratic potential of the Internet to emphasise their own hopes for a new era of 
democratic media but they chose not to integrate those elements into their online production 
model.
9.4 Imaginings and reclamations
What connects the online activities of the Republican Brothers and the online and on-air 
activities of Democracy Now!? The analysis of the data that I collected on both groups 
indicates that the strongest connection is in their mutual constructions of counterpublics 
through public discourse. The Republicans build their counterpublic in a place where a 
discursive public did not exist, and Democracy Now! reclaims a discursive public that they 
say existed once and needs to be taken back in order to build a just society in the United 
States and beyond where its policies affect other societies.
The people studied in the thesis seem to be involved in discursive reclamations, as 
demonstrated by the discourses on democracy by both groups. Democracy Now! is trying to 
take back the diverse, discursive public sphere that they say existed (even if it has only 
existed in the mythical, timelessness of American democratic ideology) and the Republican 
Brothers say they are trying to carve one out. Both groups through how they talk about 
democracy are attempting to reclaim something that never really existed in the first place;
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they are in fact reclaiming a utopian vision of democracy rather than its reality since the 
reality always falls short of the vision. Through how they talk about democracy they also 
attempt to reclaim the discourse of democracy, taking back the rhetoric that has been 
usurped by the right-wing (in the US) and by Islamic radicals (in Sudan) and reapplying it to 
what they think is its true meaning (Smith 1998:178).
So in terms of the Internet being a tool of liberation and finally fulfilling the promises 
of democracy the answer is maybe, not quite and sometimes. Part of the issue is to confront 
and disrupt the unspoken assumptions about e-democracy; that when e-democracy is 
discussed it is assumed that the “democracy” in question is a liberal model of democracy. 
Furthermore, much of the e-democracy research has been obscured by its own 
expectations of finding democratic cultures confined to the literature’s certain prescribed and 
normative theories, much as Hine (2004) found that when some social researchers went 
online they expected to find a distinct online social life. There are several competing models 
of democracy and these should also be considered when studying democracy online. What 
was suggested by one Republican may hold true not only for online Sudanese but for larger 
counterpublics, that we need to observe how people are experimenting online with 
"democracy” and wait before we draw any conclusions, since what is happening online 
could mean that a new model of democracy is emerging and previous definitions no longer 
apply.
We need to start imagining new and more complicated models. It is my hope that 
the results presented in this thesis should be considered as a small contribution to the 
bigger story of online democracy and not as a definitive statement. I hope that my research 
will encourage others who are also interested in the complexity of technological meanings 
and ambivalences as well as diversity of political cultures, to pick up on some of the 
questions raised in this thesis and continue to collect and tell alternative stories of 
democracy and the Internet.
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Appendices
A Statements of research and confidentiality, requests for 
participation
i. A research statement I gave to Republican participants, a 
different one was given to Democracy Now! (however, most of 
this was explained face to face or over the phone).
mary ebeling e-mail: m.ebeling@surrey.ac.uk
sociology telephone: 020-7687-2434
university of surrey
Research Statement
I am a PhD student in the sociology department at the University of Surrey, 
United Kingdom. My research is focused on issues of online democracy, new 
media and technologies, primarily Internet technologies such as Web sites, 
chat rooms, bulletin boards, online meeting software and e-mail, online 
journalism, Islamic democracy, Islamic modernity, and political discourse 
online.
I am especially interested in examining these issues by making a case study of 
the Republican Brothers who live in the United Kingdom and in the United 
States and who use Internet technologies to continue the dialogue on 
reforming Islam in Sudan and bigger issues about democracy in Islam started 
by Ustadh Taha with the discussion corners and the jalsas, I am interested in 
learning more about how Republicans are using online technologies to engage 
in religious and political issues within the Brotherhood and outside of it with 
other Sudanese as well as non-Sudanese people.
Therefore, I would like to learn more about your own story of being a 
Republican and how you use new computer technologies such as bulletin 
boards, online conferencing software (like Pal Talk), listservs, Web sites, and 
chat rooms to communicate with other Republicans as well as to formulate and 
explain the Republican position to non-members. I am especially interested in 
learning more about the online jalsas and the bulletin board. Of great interest 
to me would be your viewpoints on democracy, insaniyya, shura and 
Republican Thought. What kind of engagement did you have with Republican 
members in Sudan, how about now?
As part of my research I am also examining all of the Republicans' material, 
especially online media, that the group produces, observe online meetings, and 
conduct interviews with members, online newspapers from Sudan, third-party 
sources (i.e. bulletin boards such as sudaneseonline) as well as papers created 
by members in exile to learn more about current political situation in Sudan. I
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am also interested in observing and interviewing non-brotherhood members 
from Sudan (in the UK and/or US) who are also living abroad to gain 
perspective on how the brotherhood is perceived by others and how their 
message is being received.
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ii. A sample of the confidentiality statement given to all participants
mary ebeling e-mail: m.ebeling@surrey.ac.uk
sociology telephone: 011-917-733-0008 (m)
university of surrey
Statement of confidentiality
All of this research is towards the completion of my PhD only and the data will 
be used to write the PhD thesis and related articles or other publications. 
Anything you tell me will not be attributed to you directly. Rather I will use a 
pseudonym. I will also give you the opportunity to correct or clarify anything 
that I quote as well as clarify or correct anything that I have not understood, 
upon your request. I will provide you with transcripts of recordings and digital 
copies of photographs upon your request. I will NOT share any original 
documentation (i.e. notes and recordings) with anyone and all of this material 
will remain in my sole and secured possession. I am also strictly following the 
ethical guidelines for research as outlined by the Association of Internet 
Researchers (http://www.aoir.org/ethics.html) as well as the British 
Sociological Association (www.britsoc.org.uk).
Thank you very much for spending the time to talk to me.
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iii. An example of a posting on alfikra.org’s open bulletin board. A 
sim ilar post was placed on sudaneseonline.com
DPosted: Fri Jan 16, 2004 10:31 am Post quote |£ k  edi-t Ifx) 
subject: Research on online democracy and 
Republican Thought
Hello Everyone!
I recently joined this forum and would like to 
introduce myself. My name is Mary and I am a 
PhD student in the sociology departm ent at the 
University of Surrey, United Kingdom. I have a 
couple of friends who are Republicans and 
through them , have developed a strong interest in 
Republican Thought.
My research is focused the issues of online 
democracy and Internet technologies such as Web 
sites, chat rooms, bulletin boards, online meeting 
software and e-m ail. I am interested in learning 
how these technologies help people to engage in 
deliberations around key issues. Related themes 
in my research include online journalism, Islamic 
democracy, Islamic modernity, and political 
discourse online.
For my PhD thesis I am examining these issues 
by making a case study of Republican 
Brotherhood members who use Internet 
technologies to continue the dialogue on Islamic 
reform and bigger issues about Islamic democracy 
started by Ustadh Taha. I am interested in 
learning more about how Republicans are using 
online technologies to engage in religious and 
political issues within the Brotherhood and outside 
of it with other Sudanese (like on 
sudaneseonline.com) as well as with non- 
Sudanese people (like m e!).
mebeling
Joined: 
10 Nov 
2003 
Posts: 1 
Location: 
U K
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Therefore, I would like to learn more about your 
own stories of being a Republican and how you 
use new computer technologies such as this (and 
other) bulletin boards, online conferencing 
software (like Pal Talk), listservs, Web sites, and 
chat rooms to communicate with other 
Republicans as well as to formulate and explain 
the Republican position to non-members. Of great 
interest to me would be your viewpoints on 
democracy, insaniyya, shura, ijma and ijtihad and 
Republican Thought.
Also, I am just now starting to learn Arabic, and 
inshallah, will develop it further soon...but for 
now, I have to write in English!
Please contact me at my school address 
< m .ebeling@ surrey.ac.uk> or through this board.
Salaams to everyone, Mary
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iv. An example of email requests made to Democracy Now! producers
Hi xxx,
I spoke with you yesterday at Democracy Now! about interviewing you (and possibly other 
producers). As you know I am a DN! volunteer as well as a full time student (U of Surrey, 
UK) working on my PhD. I am also a journalist. I was hoping that I could speak to you (and 
others) about the work that you do at DN!, your thoughts on how the DN! website reaches 
audiences (as well as your thoughts on the new website), and how independent media like 
DN! fits into the American political culture and media landscape.
My PhD is focused on online journalism, political discourse and media opinion shaping, 
and democratic theories, there is more information on the project, my PhD supervisors as 
well as more info on me at: www.tresfort.me.uk. Your input as a journalist is really 
important to my project. I will be volunteering next week (Monday and Tuesday) if you are 
interested and have 15 minutes to talk I would greatly appreciate it.
Very kindly yours,
Mary
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B Interview questions
i. Republicans
Interview questions: Please answer as many as you can and write as 
much as you want.
Name:
Age:
Marital status:
Children:
Occupation:
Education:
City or town where you lived in Sudan:
City or town, country that you live in now:
Why did you leave Sudan?
How did you leave? (ie. Did you find a job in another country, were you forcibly 
exiled, did you voluntarily leave? Did you move to a few places before settling 
in where you live now?):
When did you become a Republican?
Why?
How did you join?
How did you participate in Sudan? How does this compare to your participation 
now?
How many Republicans do you see during a given week, month, year? How has 
this changed since moving from Sudan?
Are other family members also Republicans (ie spouse, parents, children, 
aunts, uncles?)?
What is your status in the Brotherhood (are you a member or part of the 
leadership)?
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What is the structure of the Brotherhood? How are decisions made and how are 
they implemented?
How many members are there?
What kind of digital equipment (computers, WebTV, web-enabled mobile 
phone, etc.) do you have or have access to?
Where do you use it...at home, at work, at a public facility?
How often do you use it?
What kinds of reasons do you use it for ... to send e-mails to family, friends, 
colleagues; to look at Web sites; to post messages to bulletin boards, etc.?
What kind of Republican activities do you do online, do you participate in the 
jalsas every Saturday, how often do you use the Republican's Web site?
Do you post to the public bulletin board?
Do you post to the closed bulletin board?
What prompts you to respond to certain posts ... e.g. are you more likely to 
respond to a post if you have a strong opinion about it?
How do these activities differ for you from the jalsas, discussions corners and 
developing Republican publications that you may have participated in before 
you started to participate online?
Do you post to non-Republican, Sudanese bulletin boards such as 
sudaneseonline. I f  yes, which ones?
Do you read online newspapers and magazines? Which ones, how often? Why? 
Do you read print newspapers and magazines? Which ones, how often? Why?
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Do you listen to the radio...online, broadcast? Which ones, how often? Why?
Do you watch TV? Do you have digital or satellite TV? Which stations do you 
subscribe to, watch? How often? Why?
With all of the media that you read, listen to or watch, does any of the 
information or opinions that you gather influence what you post on the bulletin 
board or discuss during the online jalsa?
Can you describe to me the online jalsa? Are decisions made during online 
jalsas?
How are they made...what is the process?
What are your viewpoints on democracy, insaniyya, shura, ijma and ijtihad and 
Republican Thought?
What are your thoughts about democracy in Sudan?
What are your thoughts on democracy in your new home country?
Do you think there are ways that democracy can exist through using the 
Internet?
Are you continuing to spread the word on Republican Thought in the US? How 
are you doing it and to whom are you talking? Who would you not talk to 
about Republican Thought?
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ii. Non-Republican questions
Name:
Age:
Marital status:
Children:
Occupation:
Education:
City or town where you lived in Sudan:
City or town that you live in now:
Why did you leave Sudan?
How did you leave? (ie. Did you find a job in another country, were you forcibly 
exiled, did you voluntarily leave? Did you move to a few places before settling 
in where you live now)?
When did you first hear or learn about the Republican Brotherhood? How?
Did you participate in discussion corners or jalsas in Sudan? How does this 
compare to your participation now?
Do you have friends or family members who are Republicans (ie spouse, 
parents, children, aunts, uncles?)?
Do you ever see these Republicans that you know "offline" or is your 
relationship online only?
What kind of digital equipment do you have or have access to?
Where do you use it...at home, at work, at a public facility?
How often do you use it?
What kinds of reasons do you use it for ... to send e-mails to family, friends, 
colleagues; to look at Web sites; to post messages to bulletin boards, etc.?
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What kind of activities do you do online and how often?
Do you post to the public bulletin board?
Do you post to the closed bulletin board?
How do these activities differ for you from the jalsas, discussions corners and 
Republican publications that you may have participated before you started to 
participate online?
Do you post to Sudanese bulletin boards such as sudaneseonline?
Do you read online newspapers and magazines? Which ones, how often? Why?
Do you read print newspapers and magazines? Which ones, how often? Why?
Do you listen to the radio...online, broadcast? Which ones, how often? Why?
Do you watch TV? Do you have digital or satellite TV? Which stations do you
subscribe to, watch? How often? Why?
With all of the media that you read, listen to or watch, does any of the 
information or opinions that you gather influence what you post on the bulletin 
board? If yes, can you describe how this works?
Do you ever use other online sources (links to news sites, etc.) to validate 
opinions or thoughts that you post to the bulletin board (i.e. do you ever paste 
links to articles from other sources in your posts)?
What do you think about the Republican ideas on Islamic democracy, insaniyya, 
shura, ijma and ijtihad?
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iii. Democracy Now! producers’ questions
Name:
Age:
Job role at Democracy Now!:
Education:
How long have you been working in journalism or media production?
What role do you think journalism plays in a democracy?
How does Democracy Nowl's role differ or is it similar?
What do you think about objectivity in reporting?
What do you think is meant by Amy Goodman's term 'trickle-up media'?
How does the Democracy Nowl's production process support democratic media 
or independent grassroots media?
How does what you do differ from American mainstream media?
How does the Democracy Now! website fit into the overall programme of the 
show?
Do you think the Internet is changing the media politics of the country? How 
about politics overall?
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